

**THE LIBERAL
ESTABLISHMENT**

WHO RUNS AMERICA...AND HOW

M. STANTON EVANS

THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT



M. Stanton Evans

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For Sue Ellen

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
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►► *Part One*

THE ESTABLISHMENT



►► 1. *Is There an Establishment?*

SINCE both its operational terms are subject to controversy, the title of this book needs explaining. "Liberal" and "establishment" are words of indefinite extension, pliable to the hands of the user. The writer who employs them should say how he wants them understood.

As to "Liberal," we may for present purposes ignore academic disputes about similarities and distinctions between present bearers of the title and their precursors in the 19th century. Our object is to know current political tendencies, not the underground circuits of philosophy. For the rough purposes of a working vocabulary, contemporary Liberalism, in its domestic modulation, may be defined as belief in increased centralization of power in the federal government, and in economic "planning" aimed at the creation of a welfare state. In foreign affairs, Liberalism holds to the idea that Cold War problems can best be settled by "reasoning" with

the agents and principals of the Communist global conspiracy, and cooperating with the "revolution of rising expectations" among less civilized countries. This definition tells us nothing about the deeper roots of Liberalism, or why it is what it is. It simply marks out the sector of political life intended when the word is used in this discussion.

Even on this restricted plane, of course, exceptions can be noted. There are areas where Liberals, reversing their normal stance, declare themselves against the authority of the federal government and assume the role of libertarian advocacy—principally in matters of internal security; this exception, one of the most curious features of Liberal thought, will be examined at the proper place in our text. Still another species of exception concerns those individuals—like Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut—who are Liberal in domestic matters but do not share the prevailing Liberal view on questions of foreign policy. This particular class of exceptions cannot, however, concern us in this volume, since our subject is domestic rather than foreign affairs. Suffice it to say that, when a political figure professes both points mentioned above, he is by our definition a Liberal.

One philosophical aspect of Liberalism should be briefly noted, because we will have occasion to observe its impact on political matters. This is the moral relativism which characterizes much if not most Liberal thought, even, on certain occasions, when the Liberal in question formally pays allegiance to a non-relativist creed. The highest virtue of Liberal orthodoxy is "tolerance"—tolerance of anything and everything. This universal elasticity springs from the belief that there are no fixed standards of right and wrong, that we cannot hold people or nations morally accountable for their acts, that, in fact, the idea of "moral accountability" is without content. This aspect of Liberal thought can be traced in everything from raising children (or preventing them) to punishing criminals to dealing with the Soviet Union.

When the word "Liberal" is used in this essay, then, it refers in the first instance to people who believe in centralized power at home, complaisance and conciliation toward the Communist enemy abroad, and the notion that, in the working ethics of the world, everything is relative. To give greater substance to that conception is the purpose of this book; but these bare bones of meaning will tell the reader what is here intended by the word until our story can spell out its own fuller definition.

If the word "Liberal" is in some respects troublesome, "establishment" is no less so. Originally, the word referred to the official status of Anglicanism in Great Britain as the "established" church—the communion recognized and supported by government; from that meaning, "establishment" has been broadened to include the entire machinery of British religious, civil, and cultural authority, revolving about the nobility, the public school system, the great universities—to include, that is, the effective governing class of England.

An establishment is, then, a kind of informal junta by which a community is guided in all those things which matter. It is defined by large areas of agreement among its members on key social and political questions, and the remarkable adhesion they display in action when their views are tested by political resistance or the friction of ideas. Whether the United States has an establishment of this kind, comparable to the English original, is a minor controversy of sorts, the subject of raillery between such literary antagonists as Richard H. Rovere and William F. Buckley, Jr. This book holds that such an establishment does exist in America, that it labors to make the ideas of Liberalism supreme in our politics, and that its members do work in concert although not necessarily by pre-arrangement.

The "establishment" concept is sometimes thought to imply coordination and common planning, and while there is little doubt that some of this is going on, to suppose it an

essential feature of Establishment rule is to miss the point. The American Establishment is not the result of a deep-dyed plot, although one of its most grievous failings has been its negligence in dealing with those who *are* engaged in plots; it is the result instead of a cultural condition, of the fact that American thought in all its departments has been shot through with the presuppositions of Liberalism and has come to accept its indicated political conclusions and habits of mind. Establishment members are for the most part products of a Liberal education in the American academy, where they have been taught as right and natural the characteristic Liberal ideas of centralized power, "accommodation" of our foreign adversaries (when they are of the left), the absence of fixed standards of judgment, and the conviction that anyone who does not profess these ideas is an ignoramus.

Sharing such views, it is not necessary for various components of the Establishment to check signals before every major encounter—just as it would not be necessary for the opponents of Liberalism, were they in the same comfortable position, to consult minutely on every question in order to present a common front concerning it. Members of the Establishment know where they stand on major issues before the issues come up, because the Liberal ideology supplies them with a whole agenda of set answers to political problems. Moreover, since they are constantly engaged in the normal communication required to administer the affairs of a vast society—through government, civic institutions, academic duties, foundation work, the public media—they readily develop a common idiom and portfolio of tactics.

That there is an empirical thing out there which is Liberal, and which acts concertedly to achieve common ends in political life, is a fact which yields itself to the most cursory inspection. The reader who doubts as much can settle the matter for himself by comparing one week's utterances in *The New York Times*, *Newsweek* magazine, and the CBS

television network—to pick some random but obvious examples. If he does so, he will find people widely separated by geography, corporate employment, education, and economic interest—in fact, people nominally in fierce competition with each other—saying very much the same things, nudging the mind of the nation down the same road toward the same objectives. The objectives are, with exceptions so rare as to be negligible, Liberal—support for the United Nations, negotiations with the Soviet Union, a welfare proposal before Congress. Add to these examples a dozen other powerful newspapers, most of the slick magazines, both remaining TV networks, a heavy majority of the nation's academic community, almost all vocal labor leaders, many clergymen, and most high government officials. The outline of something in which a cluster of influential people are working in the same direction becomes easily discernible. That something, whatever its own members want to call it, is herein described as the “Establishment.”

Liberals are not, to be sure, the only influential people around. There is in a sense a “conservative” establishment as well. Such organizations as the Farm Bureau, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of Commerce and the American Legion represent interest and power groupings which frequently take up the cudgels to oppose the Liberal view of things. These organizations, however, are not as comprehensive in their ideological concern as are Liberal spokesmen; faithful to the interests of their members, they tend to restrict themselves to issues within their own particular fields of competence. They do not, generally, display the concertedness of action which is so familiar an aspect of Liberal performance. Even more to the point, perhaps, they are transparently *not* in control of things where control matters most. In the opinion-moulding industries, in the academy, and in the halls of Congress, their influence is small and of late diminishing.

The chief point about the Liberal Establishment is that it *is* in control. It is guiding the lives and destinies of the American people. It wields enormous, immeasurable power. In common prudence, it should, therefore, be subject to careful and continuing public scrutiny. But it is characteristic of the Establishment that its control embraces the *instruments* of public scrutiny. It directs and instructs popular opinion. It decides what subjects shall be submitted to the x-ray of media examination, and what groups shall run the gauntlet of public challenge to their probity. Obviously, the Establishment is not eager to turn that kind of attention upon its own members. Public opinion, therefore, can but rarely hold the Establishment in check. More usually, its corrective potencies are directed against people and ideas which *threaten* the Establishment. This characteristic of the Establishment, essential to its strength, creates a deficiency in public discourse. It pushes thought exclusively in the direction desired by Liberalism, a situation in which thought and liberty alike tend to become impoverished.

While the existence of a Liberal community acting on common principles and generally in charge of things is not hard to discover, the notion of concerted action will undoubtedly stir protests from those designated as members of it. And, barring access to memoirs, correspondence, and psychiatrists' notebooks, there is really no way of knowing *why* Liberals in private walks of life behave so much alike and so often say the same things in very much the same way. For the most part, however, the present volume seeks to avoid this difficulty by focusing on a department where there can be no doubt as to the concertedness of the performance—to wit, the federal government. While government authorities make up only a part of any Establishment worthy of the name, it is government policy which forms the cutting-edge of Establishment enterprise, and it is the ranking personnel of government, particularly those of the executive branch, who most

clearly act together in terms of an identifiable ideology. For both reasons, government becomes the zone of Establishment activity chiefly relevant to our inquiry.

"The Liberal Establishment" thus somewhat overstates the case, since we are in fact concerned primarily with the sector of the Establishment which, in the most literal sense, is running the government. It also tends to understate matters. The reader will find people and policies discussed herein meriting a description less complimentary than "Liberal." It would be unfair to real Liberals, too kind to the more-than-Liberal specimens, to suggest a single label can describe them all. In bringing up such people our purpose should be fairly clear: To demonstrate the receptiveness of the Establishment to them and their ideas. The same Liberal community which cannot abide the presence of Michel Struelens or Otto Otepka is all too ready to forgive the exotic behavior of Owen Lattimore or Robert Oppenheimer; it will not allow Gen. Curtis LeMay to criticize Communism, but will repatriate Lee Oswald. An orthodoxy is defined by its enthusiasms and its aversions, by what it rejects and what it allows. And the more-than-Liberal subjects of this book are relevant precisely because the Establishment has nourished and advanced them and protected them when they got in trouble.

A further complication must be recorded before we begin our narrative. This is the fact that, being human, Liberals do not always agree among themselves, and are not consistent, even in their inconsistencies. While there is, generally, a "Liberal line" on most major issues, not all Liberals adhere to it at any given time, nor can the same Liberals be counted on in every case to take the orthodox position. The *Times*, CBS, Hubert Humphrey, and J. William Fulbright are all Liberal. In almost all instances, these authorities will tend to see great issues in the same way. But not all. In matters of racial integration, for example, Sen. Fulbright departs from the Liberal orthodoxy; in matters of internal security, Sen.

Humphrey departed from it in 1954 when he sponsored the Communist Control Bill; the *Times* will occasionally depart from it in some editorial commentary or another. Yet where one advocate will drop out, the Establishment generally is capable of picking up another, perhaps someone who had himself defected on a previous occasion. Thus it is misleading to expect all Liberals at all times to be agreed on everything. The Establishment functions by the law of large numbers; it is not always possible to predict, to a nicety, every individual who will partake of the Liberal consensus; but it is possible, in the overview, to predict that the consensus will be there and to suggest its general dimensions.

These pages, finally, should be read with the understanding that the full implications of the Kennedy-Johnson years are not yet apparent. The whole of the performance is not entered in the ledger, and will be seen in its entirety only in the perspective of time. Increments of data are created every week. Each day's news dispatches bring forth information affecting all the subjects discussed here, and often imply new issues or new dimensions of old ones.

This essay does not, therefore, pretend to be exhaustive. It does not tell all about everything which has been going on in Washington for the past four years. It is, by its nature, a museum of curiosities. Its purpose is not to suggest that every official in the present administration holds to all the peculiar theories spelled out herein—although it would be safe to guess there are more men of influence who agree with them than otherwise. Every political regime is mixed, but every regime also has a dominant tone and mood, a particular ideological angle that sets it off and makes it distinctive. The men and ideas discussed here set the tone for the present administration; the thrust of their doctrine is occasionally blunted, the nature of the resulting actions sometimes contradictory, but there is no one among them who publicly and

effectively engages in counter-advocacy, and few actions if any which tend in the opposite direction. The reader of these passages will, I believe, have a true idea of the direction in which our present rulers are taking the once-free society of the United States.

►► 2. *Moment of Truth*

FOR DECADES Liberalism has ruled the government and opinions of the United States with little or no effective challenge to its pretensions. Only in the last ten years or so has there been a sustained intellectual and political effort to upset Liberal dominance. And only in the last half of that span has the resistance movement achieved proportions sizable enough to make the Establishment look to its defenses.

While some degree of opposition to Liberal notions on domestic and foreign policy is a constant factor in our politics, Liberalism's own shaping influence in the world of ideas has contained and limited realization of this fact. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the existence of a substantial body of dissenters, particularly dissenters with something responsible to say, was heroically ignored in Establishment literature. It was simply assumed, contrary to fact, that everybody with any sense *was* a Liberal, and there was an end to it. This

attitude, though not particularly creditable, should occasion no surprise. It was a natural and inevitable outgrowth of Liberal rule, an essential feature of Establishment prosperity.

An orthodoxy thrives, in the last analysis, through its ability to command the imagination and passive allegiance of the people, a politic requirement even for a monarchy and a pressing necessity under our own popular form of rule. Establishment influence in America rests on the fact that Liberalism has for so long monopolized the icons and portents which bring a favorable response from the electorate; it has managed to make its own assumptions and pet phrases part of the conditioned thought processes of the country at large. To keep things this way, it is understandably concerned to prevent competitive ideas and symbols from entering the marketplace.

In the early phase of the resistance movement, "conservative" ideas, as we have come generally to call them, were not much referred to in intellectual circles or in the communications media. It was assumed that Liberal ideas were the *only* ideas, and that suggestions to the contrary were beneath the trouble of refutation, were even, in some versions of the Liberal argument, a form of avarice or dementia. This approach was used for a number of reasons. First, because many Liberals, accustomed only to the Liberal way of viewing things and particularly to the Liberal technique of attributing political interests to economic motives, simply believed it to be accurate. Second, because many of these same Liberals, having had neither inclination nor opportunity to examine conservatism, had no idea of what the resistance movement was about, and were easily convinced of a theory which supported their own opinions. And third, because it would have been a grievous tactical mistake to give a minority view the publicity necessarily resulting from wide-open argument in the media.

A duke, after all, does not write the London *Times* answer-

ing the chance remarks of a match-girl; a president of the United States does not employ the immense resources of his office to answer and publicize the effusions of some hole-in-corner pamphleteer. Far better to ignore the existence of such people altogether, thereby insuring that most of the citizenry never learn of their existence. Thus it is not uncommon to find accepted books on political life in America—books, for example, regularly used in our colleges and universities—based on the assumption that Liberalism is the only respectable form of opinion, and that conservative dissent, being the product of unbalanced or underprivileged minds, is not worth serious examination.

Despite this wall of silence, the resistance movement has grown. By 1960 it had assumed such proportions that it could not be disposed of by the policy of the averted gaze. Notwithstanding the granitic hostility of the Establishment, conservatism was beginning to develop its own literature, intellectual spokesmen, and action programs. It was even beginning to achieve some political results—chiefly in the election of young congressmen educated in conservative principles.

With this turn of events, Establishment policy necessarily changed. A president does not answer a pamphleteer—unless the pamphleteer is getting results. From ignoring conservatism, the Liberal community switched over to the *exposé*. The resistance movement could no longer be shriveled by silence; it would therefore have to be annihilated with sound. In consequence, the past few years have seen a veritable flood of books, magazine and newspaper articles, speeches and public statements, radio and TV programs, denouncing what are variously described as “ultra-conservatives,” “extremists,” or “the radical right.”

This attack has borrowed heavily from the old subdominant conservatives-are-crazy theme rearranged to suit the needs of a more immediate and less academic problem. Its principal feature is the charge that American liberties are

threatened by extremists of the right whose scarlet sins include seeing Communists under the bed, despising people who are in want, harassing fellow citizens who disagree with them, and wanting to get the United States into a war with the Soviet Union. The sheer volume of the attack has been amazing, demonstrating the immense power the Establishment can throw into the breach when the need arises.

While there is not space here to review the vast ocean of newsprint and magazine space devoted in the past few years to the crusade against the right, a brief rundown of certain books on the subject will suggest the scope of the enterprise. These include *Men of the Far Right* by Richard Dudman, *The New Conservatism—What Went Wrong?* by Peter Viereck, *The Far Right* by Roger Burlingame, *The Radical Right*, Daniel Bell, ed., *Inside the John Birch Society* by Gene Grove, *The Extremists* by Mark Sherwin, *The Strange Tactics of Extremism* by Harry and Bonaro Overstreet, *Danger on the Right* by Arnold Forster and Benjamin Epstein, *They'd Rather be Right* by Edward Cain, *Barry Goldwater, Extremist of the Right*, by Fred J. Cook; etc.

Each of these books seeks to alert the nation to the menace of a resurgent conservatism. None of them suggests there is any such thing as a problem on the left side of the political picture; nor during the corresponding period have there been any comparable books from the Establishment devoted to the possibility of "danger on the left." The problem, the American people have been told, is exclusively a problem involving conservatives. Considering the fact that this argument, together with immense collateral pressure of the daily press, the mass magazines, and the TV networks, is directed at an audience which has for 30 years been subjected almost exclusively to Establishment opinion, it is astounding the conservative movement should have survived at all. The nation, often uninformed about the misdoings of the people running the country, has been minutely and unceasingly

filled in on every failing, real or imagined, of the minority which seeks to challenge Liberal power. Public opinion has been turned, not on the people who need restraining, but on the forces which try, however well or ineptly, to restrain them. The Establishment, in short, has been demonstrating that it is an Establishment.

The central features of most of these books—and of the corresponding articles and TV programs—are the related assumptions, (a) that there is nothing very much amiss with the way Liberalism approaches things, (b) that the problems we do have are the result of external forces beyond our control or else of the fact that we don't have *enough* Liberalism, and (c) that people who say otherwise are either primitives or charlatans. To support this thesis, the Establishment has resorted to the time-dishonored technique of the "amalgam," searching out the most bizarre and misguided examples of anti-Liberal dissent—of the sort never wanting on any side of a political question—and parading these endlessly before the public as examples of what "conservatism" is all about. With only perfunctory effort being made to distinguish between one heretic and the next, all opponents of the Liberal orthodoxy are dumped into the pot and stirred to a boil.

Through it all, no effort is made to grapple with the central problems which have troubled serious conservative spokesmen and evoked their separate responses. These problems are, first, that the Liberal orthodoxy is fashioning a compulsory state which can jeopardize our liberties and has in fact already done so; second, that Liberal foreign policy has led America into an easily provable series of calamities which have aided the Communist global enterprise in absorbing half the world; and third, that Liberal orthodoxy has in several instances been negligent in dealing with the initiatives of the Soviet enemy in our midst, in the corporate person of the Communist Party and its underground cadres.

To extensively documented charges that these things have

happened and are continuing to happen, the Establishment, with a few honorable exceptions, makes no answer. It resolutely ignores the question of what kind of society we will have when it has finished constructing its vast network of controls. It offers no suggestion as to what ultimately will happen to America and the free world if we continue to yield to the demands of the Communist empire. It dismisses as irrelevant all demonstrations that the Communist *apparatus* inside the United States continues to function and to achieve measurable results favorable to the ambitions of our enemy. To all such arguments—again noting the exceptions—Liberalism's characteristic answer is to attack its critics as extremists who must be silenced. There *are* no real problems, the Establishment appears to be saying, in its own performance, or even in the performance of the Communists. All problems which are not mandated by the nature of things are created by "extremists of the right."

On this point various Liberal spokesmen have become so aroused as to demand action above and beyond the continuing potencies of the eternal public denunciation; they want the government to take steps, within its own ranks and toward the citizenry at large, to silence conservatives—a kind of action which, interestingly enough, they usually do not want to see taken toward Communists. The discrepancy is easily explained, however, since the Establishment has apparently convinced itself that conservatives are *more* dangerous than Communists—a species of madness which has led to the most disastrous consequences imaginable.

In 1961, labor leaders Walter and Victor Reuther approached the Kennedy administration with a full-scale program, replete with suggestions for Federal compulsion, to crack down on conservatives. The reasons behind these demands are most revealing. "The radical right," said Victor Reuther in a memorandum to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, "poses a far greater danger to the success of this

country in its battle against international Communism than does the domestic Communist movement . . . which has no capacity today to endanger our national security or defeat our national policies.”¹

A similar warning had issued, not long before this, from the pen of Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “Fundamentally,” said Fulbright in his own famous memorandum, “it is believed that the American people have little, if any, need to be alerted to the menace of the Cold War. Indeed, in the long run, it is quite possible that the principal problem of leadership will be, if it is not already, to restrain the desire of the people to hit the Communists with everything we’ve got, particularly if there are any more Cubas and Laos [*sic*].”²

These exhortations had the desired effect. From 1961 forward, the speeches of governmental functionaries, the airwaves of radio and TV, and the headlines of the daily press were crammed with warnings about “the radical right”—set against a soothing counterpoint of assurances about the essential tameness of domestic Bolshevism.

Given this view of things, it was understandable that, when John Kennedy set out on a political tour in November 1963, infinite precautions were taken to protect him from the overtures of “the radical right,” but not “the radical left.” In Dallas, Texas, federal agencies took careful measures to ascertain the whereabouts of right-wing agitators to forestall the possibility of violence. The Warren Commission report tells us potential trouble-makers were looked for among right-wingers who had demonstrated in Dallas a month earlier against Adlai Stevenson, and that federal agents armed themselves with photographs of these people.³ They did *not* take similar steps regarding left-wing agitators, because there transparently could be no danger where, in the classic formula, there could be no enemies. Thus no hand extended to disturb the brooding figure who waited among the shadows

on the sixth floor of the Texas Schoolbook Depository athwart the President's parade route.

At 12:30 P.M., November 22, 1963, an assassin's bullet cut through the smiling ambience of a Dallas motorcade and struck John Kennedy dead. The world paused in horrified disbelief. Inside of two hours, police had arrested the man they believed to be the murderer—a balding, defiant ex-Marine and sometime drifter named Lee Harvey Oswald. And although many commentators rushed to impute the crime either directly or indirectly to “the radical right”—that endlessly certified source of all distress—it somehow developed Oswald was not of the right at all. He was of the left. More. He was himself a *critic* of the right, one of those who had declaimed about “hate,”⁴ in chorus with the massed voices which said there could be no such as Lee Harvey Oswald and that if only we laid our whips to Robert Welch and Billy James Hargis the world would be an agreeable place.

Memory does not recall an episode of equal scope in which men whose task it was to discern the shape of things had been so stunningly wrong. The moralizers of government, press and pulpit had exorcised a spirit of little substance and ignored the demon familiar at their elbow. They had fixed the nation's gaze upon an illusory danger on its right, and ignored an all too corporeal danger on its left. The Oswalds of the world, they had said, were *not* menacing, but those who criticized the Oswalds *were* menacing. They had supported everything which made Oswald possible, and attacked everything which would have made him impossible. Now they stood bankrupt among their prophecies, every assurance they had uttered wrong, every warning a miracle of irrelevance.

“The Commission has found no evidence that the extreme views expressed toward President Kennedy by some right-wing groups centered in Dallas or any other general atmosphere of hate or rightwing extremism which may have ex-

isted in the city of Dallas had any connection with Oswald's actions on November 22, 1963."⁵ Thus reads the report of the Warren Commission on the Kennedy murder. The report also tells us that among the factors which contributed to Oswald's act were: "His avowed commitment to Marxism and Communism, as he understood the terms and developed his own interpretation of them; this was expressed by his antagonism toward the United States, by his defection to the Soviet Union, by his failure to be reconciled with life in the United States even after his disenchantment with the Soviet Union, and by his efforts, though frustrated, to go to Cuba."⁶

It would seem likely, of course, that such conclusions would have occurred even to the most pedestrian intelligence once it was ascertained that Oswald, a Marxist, a defector to Moscow, and a devotee of Fidel Castro, was in fact the culprit. Yet here was the incredible thing: In the long weeks and months following the assassination, no such conclusion emerged from public discourse on the subject. On the contrary, previous fantasies about "the danger on the right" were elaborated with even greater plangency and more fanatic thoroughness than before. In the very teeth of the evidence that the crime had been committed by one of their own, the forces of the left unleashed a vengeful attack in which guilt for the tragedy was to be pinned upon conservatives. In what appeared to be a siege of mass delusion, politicians, journalists, and even clergymen set about to sell the nation the propositions:

1. That Liberals who said Communism is not dangerous but simply an exercise in "dissent," who failed to alert the nation to the nature of the group of which the assassin was a member, whose theories of "tolerance" led to the assassin's repatriation, who applauded the Supreme Court when it negated anti-Communist statutes passed by Congress, and who said those who talk about domestic Communism are hysterical—those who took this course were *nat*, in any way,

shape or form, responsible for the actions of a Marxist defector to Russia and member of a pro-Communist group who murders the President of the United States.

2. That conservatives who said Communism is dangerous, who attempted to alert the nation to the nature of the group in which the assassin was a member, who object to free and easy treatment of defectors to Communism, who opposed the Supreme Court's attack on anti-Communist statutes, and who said the baleful energies of domestic Communism cannot be written off—those who took this course *were* responsible for the actions of a Marxist defector to Russia and member of a pro-Communist group who murders the President of the United States.*

Small errors are not difficult to own. Enormous ones, particularly for men caught in the imprisoning grip of ideology, sometimes cannot be acknowledged at all. The preceptors of the nation had been caught dead to rights in the most immense and tragic blunder of our era. They paused, baffled,

* One Liberal spokesman did dissent from the bizarre syllogism. Dwight MacDonald, a free-wheeling leftist who abhors all orthodoxies including those of the left, took exception to a variation on the Establishment version of the tragedy appearing in the *New Republic*. A columnist identified as "T.R.B." (Richard L. Strout of the *Christian Science Monitor*) had written in that journal that conservative radio and TV shows were "the kind of programs . . . that the brooding Oswalds of the left or right wing listen to and sometimes act on." This attempt to flush Oswald's specifically left-wing and anti-right wing allegiances down the memory hole was too much for MacDonald. "The awkward thing for Liberals about Oswald," he wrote, "was that he was a crackpot leftist—it now appears that he did take an unsuccessful shot at General Walker . . .

"There may be 'brooding Oswalds' on the right, but so far they have not taken action, which, as an old-fashioned believer in the Bill of Rights, I think is the important thing. The only Oswald we have had was on the left, and I think there's enough to criticize in the broadcasting activities of Messrs. Hunt, Hargis, *et al.*, without smearing them with the Dallas horror. That's what we Trotskyists in the Thirties used to call 'an amalgam,' and a dirty word it was. I agree it was a great pity the assassin turned out to be not a lunatic Birchite, as we all assumed in that first hour of shock, but a lunatic 'Marxist.' But such was the fact. Oswald is our baby, not theirs."

Needless to say, MacDonald's witness to the elementary facts of the case was a lonely one. The rest of the Establishment pushed forward with the satisfying work of pinning the assassination on "the radical right."

faintly sensible that something was amiss; and then the night closed over them once more as they fled onward. There was, given their mental state, no alternative. To acknowledge the implications of Oswald would have meant recanting, not a single and therefore retrievable mistake but an entire mind-set and vocabulary and store of passion; unraveling, not a single error, but every strand of ideology which supported and sustained them in their address to the happenings and the portents of their time. There was nothing for it but to press forward. Thus it was that the shock and anguish of John Kennedy's death became something, if that were possible, still worse; not merely something stark and tragic, but something obscene and formless and chilling to the touch.

It was, in a way, the Establishment's greatest victory. Numbed respect is due those who, in a moment of supreme crisis when their world is tumbling about them, can set to work with such zeal to snatch reality inside-out. The mind capable of blaming Oswald on "the radical right" could have with equal facility indicted Laocoon for the fall of Troy, Cicero for the treason of Catiline, or Churchill for the disaster of Munich. The nation capable of believing that mind is doomed.

Never before had America been called upon so blatantly to translate grief at a President's death into partisan energy; but, then, never had tastelessness and cormorant zeal been so perfectly mated in the citadels of orthodoxy. Liberalism had been called upon to review its preconceptions by the rude light of fact, to unite the wounded nation in its hour of pain. It was no contest. Prejudice triumphed over proof; the nation was dismissed in the rush for advantage; the heart yielded not compassion but a nameless horror.

►► 3. *Operation Goldwater*

WHILE governmental performance will concern us most in the succeeding chapters, the power of the communications media—their ability to give the proper “cues” and to achieve a unified presentation for the Liberal program—can hardly be ignored. Liberals in government and in the media work closely together, and it would be difficult to say which of the two is more important. While we can give only passing attention to this fact throughout the bulk of our narrative, it would be misleading if we did not in some measure show how crucial the communications media are to the success of the Establishment.

That the media are by and large Liberal is readily demonstrated. Each of the three television networks is heavily staffed with Liberals. CBS, during the 1964 campaign year, offered the nation such commentators as Eric Sevareid, who

writes for the *Liberal Reporter*, Martin Agronsky (an ADAer), Theodore White (former magnifier of the Chinese Communists), and other easily identifiable Liberals. NBC supplied Chet Huntley and Sander Vanocur, neither of whom bothers very much about concealing his Liberal inclinations. ABC provided such luminaries as Edward P. Morgan, paid broadcaster of the AFL-CIO, and Howard K. Smith, whose idea of journalistic enterprise is to interview Alger Hiss on the failings of Richard Nixon. In addition, the networks frequently call on such Establishment favorites as Louis Harris, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Liberal Republican Meade Alcorn for "expert" commentary on political matters.

In the mass magazine field, two publications are generally considered "conservative"—the *Reader's Digest* and *U.S. News and World Report*. Both, however, feature heavy factual and/or non-political content, so that their conservatism usually consists in giving both sides a fairly even break. Other mass magazines for general readership tend toward Liberalism. Two of the most aggressively Liberal are *Newsweek* and the *Saturday Evening Post*. *Look* magazine is consciously and unremittingly Liberal. The Luce publications, *Time* and *Life*, sometimes depart from Establishment doctrine but can be usually counted on when the chips are down.

Among daily newspapers of national repute, two—the *Chicago Tribune* and *The Wall Street Journal*—are conservative. Almost every other paper mentioned in the usual lists of "good" papers is Liberal: *The New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Baltimore Sun*, *San Francisco Chronicle*, *Atlanta Constitution*, *Louisville Courier-Journal*, *Milwaukee Journal*. There are papers influential in their own circulation areas which feature conservative editorial pages, and so offer a counter-vailing local influence against the Establishment. Almost all, however, are dependent for national news coverage on the

wire services, which try hard to be fair, but are often influenced toward the Establishment line.

Liberal dominance in the daily and weekly media is pronounced. But even this is not the entire story. Backing up these front-line forces in the battle for public opinion are still other channels of Establishment influence: **1320348**

First, the academy, whence most of the opinion-moulders have sprung. By every assessment, college faculties are overwhelmingly Liberal, and are not reluctant to get behind Liberal causes in the political arena.

Second, the upper-brow magazines, principally *Harper's*, *The Atlantic*, *The Saturday Review*, and *The New Yorker*—ultra-Liberal all.

Third, the book publishing industry, which readily makes the products of Liberal thought available to the nation, but is sometimes bashful about bringing forth the meditations of conservatives.

Fourth, a sizable segment of the clergy, as represented in the National Council of the Churches of Christ in America, who have taken to unabashed politicking in many instances and who work a powerful influence in behalf of Liberalism even when they are not explicitly political.

And fifth, the motion-picture industry and some television "drama," which, through sympathetic treatment of Liberal themes, can sell the Liberal point of view while entertaining. *On the Beach*, *Seven Days in May*, *Fail-Safe*, and *Dr. Strangelove* have, for example, probably done more to disseminate nuclear pacifism and fear of our own military—two principal themes of the Establishment—than have all the speeches and pamphlets of the Sane Nuclear Policy Committee put together. TV shows like "The Defenders," "East Side-West Side," discussion programs and the showcasing of such people as Gore Vidal, James Baldwin, John Henry Faulk, David Susskind, Steve Allen, etc., also do their bit.

With this kind of field position in the opinion-moulding

sectors of our society, Liberalism is able to exert constant and ubiquitous pressure on the public to accept its version of events. This has happened repeatedly in matters of foreign policy. In China, Cuba, Laos, the Congo, and Viet Nam, the Liberal media sold the American people a false bill of goods concerning the "agrarian reformer" goals of such as Mao Tse-tung and Castro, and the alleged evils of Chiang Kai-shek, Prince Boun Oum, President Diem, and Premier Tshombe. These are matters, however, outside our present subject. Let us, therefore, select a domestic example, a category in which we could hardly do better than the 1964 presidential campaign between Barry Goldwater and Lyndon Johnson.

The attack against Goldwater was two-fold. In its affirmative phase, it consisted of building up his most likely opposition. In its negative phase, it consisted of relentless hammering at Goldwater's vulnerabilities. In both categories the Establishment effort was formidable, unremitting, and—at last—successful.

The build-up for Republican candidates other than Goldwater originally centered in Nelson Rockefeller. After Nixon's defeat in 1960, it became an automatic assumption among many political commentators that Rockefeller was the "front-runner" for the 1964 GOP nomination. This despite the fact that Republican delegates to the 1960 convention had shown no enthusiasm for Rockefeller, and the fact that Goldwater was better known and better liked at the grass roots of the party than was the New York governor. As late as September, 1963, *The New York Times* managed to wax effusive over a Rockefeller visit to Northwest Illinois, proclaiming "Goldwater Area Likes Rockefeller: Reception Warm in Illinois Bastion of Conservatism," and declaring the visit a "triumph" for Rockefeller and his wife.¹ In point of fact, as the local newspapers made clear, Rockefeller was boycotted by GOP leaders, received with ordinary civility by his audience, and spent most of his time talking conservatism

and praising Goldwater. (In the Illinois Republican primary the following spring, won by Goldwater, Rockefeller got fewer write-in votes than did George Wallace.)

Rockefeller was installed as "front-runner" by media say-so. This is a characteristic Establishment tactic—the self-fulfilling prophecy. By *saying* Rockefeller would be the nominee, the media convinced even Republican pros who didn't like him that he *would* be the nominee. Thus, polls taken in May 1963 revealed a majority of Republican officials wanted Goldwater in '64, but thought Rockefeller would get the nod.*

The Goldwater movement, however, was real and growing, and the policy of the averted gaze became partially obsolete. Full-scale blitzkrieg was needed. The first occasion for this sort of attack presented itself when a Goldwater backer, Donald E. "Buz" Lukens, was elected chairman of the 600,000 member Young Republican National Federation. The victory was portrayed in much of the Liberal press as a "take-over" of the YRs by "extremists." Lavish attention was paid to statements by outgoing YR chairman Leonard Nadasdy, allied with the Rockefeller forces, and Rockefeller himself, to the effect that the Goldwater backers used "extremist" tactics. The fact of the matter, apparent to anyone on the scene, was that the truly scandalous tactics, including such maneuvers as switching off microphones where conservatives were trying to speak, were employed by Nadasdy and his Liberal GOP allies.²

The first all-out assault on Goldwater himself came with the murder of President Kennedy. As noted, the killing was made the pretext for disparagement of conservatives generally and Goldwater in particular. The common theme was that because Kennedy's murder was somehow traceable to the

* See "Listening Post: A Head for Rockefeller But a Heart for Goldwater," *Newsweek*, May 20, 1963; "Who'll Run Against Kennedy In '64," *U.S. News & World Report*, May 20, 1963.

"radical right," popular revulsion would destroy Goldwater's presidential chances. "Goldwater's house of cards," as one observer quoted in the *Wall Street Journal* put it, "has tumbled." No effort was made to commensurate this talk with the known facts of the assassination.

With Goldwater and conservatism thus hopefully disposed of, the Establishment began to bring on its new contender for the Republican nomination, Pennsylvania Governor William Scranton. Although Scranton's experience in elective office was small (one term in Congress, two years as governor), and although he was virtually unknown outside his own state, he suddenly began to appear with amazing regularity in the national magazines. The Scranton visage appeared (January 27, 1964) on the cover of *Newsweek*; the *Saturday Evening Post* obliged (January 18, 1964) with a flattering profile and mash note from Stewart Alsop; *Fortune* (February, 1964) supplied a character study depicting Scranton as the Galahad of Pennsylvania politics; *Life* (February 28) offered a flattering puff-piece by Theodore White; national columnists Robert Novak and Rowland Evans, among others, raised a threnody about a routine Scranton appearance in the state of Indiana; *Life* did still another cover story, plus eight pages of pictures and text (June 26); *Newsweek* still another cover story (June 22); etc. The self-fulfilling prophecy was hard at work.

Between the time of Kennedy's assassination and the California primary—a stretch of almost seven months—Establishment magazines did numerous cover stories not only on Scranton, but on Rockefeller and Henry Cabot Lodge, depending on which of these appeared to be the leading Liberal contender. *During this same period, they did not do a cover story on Goldwater,* even though he led in committed dele-*

* The single exception: A wrap-up on the New Hampshire primary in *Newsweek* for March 9, 1964, splitting the cover between Goldwater and Rockefeller.

gates at every step of the way, accumulated more primary votes than any of his opponents, and was by early spring the odds-on choice as eventual Republican nominee. It was not until after the last Republican primary, when popular sentiment was no longer a major factor in the nomination, that the magazines yielded him the publicity resulting from a cover story.

Meanwhile, the Liberal media systematically downgraded Goldwater's showing in the primaries. On the night of Goldwater's victory in Illinois, a basset-eyed Walter Cronkite informed his viewers that Goldwater's vote was "disappointing"—amounting to "only" 65 per cent of the ballots. In the *Chicago Daily News*, reporter Charles Cleveland began his story: "Illinois voters buried Barry."³ On May 4, *Newsweek* complained that "despite Goldwater's *slippage at the ballot box* and in the popularity polls," he was garnering delegates. On May 18, the magazine said "the week brought fresh evidence of Goldwater's *unpopularity among voters*," citing a poll by Louis Harris and the Indiana primary. In Indiana, *Newsweek* asserted, "Goldwater managed to make even Harold Stassen look good. Standing in for the other contenders as Goldwater's only opposition in the Indiana primary, Stassen piled up 39 per cent of the vote . . ." (This statement was flatly untrue; Stassen secured only 26 per cent of the Indiana vote.) Even in the wake of the California primary, *Time* alluded to the "fact" that "*while others were getting the primary votes*, Goldwater was getting the delegates . . ."⁴ (All italics added.)

All of this would suggest that, at a minimum, Goldwater had secured fewer primary votes than one or another of his opponents. Yet the fact of the matter was that in the 1964 primaries, Goldwater received a total popular vote of 2,147,993, or 47.7 per cent of all GOP ballots cast. His closest competitor, Rockefeller, received 1,262,539, or 28 per cent. From there the list dwindled down through Henry Cabot

Lodge (7.6 per cent) and Senator Margaret Chase Smith (5.1 per cent), to Scranton, who amassed a grand total of 229,528 votes (almost all of these in Pennsylvania), for 5.1 per cent of the total.⁵

In other words, Goldwater had received almost ten times the popular vote garnered by his ultimate GOP opponent, Scranton. This hardly supported Scranton enthusiast *Time's* bland assertion that "*others were getting the primary votes*" while Goldwater by some perverse magic was getting the delegates. Goldwater's backers noted that he had outstripped John Kennedy's record in 1960—a record depicted as a triumphal march by the same commentators who discounted Goldwater. Both men were entered in ten primaries, Goldwater drawing the 2 million-plus votes mentioned above, Kennedy some 1,775,250. In the seven states where both were entered, Goldwater polled 100,000 more votes than did Kennedy.

The browbeating of Goldwater on the subject of general popularity and primary funk was nothing, however, compared to the drubbing he received for his stands on public issues. During the New Hampshire primary, for example, the *Concord Monitor* proclaimed in a banner headline that Goldwater favored repeal of Social Security,⁶ a flatly untrue assertion. Goldwater had suggested allowing people who had made their own provision to contract out of the system, and permitting those who had religious scruples against it (such as the Amish farmers in whose behalf Goldwater had introduced a bill in Congress) to refrain from participation. Nor would his approach, as claimed by the opposition, "bankrupt" the program. That job, as is pointed out in a later chapter, is already being handled by the Liberal regime in Washington. Nevertheless, Goldwater's GOP opponents—principally Nelson Rockefeller—took hold of the issue and would not let go. Liberals in the media referred to it as though it were axiomatic that Goldwater would destroy Social Security. ABC's Howard K. Smith said blandly in one

news broadcast, for example, that Goldwater's voluntary stance would "abolish" Social Security.

Also in New Hampshire, Goldwater raised the question of the accuracy of America's intercontinental ballistic missiles. *Newsweek* (January 20, 1964) "covered" this as follows:

Pentagon officials were stunned and angry. *They refuted Goldwater on the facts; they rated ICBM's 70 per cent effective and claimed to have long since remedied a potential flaw cited by Goldwater—the possibility that a high altitude nuclear explosion would misguide a missile by erasing its electronic memory. More seriously still, Goldwater had called into question the very credibility on which the U.S. rests its strategy of peace through deterrence . . .*⁷ (Italics added.)

The italicized portions, obviously, are not "news," but editorial comment, and comment prejudiced against Goldwater.

Shortly before the California primary, Goldwater said in a TV interview with Smith that tactical nuclear weapons might be used to defoliate jungle trails in Asia, but that he did not think they would be. This was given a ride in much of the press as Goldwater's *advocacy* of such action—witness the headline given the story by the San Francisco *Examiner*: "*Barry's Plan to Use A-Bomb.*" The same issue of that paper carried on its front page a column by Roscoe Drummond, stating Drummond's *opinion* that President Eisenhower had repudiated Goldwater. This column was headlined: "Ike Backs Off Barry."⁸ During this same period, segments of the press—notably Jack Steele of the Scripps-Howard newspapers—played up a Rockefeller lament that he had been subjected to innumerable bomb threats, suggesting "extremist" Goldwater backers were willing to commit violence to defeat the New Yorker. In a *news* story on this charge, Steele asserted that he had never seen anything as shocking in all his years of journalism.⁹

All of these attacks were dovetailed into the argument that

Goldwater was an "extremist" estranged from the "mainstream" of the party—the principal theme of his Liberal GOP opponents. Yet the statistics showed Goldwater's conservatism was immeasurably nearer the consensus of the GOP than the Liberalism of Rockefeller or Scranton. At the end of the 88th Congress, there were no less than 16 GOP senators with 70-100 per cent ratings from the conservative group, Americans for Constitutional Action. At the same time, 142 of 178 Republicans in the House had cumulative ACA ratings between 70 and 100 per cent. Rockefeller ally Jacob Javits could claim only a 22 per cent rating—an abyss of "moderation" approached only by Senators Clifford Case of New Jersey and John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky. Goldwater's rating was 98 per cent.

As one of their chief pre-convention issues, Scranton people said Goldwater would drag other Republicans down to defeat. In November, after the elements of disaster had been assembled and fused, this proved all too accurate. But in June and July, according to the opinions of the local candidates themselves, it was not. Various organizations, including the New York *Herald-Tribune*, the research organization *Congressional Quarterly*, and the Capitol Hill Newspaper *Roll Call*, conducted polls among GOP nominees on the effect of a Goldwater candidacy, as they then foresaw it. *In each case, by sizable majorities ranging up to two-to-one, the respondents said Goldwater would help them in their races.* These answers were given only perfunctory attention in the national press.

The best proof Scranton backers could muster to the contrary was the assertion of a group calling itself "The Ripon Society," consisting of ten or so academicians at Tufts, Harvard, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a paper organization without offices or a telephone. Its Director, John Saloma, had been a staffer for the Rockefeller-financed magazine *Advance*, now defunct. In every respect,

"The Ripon Society" was disqualified as a source of impartial information. Nevertheless, when this group said "carefully detailed study" revealed Goldwater would lose 49 of the 50 states and cause the loss of five Senate and 47 House seats, its propaganda was given wide and respectful coverage. In a story for *The New York Times*, Earl Mazo discussed this handout as though it were some kind of major campaign breakthrough. Undisclosed by Mazo were the shadowy nature of the group and its ties to the Rockefeller-Scranton wing of the GOP. The Mazo story was picked up by papers around the country using *The New York Times* wire service. "Arizona Sure Loser, GOPs Told," read the front-page headline in the *Atlanta Constitution*. "GOP Memo Sees Disaster in Goldwater," proclaimed the *Nashville Tennessean* in a three-column page-one head. "GOP Group Says Barry Might Lose 49 States," asserted another headline in the *San Jose (Calif.) Mercury*, under the eloquent kicker—"Slaughter."¹⁰ Thus was blatant anti-Goldwater propaganda served up to thousands of American voters as "news," even as the real news on the same subject, but of an opposite tendency, was quietly played down.*

At times the Establishment attempted a double-reverse, suggesting not only that Goldwater was an "extremist," but that in those instances where he appeared *not* to be an extremist he was "changing" and therefore not to be trusted. This point was argued by Kenneth Crawford in *Newsweek* early in the proceedings (August 19, 1963) and was given the full treatment in the press generally after Goldwater staged his August 1964 "unity" meeting with Eisenhower, Nixon,

* Similar page-one heads appeared in other newspapers: "GOP Moderates Say Barry Nomination Would Be Fatal" (*Seattle Post-Intelligencer*); "Fear Loss of 49 States—Secret GOP Memo Sees Barry Defeat" (*The Boston Herald*; the memo incidentally, was hardly "secret"; it was released openly to the press and was obviously concocted for that very purpose). "Because Of Goldwater—GOP Fears Vote 'Slaughter'" (Decatur, Ill., *Herald*); "Goldwater Called Disaster To GOP" (Allentown, Penna., *Morning Call*); "Goldwater Would Lose All: Ripon" (Utica, N. Y. *Daily Press*).

Scranton and other top Republicans at Hershey, Pennsylvania. At that meeting, Goldwater issued a statement saying he was not in favor of abolishing the UN, did not want war, and that he favored the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy of "peace through strength." The Liberal media were delirious at the spectacle of the "new Goldwater." Consider the following "news" story by William McGaffin in the Chicago *Daily News*:

The moderate views [Goldwater] expressed at a "unity" conference of the Republican high command did not sound at all like the apostle of the conservative gospel who looked with disdain on all but true believers.

It was a totally unexpected move to a new middle-of-the-road position and it won the all-out support of former President Eisenhower . . .

But the Republican presidential candidate's move was so out of character, it may have given him a new problem—one of credibility. Ironically, some of the same Republican critics who have been urging him to mend his views appeared to question, now that he had done so, whether they could actually believe him. They also asked themselves whether the sudden convert could be counted on to stick faithfully to the new doctrine.¹¹

All of this, even if true, is in the nature of editorial commentary, and therefore clearly constitutes bias when it appears in the news columns. But it was not true. There was nothing in the statement which Goldwater had not been saying ever since he had declared his candidacy. In New Hampshire, in Illinois, in Indiana, in California, he had made all of the same points; he had even published them in a handbook of his views on major questions. Yet now the repetition of them at Hershey, in a forum where they could not be ignored, was proclaimed as an alteration in his opinions.

Perhaps the most awesome power of the national media—a power usually neglected in squabbles over "misquotation"

—is the power to *define the issues*. While television and the magazines and the press cannot manufacture public opinion, they can in large part decide what public opinion will be about. They can zero in on certain matters to the exclusion of others, raise and reiterate certain questions, demand certain answers from one candidate while not demanding like answers from his opponent. This kind of influence was used repeatedly in the 1964 election.

Senator Goldwater and Representative Miller, for example, were often challenged to “disavow” the Ku Klux Klan and the John Birch Society. Lyndon Johnson, on the other hand, was *not* challenged by the media to disavow Americans for Democratic Action or the Socialist Party or the tacit support given him by the Communists. On the eve of the California primary Howard K. Smith, discussing the influence of the John Birch Society in that state, off-handedly described Goldwater as “their man.” What would have been the outcry if a newscaster, discussing Communist interest in the election, had casually referred to Lyndon Johnson as “*their man*”? As it happened, of course, the Liberal media did not even discuss the Communists’ position in the election, much less pin them to Johnson. Similarly with Norman Thomas and his fellow Socialists. While Thomas campaigned for the Johnson-Humphrey ticket, no Liberal newsman called on these worthies to disavow his support. In short, the media effectively defined the scope of the extremist issue by limiting it to people backing Goldwater, and therefore defined it completely in Johnson’s favor.

Another instance of the media’s power to define the issues occurred at Goldwater’s mid-August press conference in Hershey, Pennsylvania, where he raised the question of what weapons had been authorized in the Gulf of Tonkin episode in Viet Nam. The wording of the administration’s statement ordering U.S. counterattacks, he suggested, could be interpreted to include the use of nuclear weapons. In this he was

quite correct. Secretary McNamara's statement on the matter had said American personnel in the area were authorized to respond to attack with "whatever force is necessary"¹²—a loose phrase which, on its face, would include use of nuclear weapons. Having raised the point, however, Goldwater was confronted by a famous TV newsmen demanding to know whether Goldwater was *charging* that nuclear weapons *had* been ordered. No, Goldwater explained, he was saying the wording used by the Johnson administration could be so construed. A furore then developed over what Goldwater had meant when he brought the matter up.

The relevant point is the newsmen's driving need to discover just what *Goldwater meant*. No such desire had been manifest in the case of McNamara's original statement. No belligerent demands were made upon the Johnson regime to explain what *it* meant and to spell out just what had or had not been authorized. In the view of the Liberal media, it was apparently legitimate for those actually disposing of American lives and fortunes in a far-off corner of the globe to be as vague as it suited them about the kind of weapons employed. But it was *not* legitimate—indeed, it was outrageous—for a man not in power, not disposing of those fortunes, to *bring up the subject*. Having done so, he must sustain exhaustive cross-examination on every nuance of his speech and every modulation of his thought.

The result of both episodes was to divert attention from Johnson's actions to Goldwater's *words*. It was, in short, to place the burden of explanation and clarification entirely on Goldwater, and to keep him on the defensive.

A final instance of press ability to focus opinion and magnify certain issues to the exclusion of others appears in the play given various stories in Liberal papers. When New York Republicans Kenneth Keating and Jacob Javits refused to support Goldwater, the *Washington Post* bannered that fact across a full eight columns at the top of its front page. When

Democrat Strom Thurmond not only repudiated Lyndon Johnson but endorsed Goldwater and changed parties—a far more open and revolutionary step than the actions of Javits and Keating—that story was told in a modest secondary story under a two-column head.

With the campaign under way in earnest, outright attacks dressed up as “news” began to fly thicker than ever. On the evening of September 23, the ABC “news” team “covered” Johnson through the usual technique of showing a film clip of an LBJ speech attacking Goldwater. It “covered” a Goldwater speech by having Edward P. Morgan, radio voice of the AFL-CIO, deliver a diatribe charging Goldwater with “unsupported vituperation” and speculating that Goldwater was becoming “desperate.” Thus were both candidates given “equal time”: Johnson was given his chance to attack Goldwater, and Goldwater was given his chance to be attacked by Edward P. Morgan.

A favorite sport of some Liberal reporters was “crowds-manship,” minimizing the turnout of Goldwater adherents at his various stops and thereby generating the self-fulfilling prophecy of a campaign in trouble. Exhibit A in this respect was Jack Steele, of “bomb threat” fame. Steele is a veteran Goldwater-crowd-minimizer, having played down Goldwater gatherings as far back as 1963,* an experience he put to good use in the presidential campaign. When Goldwater

* When Goldwater spoke at a GOP \$100-a-plate dinner at Hershey in October, 1963, Steele reported the Arizonan “got a cool—at times barely polite—reception last night.” Steele termed the turnout “poor” and the response of his audience “frigid.” The AP, by way of contrast, said: “Applause and cheers burst out repeatedly as he tore into the Kennedy administration . . . The applause that greeted Goldwater’s introduction turned into a convention-style demonstration . . . The Hershey crowd treated him like a candidate. Repeated rounds of applause greeted every mention of his name and it grew louder when he got tough with Mr. Kennedy.” The *Philadelphia Inquirer* said: “The Goldwater speech struck a responsive chord as his listeners interrupted him 25 times with applause . . . Goldwater, as he was introduced, received a two-minute standing ovation from the audience.”

toured the South, Steele wrote, his crowds were "spotty." In Atlanta, he said, Goldwater "drew a crowd which both police and newsmen estimated to be about one third the size of the 150,000 who greeted Richard M. Nixon in the same city in the 1960 campaign." If crowds mean anything, "and they may not," Steele concluded, "those Goldwater has wooed thus far do not seem to justify GOP hopes that he will sweep Dixie on November 3."¹³

Goldwater people, angered by such statements, said the senator's crowds in Atlanta totaled 250,000. Allowing for the opposite bias of these spokesmen, it may safely be guessed the figure was under this. Ben Cole of the Indianapolis *Star* said the crowd was estimated at 200,000. Luke Green, editor of the Atlanta *Times*, said Goldwater's crowds were as large as or larger than Nixon's, ranging from 150,000 up to 200,000. A similar verdict came from James Reston of *The New York Times*, in an article otherwise unfriendly to Goldwater. All of which would suggest that, whatever the actual size of Goldwater's crowds in Atlanta, they were hardly "one-third" the size of Nixon's, as alleged by Steele. (Georgia, of course, was one of the states Goldwater did carry—the first Republican to do so since Reconstruction.)

While the press and TV commentators thus handled Goldwater on a daily basis, the weekly magazines also did their share. *Newsweek*, whose treatment of Goldwater we have already noted, was perhaps the most consistent in its unremitting opposition. Not far behind, however, was *Look* magazine, which has made sensationalized articles about the right-wing something of a stock in trade over the past few years, and which during the election season focused these down into attacks on Goldwater. The present writer's files, which make no claim to completeness, reflect, for example, the following articles in *Look* over a two-and-a-half year span:

"Who's On the Far Right?" by Fletcher Knebel, March 13,

1962; "Setback For the Far Right," "produced" by Henry Ehrlich, September 25, 1962; "Rampant Right Invades GOP," by T. George Harris, July 16, 1963; "Memo From a Dallas Citizen," March 24, 1964, by J. M. Shea, Jr., a lament about the conservatism of Dallas, Texas; "Goldwater Speaks," April 21, 1964, a proof-text ransacking of Goldwater's utterances to find embarrassments and contradictions—a technique *not* employed by the same magazine against either John Kennedy or Lyndon Johnson; "Can The GOP Survive Goldwater?" by Richard Wilson, July 14, 1964, a balanced article shamefully slanted by its headline; "What Is a Liberal? What Is A Conservative?" by Joseph Roddy, July 28, 1964, an article disparaging Goldwater, William F. Buckley, Jr., and Russell Kirk and elevating such people as Peter Viereck and Clinton Rossiter; "Memo About A Dallas Citizen," by T. George Harris, August 11, 1964, a lament about the reaction of Dallas conservatives to Shea's lament about Dallas conservatives; "Race Riots: Goldwater Boon" (sub-head: "In many states, the Goldwater position meant: No more Negro progress now."), by Fletcher Knebel, September 22, 1964; and, after the election, a special combination celebrative and mopping-up issue, with "Four Special Reports on CONSPIRACY USA, The Frightened Far Right and How It Operates," a murderer's row of exposés featuring Arthur Larson and his "National Council for Civic Responsibility," January 26, 1965.

During this same span of time, my files fail to reflect any *Look* articles about *The Liberal Papers*, The Fair Play for Cuba Committee, Americans for Democratic Action, "danger on the left," or the contradictions of Lyndon Johnson.

This is not to suggest that all of what went on in the media with respect to Goldwater was biased; it was not. It would be unfair to tag all TV newscasters, newspaper reporters, or magazine writers with failings that should be traced and attributed to specific individual sources. Nor is it to suggest

the unfairness which did transpire was malevolent. Human beings tend to see "facts" through the lens of their own particular beliefs, and to emphasize things which appeal to them. That is human nature, and it takes men of extraordinary self-possession to overcome its frailties. The fact that too many media people in the '64 campaign did not overcome it, and that the resulting bias was heavily against Goldwater, is merely to say that the people involved are human beings and that most of those human beings are members of the Liberal Establishment.

►► *Part Two*

THE QUEST FOR POWER

THE QUEST FOR POWER

►► 1. *Pragmatism and Power*

TO UNDERSTAND the Establishment, we must begin at the top, with the President of the United States.

Before his accession to the White House, there was some doubt as to whether Lyndon Johnson was a "member" of the Establishment at all; Richard Rovere, in his humorous essay on the subject, placed Johnson distinctly beyond the pale—which, thinking back to the anti-LBJ raillery then prevalent in the Liberal media, is probably correct. As a drawling, gabardined figure from Johnson City, Texas, Johnson was decidedly non-U in the East Coast-Ivy League world which is the natural habitat of the Establishment.

All this was instantly dismissed, however, when Johnson became President. Today he is not only in and of the Establishment, in the sense intended by this book, he is in charge of it. He runs the province of Establishment life with which we are chiefly concerned; he advances Establishment pro-

grams with agility and zeal; he is acclaimed and glorified by Establishment spokesmen. A former outsider, he is now so far "in" that he is in danger of coming out the other side.

If we would know something about Establishment performance over the past four years, then, we must begin by knowing something about Johnson, and about his predecessor John Kennedy, himself an Establishment insider for many years before his arrival at the White House. It is useful, in fact, to consider Johnson and Kennedy together, for beneath their many obvious surface differences they were as similar as two distinct human beings can be. And the matters wherein they were alike go to the heart of Establishment belief and practice.

John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson were both products of 20th-century American politics at its most technical and antiseptic level, equipped with first-rate antennae for divining issues, assuaging interests, and counting votes. Both were furnished by their times, and by their political party, with a bias toward the welfare state, but both managed to project, where it mattered, a countervailing impression of "conservatism." Each was schooled in the art of convincing Liberals and conservatives alike that a given action was a blow for the ideology of the immediate listener, and that aspects of the action which seemed undesirable were insignificant sops to the opposition. Kennedy was frequently described as a "pragmatist"—that is, a man more interested in practical results than in fancy theories. The same term, with as much justice or more, could be applied to Johnson. As Majority Leader of the Senate, from 1955 through 1960, he won universal acclaim as the greatest political craftsman ever to hold that post. And it was his "pragmatism," his ability to weld men of all opinions together in concentration on the practical task at hand, which won him the accolade.

By the time John Kennedy had completed a strenuous campaign for the presidency and had conducted the affairs of

the nation for almost three full years, the extent of his Liberal predisposition had become plain—as it was not plain, say, when he attracted conservative votes for the Democratic vice-presidential nomination in 1956. When Johnson succeeded to the Presidency in November, 1963, his “image” stood roughly where Kennedy’s stood in 1956—so that the effect was one of a “conservative” succeeding a “Liberal.” The truth is, however, that Johnson himself is as Liberal in his sympathies as was his predecessor.

Johnson went to Congress in 1937 as an avowed New Dealer, elected on a platform of support for President Roosevelt’s scheme to “pack” the Supreme Court. This was at a time, notes one friendly reporter, when “even some of the most devoted New Dealers from areas far more Liberal than Texas were shying away from the Court plan.”¹ Johnson is a self-professed idolator of the late FDR, who saw to it that the youthful new legislator received a good committee appointment upon his arrival. “He was like a daddy to me,” Johnson says of Roosevelt.²

In 1941, with Roosevelt’s blessing, Johnson was the Liberal candidate for the senatorial nomination from Texas. Despite a well-publicized laying on of hands at the White House portico, and despite the fact that a large field of conservatives split the opposition vote, Johnson lost the nomination to W. Lee “Pappy” O’Daniel. In 1948, however, Johnson tried again, this time with the blessing of Harry Truman. In a hotly disputed election revolving about a mysterious access of “uncounted” Johnson votes six days after the polls had closed, Johnson was declared the winner by Liberal Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black. (The full story on how the national Establishment pulled Johnson’s electoral chestnuts out of the fire in this episode will be recorded in a later chapter.)

Down through the years, there is nothing to indicate that Johnson’s New Dealism has changed appreciably. Like most

other senators from the South and Southwest, he voted against the Liberal line when sectional or home-state interests so dictated, gas and oil votes, "civil rights," and the Taft-Hartley Act constituting his major ventures into *lèse-majesté*. Johnson vehemently objects to Liberal spokesmen who attack him for these votes, or for his down-to-earth approach to getting Liberal bills enacted. Robert L. Riggs notes that "Johnson is frequently annoyed because he is denied the accolade of New Dealer . . . he cherishes the thought that he is a genuine economic and political liberal, both by inheritance and by belief."³

Prior to his ascension to the presidency, these protests were not taken very seriously by such Liberal spokesmen as the Americans for Democratic Action. But examination of the record bears out Johnson's complaint; he has indeed been a consistent Liberal, as a number of conservative observers have pointed out. Americans for Constitutional Action, a conservative organization, found Johnson's record during his last term in the Senate had been "one of the most Liberal . . . in the Congress." Using 90 key roll calls during this period, ACA found Johnson's conservative rating was a mere 10%.

In releasing this tabulation, ACA president Ben Moreell appended a statement concerning vote analyses of other organizations, in which Johnson was found to have cast a preponderance of "right" votes by Liberal standards. "Senator Johnson," Moreell said, "was highly rated over a period of years by both AFL-CIO (COPE) and the ADA. For example, COPE gave him a rating of 73 per cent for the period 1949-1960, based on 30 COPE 'right' votes and 11 'wrong' votes. During 1959-1960 his COPE rating rose to 77 per cent. Senator Johnson's cumulative ADA rating for 1949-60 was 58 per cent, and in 1960 it rose to 66 per cent. While in the House of Representatives, ADA rated him at 88 per cent for 1947-48. His cumulative House and Senate ADA score from 1947 to 1960 is 62 per cent, based on 102 ADA 'right' votes and 64 'wrong' votes."

Moreell pinpointed one oddity—that the ACA rating of the “conservative” Johnson for the period 1955-59 was *lower* than that of the “Liberal” Kennedy, a fact which Kennedy himself had not failed to note. “In the pre-convention campaigning in 1960,” Moreell said, “the late President Kennedy and his staff used the ACA index extensively throughout the South to prove that, as seen through the eyes of a conservative organization, the then Senator Kennedy (with an 11% ACA rating) was more conservative than Senator Johnson (10%).”⁴

Nor has Johnson’s Liberalism been a matter of dry statistics; he has frequently come to the rescue of the Liberal cause when it mattered most—the premier example being his 1959 Senate action in the case of HR 3, the bill to reverse a Supreme Court decision nullifying state sedition laws. The bill passed the House of Representatives by a comfortable margin, and seemed likely to pass the Senate. But Johnson went to work with his customary zeal and almost single-handedly secured its defeat. He is also given credit by reporter Riggs for bottling up the Bricker-George effort to limit the reach of the presidential treaty power—a measure for which Johnson himself, as minority leader, had voted.

One of Johnson’s most successful ventures in projecting himself as a “conservative” has been his rhetoric about “economy”—rhetoric dramatized by his asserted passion for flicking off the lights in the White House. Those who grant Johnson’s Liberalism on other scores have been to some extent impressed by his words on this one. Yet government spending is the one aspect of Johnson’s career in which he has been most consistently Liberal. Riggs tells us: “No northern Liberal has preached better New Deal gospel than Lyndon Johnson after the new Congress assembled in January, 1959. No Liberal has been so effective as was Johnson in giving respectability to the doctrine of spending. No New Dealer has been a more vigorous champion of the view that the federal budget must not be balanced at the expense of vital welfare services.”⁵

This partiality for spending was equally evident as Johnson acceded to the White House. Even as he reaped yards of newsprint for his "economy" drive, Johnson was increasing federal expenditures. This was achieved by the expedient of allocating part of the new money he spent to the Kennedy budget for 1963-64, so that Kennedy, not Johnson, could posthumously take the rap for stepped up spending; requesting "new obligational authority" empowering him to spend money not included in his cash budget; and pro-rating new expenditures so that they could be counted in budgets for years ahead—years, that is, after the 1964 election. Immediately upon taking office, Johnson ordered a speed-up in current spending in the amount of \$600 million—a step which somewhat negated the estimated \$36,000 saved by switching off the lights, the net loss for the taxpayer between the two transactions being some \$599,964,000.

Government spending during this period was up all along the line. *U.S. News and World Report* commented that "during Mr. Johnson's first three months in office the government spent more money than in any other December-February period in U.S. history. All told, the budget expenditures in those three months under Mr. Johnson came to \$24.3 billion. Mr. Kennedy, in his peak year of spending for those months, hit a total of \$22.3 billion. . . . So far, then, spending since Mr. Johnson took over has topped Mr. Kennedy's record by 2 billions. It has eclipsed Mr. Eisenhower's by 4.3 billions."⁶

Johnson's chief device for projecting his "economy" image was the division of requested spending authority into different departments, one department labeled "new obligational authority." In this category, Johnson placed some \$5.9 billion for fiscal 1965, and another \$4 billion thereafter. In other words, a total of almost \$10 billion of new spending authority—not counted in the budget for 1964-65. By this manipulation, a request for \$108 billion was made to look

like a request for less than \$98 billion, with resulting headlines about "economy." Members of Congress, however, were not so easily misled. Rep. Clarence Cannon (D.-Mo.), Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, declared that "contrary to impressions, this budget is higher, not lower, than the current year . . . This budget, if adopted as presented, sows the seeds of increased spending in the future."⁷

The object of all this new spending was spelled out by Johnson in a speech January 15, 1964: "We are going to try," he said, "to take all of the money that we think is unnecessarily being spent and take it from the 'haves' and give it to the 'have nots' that need it so much."⁸ Which is about as close as any recent American President has come to proclaiming the "redistribution of wealth." The statement, admittedly, is a little confused. On the one hand, it seems to say only money "saved" is going to be given to the have nots—which is slightly different from taking money away from the "haves." When we reflect, however, that there *is* no money being saved, it seems the "have nots" must in fact be serviced by soaking the haves. The one area in which the Johnson budget did cut spending was defense; yet this, as noted, does not cut the aggregate amount of money spent.

In still other actions during his first few months as President, Johnson made it clear he would continue to hew to the Liberal line—even though he did not neglect to burnish his "conservative" image simultaneously. In all fields, domestic and foreign, he continued the Kennedy programs with no noticeable alteration, while adding a few of his own for good measure. Whether the issue was domestic finance, internal security, or national defense, Johnson's response was unwaveringly Liberal. His 1965 State of the Union address, for example, included suggestions for the intrusion of federal authority into almost every conceivable sphere of American life, from air pollution to mental illness. Small wonder columnist

William S. White, a warm admirer of Johnson, should state: "The effective and rational Liberals, such men as Senators Hubert Humphrey and Eugene McCarthy and Ernest Gruening and Henry Jackson and Warren Magnuson, came to understand, to support, and value Johnson as their friend and ultimate protector. Just so, the effective right-wingers, from Robert Taft's time and beyond, always knew him for what he was; the strongest antagonist they had, precisely because he knew how to make rational Liberalism work and they knew he did."⁹ In a 1963 interview with Robert Spivack of the New York *Herald-Tribune*, Johnson confirmed White's estimate. "You say I am not a Liberal," he protested. "Let me tell you I am more Liberal than Eleanor Roosevelt, and I will prove it to you. Franklin D. Roosevelt was my hero—he gave me my start."¹⁰ As that statement indicates, the regime of Lyndon Johnson is in all ideological respects an extension of John Kennedy's New Frontier.

Through it all, the major resemblance, larger than any particular issue, continues to press itself upon our attention. While this is a book about extremists, it is clear that neither Kennedy nor Johnson can be described by that word. Extremism, whatever its bad connotations, implies *commitment*, enthusiasm for some idea or objective outside the limits of personal advancement or comfort. It implies zeal in behalf of a cause, dedication to ideas, likes and dislikes shot through with ideological fervor. There was little in the Kennedy record to suggest anything of the sort; there is equally little in the Johnson record. Both men, indeed, are known to have professed abhorrence of people excessively moved by ideas; both were concerned to achieve certain things in terms of the ideology of Liberalism, but neither seems to have been moved or dominated by its antic potencies; there is more than a suspicion that, in an age suffused with Liberal thought, each was able to use the energies of Liberal ideologues to get where he was going. Of the

two, Kennedy seems to have been more conscious in his pragmatism, sophisticated in his pursuit of power. Johnson's approach is natural and inborn, a kind of seat-of-the-pants system which they would not call "pragmatism" in Muleshoe, Texas, but which adds up to pretty much the same thing.

Prof. Eric Goldman of Princeton, who heads up a committee of intellectuals for Johnson, has testified to the pervasiveness of the Kennedy power mystique. "The outgoing President [Eisenhower] believed that the Chief Executive should not attempt to run things too much and especially should not try to whiplash Congress and the nation into line," Goldman says. "John Kennedy took office with whip brandished high." The men around Kennedy, Goldman adds, were "students—and products—of the new managerial America, a managerial world that includes political campaigns and universities as well as business corporations, and they are acutely aware that a managerial world is one in which men and ideas are made or broken by subtle configurations of power." Goldman notes what he calls the "new moralism" of the New Frontier—symbolized by the "ask not" peroration of the Kennedy Inaugural Address. "The new moralism is the more striking," he says admiringly, "because it is accompanied by the most unabashed power-consciousness that the Capital has ever known."¹¹

If friends and critics agree that Kennedy sought to concentrate power in the federal government, and particularly in the presidency, they are equally agreed that he did so for non-doctrinaire reasons. John Owens of the Baltimore *Sun* described him as a "relaxed pragmatist." Kennedy, Owens wrote, "is not a revolutionist. He is not even a doctrinaire. He is a day-by-day worker on the condition in front of him."¹² That conclusion is seconded by Goldman, who quotes Kennedy as saying that, when issues arise, "I don't have an automatic commitment." "The Kennedy Group," Goldman says, "appeared to be sure that, if the world was to

be saved, it would be saved by their becoming masters of the *ad hoc*.”¹³

America's founders feared power because they thought it would endanger freedom—no matter how good or noble the ends for which it was created. How much more dangerous would they have found power sought out and husbanded by “masters of the *ad hoc*.” Unchecked by the restraint of principle or tradition, power develops its own logic and momentum. Unguided by superior ends, it becomes an end in itself. The focus of concern, in an administration absorbed purely in the issue of the moment, must be the accretion of power—on every front; those exercising the power, after all, can never be quite sure what particular problem they will be called on to set aright tomorrow. A new strike, an objectionable television program, traffic congestion in the cities, a lag in support for civic symphony orchestras, unfriendly articles in the newspapers—any or all of these might create difficulties requiring the use of power, or stand in the way of programs designed to get it. In such contingencies, a power-conscious administration is always better off with too much power rather than too little.

Johnson's preferences in such matters are similar to Kennedy's. Indeed, the rhetoric used by Johnson's admirers immediately puts us in mind of Prof. Goldman. Stewart Alsop makes the comparison explicit, saying:

To say that Johnson loves power is no affront to the man. Kennedy loved power too. Kennedy once remarked that he wanted to be President “because that's where the real power is”.

As soon as Johnson won that Senate post in 1955 [Alsop goes on] he reached out with a sure instinct for the chief levers of party power; the Policy Committee, the Steering Committee, the Democratic Campaign Committee and the party secretariat. He was chairman of the first two, and thus controlled both broad policy decisions and the vital committee assignments. He had a majority of Johnson men on the Democratic Campaign Committee, and

thus controlled campaign largess. And the whole party secretariat, from the now-fallen Bobby Baker on down, was devoutly loyal to Lyndon B. Johnson and to nobody else.

The executive branch is, of course, wholly different from the legislative branch, and is even more difficult to control than the Senate. But anyone who saw Lyndon Johnson operating as majority leader will be dead certain of one thing: Johnson will dominate absolutely his branch of the government. He will be a strong President, a dominant President, master in his own house, for good or ill.¹⁴

Other journalistic testimony bears out this analysis, as does the remark of Adlai Stevenson, who says: "Like few political professionals I have known, our new President understands power—its uses, its sources, its limitations, and its corruptions."¹⁵

Life magazine, which supported Johnson in the 1964 campaign, quoted one intimate of the President as follows:

Now when I say Lyndon wants it all and intends to get it all, I mean something like this: He wants all the respect, all the admiration, and all the love there is. He wants all the votes there are. He doesn't just want to win in 1964; he wants to win bigger than anybody ever did. He wants all the Texas land there is, and, by now, he has quite a bit of that. He wants all the money there is and already he has a lot of it. He not only wants to be a great President; he wants to be the greatest ever. He doesn't want the history books to say he was as good as Lincoln; he wants them to say he was better.¹⁶

In quest of All, Johnson has been an indefatigable manipulator of things, issues, and people. We have noted Prof. Goldman's observation that the arena of power today is a "managerial" one, "where men and ideas are made or broken by subtle configurations of power." Johnson is, above all, The Manager. He is a kind of mortal Prospero, controlling and manipulating people and events to establish his own

mastery of the situation. Johnson's official biographer, Booth Mooney, says LBJ viewed his Majority Leadership in the Senate "as a sort of general managership."¹⁷ His multifaceted yet essentially vacuous appeal in the 1964 election, his endless massaging of every interest in society, have made it clear he conceives of the presidency in the same way. It is all one big colossal Managership.

Like Kennedy's, Johnson's desire for power is disembodied from ideological objectives. Power is power, good for its own sake. Just what the power is supposed to do is never made very clear; nor, on Johnson's record, is it likely ever to be. In a now-famous article for *The Texas Quarterly*, Johnson actually went a great deal farther than his predecessor in disavowing political philosophy. In that article, Johnson wrote:

I am a free man, an American, A United States Senator, and a Democrat, in that order.

I am also a liberal, a conservative, a Texan, a taxpayer, a rancher, a businessman, a consumer, a parent, a voter, and not as young as I used to be nor as old as I expect to be—and I am all these things in no fixed order.

After thus touching every conceivable base, he goes on to add: "I am not able—nor even the least interested in trying—to define my political philosophy by the choice of a one-word or two-word label." And: "I bridle at the very casualness with which we have come to ask each other, 'What is your political philosophy?'"¹⁸

This confession is unique in two respects. Unique, first of all, because it is as clear an effort to say, "I am all things to all men," as one is liable to find in print. And unique because it magnifies the absence of fixed belief and disparages those who have such belief or seek it in others. Here is "pragmatism" militant, erecting non-commitment as the first of virtues, proclaiming clarity and principle as vices. Here is justifica-

tion in plenty for ideological vagueness, reversing oneself on the issues, playing the angles and deploying both ends against the middle. Under this aspect, changing one's beliefs to suit different times or different constituencies is not merely cricket; it is a solemn duty.

The resulting paradox became crystallized in Johnson's famous dual candidacy of 1960, when he ran for Vice-President on the national ticket and for re-election to the Senate on the statewide Texas ticket. In that curious election year, Johnson stood for office on two political platforms directly opposed to one another. The Texas platform opposed "federal encroachment" on the states, while the national platform called for an increase of federal powers unprecedented in American history. The Texas platform endorsed the state's right-to-work law; the national platform called for the repeal of right-to-work laws. The Texas platform supported the depletion allowances favored by the gas and oil producers; the national platform pledged elimination of such "loop holes." The Texas platform opposed sit-in demonstrations; the national platform supported them. Etc.¹⁹ This double candidacy represented the culmination of Johnson's mixed career as a Liberal abroad and part-time conservative at home and undoubtedly constitutes the ultimate achievement in political flexibility.

Once elected as Vice-President, Johnson left the substance if not the rhetoric of conservatism behind; and since becoming President, he has confirmed himself in Liberalism as emphatically as did his predecessor. There have been a few trappings of language and inflection to mollify conservatives; but the particulars of the Johnson program have been as Liberal as those of Kennedy's, in some cases more so. The reversal has been most dramatic, of course, in the realm of civil rights, where Johnson has pressed hard both for cloture on Senate debate and for two "civil rights" bills more sweeping than anything since Reconstruction. This was the same

Lyndon Johnson who in 1949 declared the right of unlimited Senate debate to be the key principle of free government, and who opined that a law to compel an employer to hire a Negro against his will (which the 1964 civil rights bill does) was little better than tyranny.²⁰

As the '60 campaign suggests, Johnson's political mastery and his ideological vagueness are closely related. The ability to appeal to differing and even overtly hostile segments of the political community, in series and simultaneously, helped make him a skillful broker between the warring factions of the Democratic Party. It is very likely true, as Johnson's enthusiasts allege, that he was the only man who could have successfully kept the Northern Democrats and the States' Rights Southerners operating in single harness. The same kind of agility and suppleness helps him now.

The resistant stuff of conviction, at the level of technical virtuosity, is a political handicap; it tends to build up animosities among those who hold different convictions. It makes shifting positions difficult. These are handicaps Lyndon Johnson has avoided. Such animosities as he has stirred are chiefly personal; and those which have been most vividly ideological—*e.g.*, ADA's long-nourished distaste—have proved ephemeral enough in the upshot. At the time of his ascendancy in the Senate, and today as he sits in the White House, there is no man living who could safely categorize his political creed—which is the way Johnson, on his own testimony, likes it.

►► 2. *Americans for Democratic Action*

TO THE EXTENT that Liberalism has a doctrine and program, they may best be discerned in that most doctrinaire and programmatic of organizations, Americans for Democratic Action. ADA represents the pure ideological tendency of Liberalism in all its major phases—domestic policy, internal security, and foreign affairs. In its Herculean schedule of demands and exhortations we encounter, more clearly than in the indefinite profile of a Kennedy or a Johnson, the distilled essence of Liberal aspiration.

That ADA is dead amidsthips of the Establishment has been attested by friends and critics alike. Its penetration of the federal government under Kennedy and Johnson has been remarked by ADAers themselves, by ADA biographer Clifton Brock, by Robert Hartmann of the *Los Angeles Times*, and by James Burnham of *National Review*, among others. Under Kennedy, ADA managed to place three dozen

or so people in the high echelons of the executive branch; under Johnson, it secured the choicest political plum available to it, nomination of its all-time favorite legislator Hubert Humphrey as Vice President. And under both Kennedy and Johnson, it has received favorable consideration for virtually its entire legislative program—although not always with the speed and certitude its ideologues would like.

This record of success is somewhat astounding in view of ADA's small and—according to Prof. Brock (as of 1962)—dwindling membership, depleted exchequer, lack of political muscle, and history of unpopularity with the voters. It is even more astounding in view of the fact that the men who made it all possible, John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, had voiced their distaste for ADA in no uncertain terms and were themselves the object of suspicion and hostility from the group's dedicated planners for tomorrow.

In a 1953 interview with Paul Healy of the *Saturday Evening Post*, for example, Kennedy commented on people who charged he was not a "true Liberal." "I'd be very happy to tell them I'm not a Liberal at all," he said. "I never joined Americans for Democratic Action or the American Veterans Committee. I'm not comfortable with those people."¹ Those people reciprocated by making it clear on many occasions that they were not very comfortable with Kennedy either. According to New York ADA chairman Allen Taylor (himself a Kennedy backer), Kennedy's Catholicism was "the major element in the Liberals' doubts" about him. Taylor added that "many Liberals doubt that Kennedy is a real Liberal. Mrs. Roosevelt's comments have had an effect."² With the exception of Arthur Schlesinger Jr., few ADAers were for Kennedy with any enthusiasm. One ADA chapter in New Jersey said: "In our view Senator Kennedy does not measure up to the principles which guide ADA."³

If ADAers viewed Kennedy suspiciously, they saw Lyndon Johnson as a positive evil. As Majority Leader, Johnson was

constantly under fire from ADA members in the Senate. ADA pilloried him in its publications and public statements, describing him as "a conservative, anti-civil rights, gas-and-oil senator."⁴ As we have seen, this description is hardly a fair characterization, since Johnson had to live with a Texas constituency. But such considerations have small bearing on ADA's demands for doctrinaire Liberalism in all things at all times.

When Kennedy turned to Johnson for the vice-presidential post in 1960, the ADA was stunned. Joseph L. Rauh, G. Mennen Williams and others shouted an angry "no" when the convention was asked to nominate the Texan by acclamation.⁵ Rauh later said: "It may prove to be a disaster in November, but more important, in my opinion, is that it throws doubt on the sincerity of the entire party in adopting that wonderful platform."⁶ Even when passions had cooled somewhat, a vote by the national ADA board to limit endorsement to Kennedy, omitting Johnson, split the group down the middle. Only a tie-breaking ballot by chairman Samuel Beer carried the day for the ticket as a whole.

Johnson disliked ADA just as much as it disliked him. Taking note of ADA's opposition to his bid for the presidential nomination in 1960, Johnson said: "We don't want the support of odd balls on the left or the right . . . ADA or KKK."⁷

The fact that both Kennedy and Johnson should have spoken disparagingly of ADA suggests something about its position in the power structure of the Democratic party. For a decade or more, ADA's radicalism was considered too far out for the American people, and therefore for Democrats seeking favor with the voters. Former Democratic Chairman Stephen Mitchell, when asked what he thought of ADA support, said, "I think we can get along without it."⁸ A Massachusetts Democrat, Governor-to-be Foster Furculo, told an audience of thunderstruck ADAers: "You no longer enjoy

the confidence of the public and no candidate can do without it.”⁹

Others withdrawing support from ADA because of its radicalism have been David McDonald of the Steelworkers Union and the President of the Upholsterers Union. Even certified Liberals such as Adlai Stevenson, G. Mennen Williams, and Congressman Chet Holifield have gone out of their way to deny connection with it. (Stevenson is listed as a “founder” of ADA—an allegation he denies.)

After all the unfriendly words between Kennedy and Johnson on the one hand and the ADA on the other, and the eagerness of so many Democrats to cut free from it, it does not seem logical the present administration should be awash to the scuppers with ADA members. Yet such is in fact the case. Under Kennedy, prominent ADA spokesmen popped up all over Washington; under Johnson, Hubert Humphrey is Vice President, and Joe Rauh is now a favored guest at the White House. Rauh appeared prominently, for example, at White House ceremonies for the signing of the 24th Amendment, abolishing the poll tax.* Despite the aura of public disfavor, then, ADA has managed to spot its members everywhere in the Democratic administration, and has exerted a strong shaping influence on its policies. National ADA chairman Samuel Beer boasted, in 1961, of “our new respectability, with so many of our leaders prominent in the New Frontier.”¹⁰ The same John F. Kennedy who in 1953 disavowed ADA turned about and retrieved its injured reputation, brushed up its radicalism, and supplied it with some sorely-needed prestige. The same Lyndon Johnson who in 1960 compared ADA to the Ku Klux Klan has put it within field goal distance of the White House.

* This episode was additionally curious for other reasons: There is no provision in the Constitution for the President to “sign” a constitutional amendment; and the beaming Rauh who looked on as Johnson did sign had actually opposed the amendment in question. Reason: As a good ADAer, he preferred direct congressional action without recourse to the amendment process.

Reporter Hartmann, in his series for the *Los Angeles Times*, compiled a painstaking list of ADAers, past and present, who had secured jobs in the Kennedy administration. The best known of the group were Schlesinger, then special adviser to President Kennedy; Chester Bowles, a roving ambassador; Ambassador "Soapy" Williams, a one-time ADA member despite his later disavowal; Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy's special assistant and "alter ego"; former Ambassador to India J. Kenneth Galbraith; former Ambassador to Peru James Loeb Jr.; former Secretary of Labor, now Supreme Court Justice, Arthur Goldberg; former Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, now Senator Abraham Ribicoff; Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman; Solicitor General Archibald Cox; Housing Administrator Robert Weaver; and HEW Assistant Secretary Wilbur Cohen. In addition to these, Hartmann lists some two dozen other Kennedy officials who are either current ADA members or alumni of the group.*

Scanning ADA's meager resources, Hartmann makes the obvious comment: "... when any 14-year old organization numbering no more than 50,000 citizens, with a budget of

* In 1963, James Burnham updated the list as follows: "ADA's Supreme Court Justice is Arthur Goldberg, who was shifted to the Court from President Kennedy's Cabinet. ADA graduate Abraham Ribicoff recently went from the Cabinet to the Senate. Ardent ADA member Orville Freeman continues as Secretary of Agriculture. Senators Hubert Humphrey (who has served as ADA National Chairman) and Wayne Morse are on the ADA National Executive Committee; Joseph S. Clark, Paul Douglas, Maurine Neuberger, William Proxmire, Pat McNamara, Estes Kefauver and Eugene McCarthy are also in the ADA's senatorial bloc. ADAer J. Kenneth Galbraith represents the nation in New Delhi and will be followed in that post by Ambassador and ADAer-at-large Chester Bowles. ADAer Thomas Finletter is our man at NATO. (ADA founder James Loeb Jr., was Ambassador to Peru until retired last summer after his awkward role in Peru's government overturn.) Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., another ADA founder and present Executive Committee member, works in the White House's most intimate circle, along with ADAers Ted Sorenson and Lawrence O'Brien. As Under Secretaries (*i.e.*, second in departmental command), ADAer Ivan Nestingen is at Health, Education and Welfare; Charles Murphy, at Agriculture; Henry H. Fowler, at Treasury. There were at one time no less than four ADA Assistant Secretaries at State (Averell Harriman, G. Mennen Williams, Philip H. Coombs, Carl Rowan; Harriman has since been promoted to

less than \$200,000 a year, regarded as an albatross by many Democrats and as anathema by most Republicans, holding no I. O. U. from the presidential winner for his nomination—when any such organization can staff a new administration with three White House aides, three Cabinet officers, and 31 key administrators in vital areas of finance, labor, civil rights, public works, power, housing, and foreign policy, it is worth looking into.”¹¹

ADA is indeed worth looking into, on several counts. It is a curiosity in American politics, a half-intellectual, half-political-action organization which does a little of everything in general, and, until the arrival of the Kennedy-Johnson regime, not much of anything in particular. It is involved, on a limited basis, in precinct politics; it lobbies on Capitol Hill; it is a fountain of statements on every subject under the sun, a repository for Liberal brain trusters who will gladly give a speech, or ghost one, on whatever topic happens to be at hand, and today something very like an employment service for the Liberal regime in Washington.

ADA was founded in 1947 for the purpose of separating Liberal sheep from Communist and pro-Communist goats then crying up the Progressive Party candidacy of Henry Wallace. For its initiative on this score ADA should be given full credit, and above all should be spared charges that it is either “Communist” or “pro-Communist.” It is neither of these, and assertions that it is somehow a front for Moscow serve only to darken counsel by making impossible any ra-

Under Secretary, and Rowan named Ambassador to Finland); two at Labor (George L. P. Weaver and Esther Peterson); and an Assistant Postmaster General (Frederic C. Belen). ADAer Archibald Cox is Solicitor General; ADAer Charles Donahue, Solicitor of the Labor Department. ADAer Frank McCulloch is chief of NLRB; ADAer Robert C. Weaver, of the Housing and Home Finance Agency; ADAer George Docking, of the Export-Import Bank. ADAer Howard Morgan is a commissioner of FPC; ADAer Philip Elman, of FTC. Eleanor Roosevelt, a member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, was ADA's First Lady from its birth until her death. ADAer Jonathan Bingham is U.S. delegate to the Trusteeship Council.” •

tional determination of what it really is. ADA itself claims to be "anti-Communist," which may be a true enough designation of the impulses which gave it birth, but can hardly be applied to its erratic record on internal security matters and certain foreign policy questions. A more correct description would be "non-Communist." "Anti-anti-Communist" would be more accurate still.

On questions of domestic policy other than internal security, ADA favors putting increased power in the hands of the federal government. It urges the transfer of power away from private individuals and from the states to the authorities in Washington, in the interest of "democratic national economic planning." Within the federal authority, it favors moving power away from Congress into the hands of the President, where it is less restrained by such things as committee hearings, filibusters, and tedious procedure, and can be used quickly and without impediment. It favors, in short, doing away with substantive barriers to the concentration and exercise of political power at the national level—always excepting the internal security question.

There is hardly a welfare program on record which has not received ADA backing, hardly a request for presidential power which ADA has not found good and necessary, hardly a problem of any description for which it has not proposed a federal solution. "The government," ADA tells us, "must undertake to build firm foundations for enduring prosperity by bold long-range programs for the development of our resources, the rebuilding of our cities, the elimination of our slums, and the provision of full and equal opportunities for health, education, and security for all our people."¹² In each of these categories and more, ADA has a multitude of federal schemes it wants enacted or enlarged in scope. Among its standard proposals are federal aid to schools at all levels, a stiff federal fair employment practice law, a federal "medicare" program, price and wage controls, federal housing as-

sistance, "direct income support for farmers and a food stamp plan" (the Brannan plan), use of federal funds "to finance basic services which state and local governments provide," on condition that plans be submitted which "meet certain basic standards" etc., etc. What ADA is after is a federally subsidized, federally regulated, federally administered government in which Congress yields up its powers to the executive, the states perform as administrative subdivisions, and the citizen accepts a regimen planned for him by ADA experts in Washington.

In the contemporary meaning, the ADA program would achieve in America approximately what the Socialists would achieve in Europe. Its resemblance to the Socialist Fabian Society in Great Britain is not only marked but somewhat self-conscious. ADA critics have frequently drawn the parallel, but ADA enthusiasts have also acknowledged it. The Fabian Society set out, in the guise of reform, to introduce the total state to Britain by degrees; it achieved its effects not through mass membership or political expertise, but through the propagandistic energy of such intellectuals as Bernard Shaw, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, and Graham Wallas (who, for what it is worth, coined the phrase, "The Great Society"). The same considerations, as to goal and method, apply to ADA, with such figures as Arthur Schlesinger Jr., J. Kenneth Galbraith and Leon Keyserling filling the roles once played by Shaw and Co.

ADAers evidently do not find the comparison odious. Prof. Brock repeatedly points out that, at least in its "intellectual" modulation, ADA is a kind of American Fabian Society. The main difficulty with being American Fabians, in the ADA view, is that U. S. politics is too loose-jointed to make the approach effective. Prof. Brock says: "Various ADA leaders have advocated such a policy [*i.e.*, functioning, like the Fabians, exclusively as an idea center], and much of the organization's educational and propaganda activity can be

viewed in this light. The ADA has never committed itself to a clear-cut Fabian concept, however, perhaps because the primary vehicle of Fabian success in Britain—a centralized and disciplined political party—has never existed in the United States.”¹³

Evidently the fact that Fabianism was at all times a Socialist technique aimed at Socialistic objectives has not been a factor in preventing ADA enthusiasm for it. (Interestingly enough, one of ADA’s prime objectives has been to do away with the chief impediment to Fabianism cited by Brock—to make the Democratic party a “centralized and disciplined” body in the ADA image.) ADAers tend, in fact, to think well of European Socialists all along the line. Brock notes that a main cause of ADA unpopularity in the early ’50s was “an expression of sympathy with the British Labor Government,” and Hartmann quotes one “Liberal Democrat with impeccable credentials” as saying ADA is “very dominated by Fabian ideas.”¹⁴

James Burnham notes ADA’s “foreign connections have always featured the Socialist leaders and parties of other countries. The first foreign lecturer to tour this country under ADA auspices was Jennie Lee, a leading British Socialist, wife of the very leftist Aneurin Bevan.” Among foreign figures smiled on by ADA have been French Socialist Leon Blum and Italian Socialist Giuseppe Saragat. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. has placed ADA in the same spectrum as “the democratic socialists and leftists” of Europe.¹⁵

Perhaps nowhere can ADA’s affinity to European Socialism be better glimpsed than in the writings and utterances of Schlesinger himself. If anyone deserves the title of “Mr. ADA” in the intellectual world, as Humphrey deserves it in the political, Schlesinger is the man. He has been an indefatigable source of pamphlets, articles, books, and speeches expounding and defending the ADA position. It was he who swayed many ADA members to accept Kennedy. And it was

he, in turn, who led the wholesale charge of the ADA into the upper ranks of the Kennedy government.

"There seems no inherent obstacle," Schlesinger wrote in 1947, "to the gradual advance of socialism in the United States through a series of New Deals."¹⁶ Schlesinger, then a precocious professor of history at Harvard, had been asked to comment on the future of socialism. As the quotation suggests, he was quite optimistic. The long-term growth of government control indicated to Schlesinger that the Socialist ideal of gradual takeover could and would be fulfilled.

Some background is necessary. Since the days of Eduard Bernstein, the cause of world socialism has been divided into two major camps: The Communists, who believe socialism possible only by violent revolution; and the "social democrats," who think the goal can be achieved through parliamentary process, *i.e.*, by legislation. Addressing himself to this historic debate, Schlesinger took the side of the social democrats.

His reasoning: the Communists held that "gradualism" would not work because, if it ever threatened to succeed, capitalistic businessmen would take steps to forestall proletarian triumph. This expected resistance, the orthodox Communists reasoned, could be overcome only by violence. Schlesinger believed the history of the Labor government in England, and of the New Deal in America, proved the Communists in error. Instead of putting up a fight, he asserted, the capitalists had simply caved in. The way they humbly took their medicine from British and American planners—such as Schlesinger himself—proved they were cowards without the fortitude to defend themselves.

"... the Marxists," he wrote, "enormously overestimated the political courage and will of the capitalists. In fact, in the countries where capitalism really triumphed, it has yielded with far better grace (that is, displayed far more cowardice) than the Marxist schema predicted."¹⁷ Because businessmen

are cowards, Schlesinger said, another depression would provide the proper occasion for locking government control even more firmly on the economy: "... the New Deal greatly enlarged the reserves of trained personnel; the mobilization of industry during the war provided more experience; and the next depression will certainly mean a vast expansion in government ownership and control. The private owners will not only acquiesce in this. In characteristic capitalist panic, they will demand it."¹⁸

Sometime prior to the 1960 elections, Schlesinger drafted a semi-secret document which bore the title "The Shape of National Politics to Come." Since this memorandum was prepared for the edification of the Democratic leadership, there can be little doubt that President Kennedy chose Schlesinger as his adviser with full knowledge of the opinions it sets forth—perhaps even because of them.

The document makes clear that Schlesinger still thinks patronizingly of the business community; these are people, in his view, who exist to be pushed around and "disciplined" by the government. "The fact has to be faced," he writes, "that private interests and the public interest often come into harsh conflict. The test will lie in willingness to take on the private interests whose aggressive pursuit of their own advantages imperils the general welfare."¹⁹

Schlesinger indicates he is perfectly willing to meet this test. The aggressive private interests, he says, must be "disciplined." Moreover: "The assertion of the public interest will therefore mean, in particular, a determination to prevent special interests from absorbing the communal surplus which ought to be dedicated to communal, not to private, purposes."²⁰ (For workingmen who think this might be acceptable doctrine, Schlesinger indicates his strictures are directed at labor unions as well as businessmen.) Here Schlesinger incorporates, wholesale, the prevailing economic cliché of 1960—the dilemma of the public vs. the private sector. We

are getting plenty of consumer goods, he says ("private interests"), but our public facilities are falling into "disrepair." We are not spending enough on government (this at a time when the national budget stood at the highest point in history). His answer to both problems—cracking down on "private interests" who want to spend their own money on consumer goods, and building up the "public sector," or the amount of money available to government—is therefore obvious: Increase taxes.

Of course, Schlesinger is aware that the American people resist paying still higher taxes; but he is hopeful they can be re-educated to see the error of their ways. "As yet," he says, "the issue is not yet [*sic*] widely understood, as shown by the continuing complaints against taxation, public spending, etc. But gradually it will seem more important to enlarge services than to reduce taxes. Already the idea of the government as the enemy—the one great triumph of Republican propaganda in the last two decades—is beginning to give way before the idea of the government as one means by which a community achieves its purposes."²¹

Like certain other Liberals, Schlesinger is willing to pay his respects to individual freedom—particularly if the "freedom" up for discussion is the "civil liberty" of the radical left. He even saluted freedom in his 1947 article, saying that "if socialism (*i.e.*, the ownership by the state of all significant means of production) is to preserve democracy, it must be brought about step by step in a way which will not disrupt the fabric of custom, law, and mutual confidence upon which personal rights depend."²² He never makes clear, however, how "personal rights" can exist in an economy wherein "all significant means of production," and therefore virtually all power over the means of subsistence, are in the hands of government.

Schlesinger has further qualified his belief in individual freedom by remarking that "the value of the individual can

become abstract and sterile; arrogant forms of individualism sometimes discredit the basic faith in the value of the individual."²³ "Arrogant" forms of individualism are apparently the same thing as "aggressive private interests"—people who want to conduct their affairs in their own way, not according to the plan of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Schlesinger clinches the point by adding that the "individualism" he prefers is that which "derives freely from the community."²⁴ Which means, if it means anything, that private rights can exist only by leave of "the community," *i.e.*, government. Which means they are not rights at all.

In matters of economics Schlesinger's writings are generally a superficial confection of whatever happens to be prevalent among the Liberal intelligentsia. His memorandum to the Democratic leaders, as previously suggested, is in fact a sort of retail version of J. Kenneth Galbraith's theories, devoid of Galbraith's wit or economic expertise.

Schlesinger seems charmingly innocent of the forces which make our economy run. The prosperity of America, produced by the free enterprise system, he takes as sort of given—something which is simply there, to be chopped up and redistributed according to whatever plan "intellectuals" like himself happen to devise. He takes no thought for the incentives which must exist for free men to create such abundance, and insofar as he is required to notice them he obviously thinks them contemptible. He says derisively, in the Galbraith manner: "While consumer goods pour out of our ears, while our cars grow longer and our kitchens shinier and gadgets and gimmicks overflow our closets and our attics, the public framework of society, *on which everything else rests*, is overstrained by population growth and falls into disrepair." (*Italics added.*)²⁵ Any economist, no matter what his persuasion, could tell Schlesinger that the free economy does not "rest" on the "public framework" of 12,000,000 government employees. Just the opposite is the case—public expenditures

paid for by taxes are possible only if there are industry, production, jobs and wages—from which taxes can be taken. Without the free economy, the “public sector” would have no means of support.

Schlesinger's imitative economics sometimes leads him into blatant contradiction. In his 1960 memorandum, he lambastes our long cars and our shiny kitchens as the needless excrescences of a private-interest economy. Because we have followed the ways of free enterprise, with its bias toward consumer goods, we have become “the affluent society,” awash with gadgetry, oblivious to the plight of worthy bureaucrats. He thus makes it clear that “the affluent society” is entirely the fault of capitalistic free enterprise.

In a later effort, however, he says precisely the opposite. In a 1962 piece prepared for the *Saturday Evening Post*, he writes: “The champions of the affirmative state, in their determination to avert Marxist revolution, had to fight conservatism at every step along the way. Nonetheless, they persevered; and the twentieth century in America and Great Britain saw the rejection of *laissez faire*, the subjugation of the business cycle, the drowning of revolution in a torrent of consumer goods and the establishment of the ‘affluent society’.”²⁶

Thus the “affluent society,” formerly characterized as the distasteful result of free enterprise, is now described as the glorious result of “the affirmative state.” Responsibility for affluence, in Schlesinger's view, evidently depends upon how you want to evaluate it. If you want to describe it in its aspect of materialism and “greed,” then you pin it on conservatives; but if you want to invoke its great creative potencies, then you claim it for Liberalism.

It is a disingenuous game Schlesinger is playing; but while his arguments may change with the winds, his objectives do not: The aggrandizement of government power, and the reduction of individual choice—these were the lode stars of his

policy, in 1962 as in 1947. Nor has he been alone in that respect.

Among the authorities quoted approvingly by Schlesinger in his "Shape of National Politics" memo is fellow ADAer Joseph S. Clark, Democratic Senator from Pennsylvania. The citation is apposite, for Clark is as outspoken in his professions of collectivist faith as is Schlesinger himself. Clark has described his point of view, for example, as follows: "A Liberal is here defined as one who believes in using the full force of government for the advancement of social, political and economic justice at the municipal, state, national, and international levels . . ."27

As a member of Americans for Democratic Action, Clark is used to hearing the charge that his Liberal philosophy will lead America into a planned economy. He does not deny the charge. In fact, he took occasion to rise to the defense of his fellow Kennedyite and ADAer—and principal author of the 1960 Democratic platform—Chester Bowles, and to confirm the desirability of a planned economy in the United States. There had been some agitation to have Bowles discharged as Under Secretary of State, in part because of his radical views on domestic matters. Clark offered this revealing comment:

It is suggested that one reason why it is necessary to get rid of Mr. Bowles is that he is alleged to be a devotee of the planned economy and welfare state. If Mr. Bowles is to be indicted for such views it will be necessary to indict about three-fourths of the Senators on this side, and about one-fourth of the Senators on the other. If we do not get more planning into our economy and go forward with the welfare measures advocated by the President of the United States, the country will be in a far worse condition than it otherwise would be. I should say that the majority of the Senate will heartily support the well-known views of Mr. Bowles on domestic policy.

Furthermore, I am confident that one reason why the Presi-

dent of the United States has made the decision to retain Mr. Bowles is that, by and large, the President of the United States himself shares those views. It is said that Mr. Bowles is unpopular with the conservative wing of the Democratic Party. So are 45 other Democrats who serve in this body. I suspect their number is not confined to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but I assert also that the views of Mr. Bowles and other members of this body in that regard are shared also by the President of the United States.²⁸

Clark has gone on record abundantly as to what he conceives a "planned economy" to be, and what he wants to do with the "full force of government." In an article for the *Atlantic*, he rejoiced that American schools were training young people to accept a government-dominated society. "It is significant," he wrote, "that what used to be called 'history' is now 'social studies.' Spiritually and economically youth is conditioned to respond to a *Liberal program of orderly policing of society by government*, subject to the popular will, in the interests of social justice."²⁹ (Italics added.)

To get this "orderly policing," Clark itches to do away with the constitutional restraints built into our system by the Founding Fathers. In yet another piece for the *Atlantic*, he discusses this effort of the founders to restrain tyrannical action in government. He says: "In a day when governmental action, if needed at all, could afford to be slow, when the 'tyrant' George III was fresh in men's minds, this original conception, favoring inaction, made good sense. Does it still do so? I think not."³⁰

Apparently Clark was looking the other way when modern tyrants like Mussolini and Hitler and Stalin were making George III seem benevolent by comparison.

Like the Marxists, Clark views social and political problems in terms of a "class struggle." In a 1960 speech, the senator made this revealing comment: "I realize that it is not

considered quite nice to refer in America to anything like a 'class struggle.' That is too Marxian. In America, it is considered nicer to pretend that, 'What's good for General Motors is good for the country.' Yet the tax issue is at heart a class issue."³¹ Clark wants the federal government to step into this class struggle and "redistribute the wealth downward."³² That is why he favors federal aid programs.

Clark enlists himself in the campaign against private opulence, and shows clearly how that campaign leads on to government control. Consider this remarkable passage: "Today we have no national personnel policy or plan. We do not try to steer our best young people into the careers where their brains are needed. We leave the choice to chance and the market place. We hope that a sense of dedication will prove more compelling than the dollar reward."³³

The result of this reliance on the market place, of course, is that people choose the products they want, rather than the products Joe Clark thinks they should want. "Does it really make sense," he asks, "to siphon our ability into color television, the manufacture and sale of soft drinks, cigarettes, whisky and cosmetics, and the advertising of these commodities? Hasn't the time come to start thinking about how to put American capabilities into jobs where they can best advance American national interests?"³⁴ In other words, Americans are not only choosing the wrong goods, but (another way of saying the same thing), they are choosing the wrong jobs. The government should do it for them.

Clark nostalgically recalls that "in 1942, Military Occupation Specialty determined where one served 'the cause of freedom'."³⁵ He wants something of the same sort now; government should pick jobs for us, then "persuade" us to accept its choice. Clark says: "They plan well in Russia. There someone decides where little Ivan is going to work. If, at the age of eleven, he seems unresponsive, he goes back to the collective farm. If he shows promise, his education is con-

tinued at state expense through technical school and the university. Education and incentives for different occupations are adjusted to meet the personnel needs required by the current Five or Seven Year Plan."³⁶

Why can't we do the same thing here, Clark asks, using "persuasion" instead of compulsion? He does not elaborate on what forms "persuasion" strong enough to overcome the incentives of the market place would take; but it winds up sounding a great deal like the compulsion it is supposed to replace. He says: "How can we use *both the carrot and the stick* to get these young people trained and on their way to where they are needed? How can we get more and better teachers, scientists, priests, politicians, rabbis, ministers, and social workers? To get them we will have to settle for fewer brewers, night-club proprietors, and lobbyists."³⁷ (Italics added.) Brewers, night-club owners and lobbyists (including the ADA?) please note. The ADA's prize Senator, with a bland Orwellian twist, describes this program as "staffing freedom."³⁸

In short, the American people don't know what they want. Therefore, the all-seeing Joseph Clark and his ADA brethren would be glad to take care of that item for them—if only our obsolete Constitution didn't stand in the way!

►► 3. *Is It Socialism?*

IT SHOULD BE CLEAR that, whatever the differences between pragmatic politicians of the Kennedy-Johnson mould and leftist theorists of the Schlesinger-Clark school, they are agreed on one thing: The total concentration of power in the federal government in Washington. The quest for domestic power is the number-one objective of the Establishment in all its categories and subdivisions.

Numerous important questions are suggested by this fact, including matters of constitutionality, cost, impact on personal freedom, and the like. But before we discuss such things we must first try to decide, in the round, what it is we are dealing with. Some theoretical grasp of the whole is necessary to set our bearings, to launch us properly upon an inspection of particulars. What is the reason for all this power-seeking? Why does the Establishment want it so badly? And where will we finally end up if we accede to it?

Comprehensive answers to such questions are usually avoided by the proponents of centralization. The critics are not so reticent. Spurred by the writings of such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., they are ready to describe what is happening as "Socialism". As sometimes used, however, the term has been too freely applied. *Every* proposal to centralize power is not "Socialistic," even though it may be mistaken or harmful in its effects. The cry of "Socialism" has often served as a handy reflex to save businessmen or other conservatives the trouble of making a detailed criticism of the action suggested.

In the classical sense, "Socialism" has a clear and definite meaning: Ownership by the state of the means of production and distribution. And that, for the most part, is not the kind of thing being sponsored by Liberalism in America today—a point which Liberals are eager to make. Joseph L. Rauh of Americans for Democratic Action, for example, says his organization is not Socialist, "because we don't believe in government ownership of the means of production."¹ ADA's semi-official biographer, Clifton Brock, makes the same rebuttal.

The Rauh answer, however—and much of the general argument about Socialism in America—ignores the fact that this definition has long since been abandoned by the Socialists themselves. In America, in Great Britain, and in Western Europe, "social democracy" no longer implies extensive nationalization. At its most doctrinaire level, it involves nationalization of certain basic industries. At its most effective level, it involves not government *ownership*, but government *control*.

The change in meaning has been a psychological and political masterstroke. Control, after all, is much easier to obtain than ownership. It is less revolutionary in appearance, therefore less frightening to the public. Transfer of ownership is sudden and total; assertion of control can be pedestrian and piecemeal. The first alarms people; the second pacifies them.

In the end, the result is the same. As Henry George pointed out, formal title to a piece of property is of small importance if government has the right to dispose of the benefits it can yield. What difference does it make if a manufacturer or a laborer or a farmer is, technically, a free agent, so long as government has complete disposal over all energies and resources? The distinction is purely legal and formal, and, while not without value, winds up making little substantive difference to those who have transferred their rights to the state.

That this is indeed the shape of contemporary Socialism may be established readily enough from a number of sources. One source indicating the full awareness of our own rulers concerning the true nature of our subject is a report recently prepared for the Central Intelligence Agency, surveying, among other things, the shape of internal politics in Western Europe. The report tells us that "leftists and younger leaders" in these countries have come to realize that "it was not necessary to nationalize industry and finance in order to achieve the objectives of Socialism, and that much the same ends could be achieved through welfare programs and through proper use of the mechanism of modern fiscal and monetary systems."²

If that is the gist of Socialism in the Western world, how does it compare with American Liberalism? The differences, it would appear, are small; not that any single program is *per se* equivalent to Socialism, but rather that the effective tendency of Establishment policy is toward Socialist objectives. The Establishment, or at any rate a sizable and vocal part of it, *wants* to achieve these objectives, and consciously views each individual measure as a building block which will help construct a collectivist United States.

In 1933, New Dealer Stuart Chase, discussing the prospects of national economic self-sufficiency, said: "It can only be undertaken when governments take power and speculative

profits away from businessmen and bankers. Vast and delicate problems of adjustment are entailed, which cannot be left to the clumsy hands of high finance. New industries must be set up; old industries liquidated; industrial research for substitute commodities encouraged on a large scale; millions of unemployed steered to new jobs; colossal capital shrinkage adjusted in some fashion; such foreign trade as remains rigidly budgeted by central authority.”³

In 1939, Rexford G. Tugwell, one of the original theorists of the New Deal, put matters this way: “It seems to me that we are now engaged in a more or less conscious process of reassigning and redistributing powers and controls . . . In certain spheres, no doubt, where enterprise is affected with a public interest we shall be forced to resort to an increasing degree of public authority to achieve the necessary control.”⁴

More recently, Liberal economist Robert Theobald—whose views are endorsed by a high official of the Fund for the Republic as “texts” for the Liberal administration in Washington—described the proper objectives of government policy as follows: “We must recognize the fact that society’s needs may be more important than those of a single person . . . a strict insistence of existing rights would lead to an intolerable situation for all.” In the ideal future, Theobald adds, “Each person and each pressure group would be willing to concede that the interests of the community as a whole—once they were known—should take priority over their own interests.” Theobald observes that “many of the policies now required by the situation have been described in the past as socialist and communist and therefore arouse widespread mistrust.” He is happy to note, however, that such “doctrinal” considerations now receive less attention than formerly.⁵

To take a final example, consider the 1964 platform of Americans for Democratic Action, which quite straightforwardly states: “The blind forces of the market place cannot

be depended upon either to achieve full employment and vigorous growth or to direct economic resources in accordance with national priorities. For these purposes we need democratic national economic planning to evaluate our resources and our needs and to develop an order of priorities for the application of resources and our needs . . .”⁶

The dominant urge, in short, is to get *control*—to plan, direct, manipulate. Control, to be sure, for the best of purposes—as defined by Liberals. But then Socialists, too, want control for the best of purposes—as defined by Socialists. The object is to put government in charge of everybody’s destiny; to have economic and other decisions made, not by private individuals according to their own lights in the employment of their own energies, but by political authorities wielding the mace of power.

Compare with these Liberal statements the following utterance by British Socialist Douglas Jay: “. . . the cure for underemployment . . . lies in the adoption of a rationalized employment policy. Such a policy is not necessarily Socialist; but it can only be adopted by a government which abandons *laissez-faire* theory, and undertakes wholeheartedly the deliberate planning of the nation’s economic life. The redistribution of resources and incomes, however, which is necessary to effect a better adjustment of resources to needs, must always be the central aim of Socialist policy.”⁷ The differences between Mr. Jay’s formulation of the matter and that used by ADA are not readily discernible.

The power being sought by Liberals achieves its most potent effects by avenues which seem indirect and tortuous—although as the process of centralization continues this becomes less and less the case. The fact remains that the control is there. Its chief instrument, chosen by the New Deal and wielded vigorously by Liberals ever since, is the economic analysis of John Maynard Keynes.

Keynesian theory assumes government should manipulate

the economy. It views economic life, not as a series of transactions between private individuals, but as a vast impersonal "flow" of goods and services, which can and should be turned on and off like water from a spigot. That the multifarious exchanges of private individuals do add up to such a flow, which is to a certain extent manipulatable, is, of course, economic fact. But the converse fact that by controlling and manipulating the flow one also controls and manipulates millions of individual human beings is also true. The essence of the Keynesian analysis is to regard this fact as irrelevant.

In its leading premise that government should control the economic activities of its citizens, Keynesian economics incorporates the central objective of the Socialists. In its detailed workings, it incorporates another Socialist objective as well. The avowed purpose of Keynesian fiscal and monetary manipulations is to transfer resources away from those who lend money to those who borrow it and earn it as wages. By pursuit of a "loose money" policy through the central banking system and inflation through deficit finance, Keynesian government makes it unprofitable to save or to lend money at interest. The value of savings is eaten up by depreciation of the currency; the interest rate is driven down below the market rate by control of the banks. The net result is "the euthanasia of the rentier"—that is, expropriation of the saving, money-lending class in order to assist the entrepreneur and the wage-earner. The goal, in short, is to "redistribute the wealth" through the intricate workings of money and credit. Moreover, the Keynesian program, through what has turned out to be a permanent spiral of inflation, induces governmental controls to deal with the rising prices that result from its own profligacy.

All of these things are essential features of American Liberal government today—aptly described by Swiss economist Wilhelm Roepke as "fiscal Socialism." Our officials do not view the taxing power, for example, simply as a means of

raising revenue. They view it instead as a method of deciding how much American citizens ought to spend. They believe government should take money away from private individuals who will spend it unwisely, and put it in the hands of bureaucrats, who will of course spend it wisely. They are, as we shall see, eager to gain other controls which result from all this activity—particularly the control which follows necessarily from the extension of subsidy. Finally, they are happy to employ the control implicit everywhere by mere dint of the fact that so much power has been accumulated; as authority is drained into the central government in Washington, alternative centers of decision are progressively enfeebled. When the central government misbehaves, there is no one influential enough to restrain it.

Against that background, it is not surprising that British Socialist John Strachey should remark: "Was it not apparent that Keynesism has only to be pushed a little further and a state of things might emerge in which the nominal owners of the means of production, although left in full possession of the legal title to their property, would in reality be working not for themselves but for whatever hands had grasped the central levers of social control?"⁸ Was it not apparent, in short, that Keynesism comes out precisely where modern Socialism itself has come out—securing control of the economy to government, leaving private citizens only the formalities of their free estate?

The presumption grows that bracketing modern Liberalism with Socialism is not so great an injustice as Mr. Rauh and some of his colleagues would have us believe. Indeed, the similarities have become so marked that certain Liberals, and certain Socialists, have said as much. There has been a progressive intertwining of Liberalism with American and European Socialism over the past few decades, to the point where conservative critics may be forgiven if they do not always know which is which.

It is fact, for example, that many contemporary spokesmen of the Establishment have emerged directly from the Socialist movement. To take only the most illustrious examples, it is worth noting that both Walter Lippmann, the columnist, and Walter Reuther, the labor leader, are alumni of the Intercollegiate Socialist Society, Lippmann having been head of the Socialist club at Harvard, Reuther at Wayne State University. These two men represent the quintessence of Establishment muscle—Lippmann as verbalizer, Reuther as political ramrod. That both in their college days became impregnated with Socialist doctrine does not tell us anything about their present opinions. But a survey of those opinions reveals their displacement from Socialist orthodoxy is roughly the same as that experienced by Socialism itself. Neither advocates “nationalization” of industries; both advocate extensive government control of the economy.

Also illustrative of our point is Hubert Humphrey, current Vice President of the United States. Humphrey is an advocate of almost every conceivable proposal to expand the scope of federal power, to substitute government control for the free play of private decision. He is a champion of Americans for Democratic Action and all its ideological baggage. Indeed, he could hardly be otherwise, having performed as founder, national chairman, and perennial vice chairman of it. On one memorable occasion, Humphrey suggested the fullness of his obeisance to ADA in the following words: “So far as the ADA is concerned, I, too, am one of its officers. I think it is no secret that on occasion this great organization has seen fit to chastise me, and perhaps properly so. Perhaps I did not understand why at the moment, but their judgment is undoubtedly better than mine.”⁹ Fortunately for Humphrey, such self-abasement has not often been necessary, since ADA has seldom disagreed with his stance on issues. In 15 years’ service in the U.S. Senate, Humphrey voted in accordance with ADA wishes on 191 out of 194 key roll calls, a pro-ADA percentage of 97 per cent.

Humphrey is a close personal friend of Great Britain's Socialist leader Harold Wilson. According to the London *Observer*, Humphrey and Wilson took a 1963 jaunt together to a Socialist conclave in Europe. And in his 1964 campaign book, Humphrey spoke in genial terms of European Socialists, pointing out that "socialism" on the continent and "Liberalism" in America are virtually identical¹⁰—the point which his ADA colleague, Mr. Rauh, was at pains to deny.

Humphrey's relationship to America's homegrown Socialists has been equally congenial. An openly Socialist organization, the League for Industrial Democracy (out of whose youth contingent, ISS, emerged Humphrey admirers Lippmann and Reuther), lists him as one of its "co-operators." In 1948, the year he was elected to the Senate, Humphrey accepted the LID's "Reunion of Old-Timers" award.

In 1951, Humphrey delivered a eulogy to the Rand School, a self-described Socialist group controlled by the American Socialist Society. One of the courses offered by the school claimed to train people as "Socialist Party or labor union organizers, secretaries, writers, and speakers." Addressing an anniversary meeting of this blatantly Socialist organization, Humphrey said: "My only regret in this heart-warming anniversary celebration is that Rand schools do not dot the land from New England to California."¹¹

Unsurprisingly, Humphrey won election-year accolades from the dean of American Socialists, Norman Thomas. In a 1964 speech in Chicago, Thomas expressed his backing for Humphrey as Vice President, saying Humphrey was "the type of Democrat who would be a Socialist if he got to England."¹²

Humphrey's position in our government, needless to remark, is of great substantive importance. Should anything happen to President Johnson, this friend of Socialism and Socialists would be in control of the immense potencies of the Federal executive. But Humphrey is, for the moment, even more important symbolically. He illustrates the whole drift

and trend of Establishment politics. The items alluded to above were of course well known to the leaders of the Democratic Party and to the opinion-moulding members of the Establishment. They could not, on the record, have cared less. They accepted Humphrey, ADA ties, collectivist sympathies, and all, without public demur. That acceptance suggests how far down the road toward a native collectivism we have advanced.

It is worth noting, for example, that Norman Thomas' 1964 enthusiasms were not limited to the person of Hubert Humphrey. The Socialist leader also endorsed and campaigned for Lyndon Johnson, and gave enthusiastic backing to the Johnson domestic program. Indeed, Thomas has given his backing to the whole tendency of Establishment policy, reading it—for all the world like a member of the NAM—as an exercise in crypto-Socialism.¹³ For that reason, Thomas has felt it unnecessary in recent elections to run as a Socialist candidate for President.

Thomas is particularly pleased by the Johnson administration's battle against "poverty." According to the *Chicago Tribune* Thomas has said of Johnson's program: "I ought to rejoice and I do. I rub my eyes in amazement and surprise. His war on poverty is a Socialistic approach and may be the major issue of the 1964 campaign."¹⁴ In a subsequent letter to the *Tribune*, Thomas said the war on poverty "would have to go farther along Socialist lines."¹⁵ He did not retract or deny the original quote.

In October 1964, the Liberal Establishment reciprocated Thomas' esteem. A "Norman Thomas 80th Birthday Committee" set about raising funds to give to Thomas to "spend as he wills," as a means of supporting him and "the things for which he stands,"¹⁶ and Establishment figures rushed to get their names on the list of sponsors. Among those lending their names to the fund appeal were Senators Maurine Neuberger, Ernest Gruening, Clifford Case, and Harrison

Williams, ADA figures Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., J. Kenneth Galbraith and Walter Reuther, and such other representative Liberals as Ralph Bunche, Norman Cousins, Adolph A. Berle, Jr., and Martin Luther King.

Another old Socialist overjoyed by Johnson's war on poverty was Upton Sinclair. "I've been working on poverty since I was a little boy," Sinclair said in 1964. "Johnson's anti-poverty program is a miracle for which I've been working all my life. The President is my man. He's going to accomplish the feat." Sinclair added that "I'm as much of a Socialist as I have always been, but I have come to realize Socialism will come slowly and it won't be labeled as such."¹⁷

That the war on poverty admired by Thomas and Sinclair is indeed "a Socialistic approach" seems obvious enough in view of the fact that its major inspiration is traced to an avowed Socialist named Michael Harrington. Harrington is the author of a book called *The Other America*, a study claiming that 50 million U.S. citizens, by Harrington's lights, are impoverished. By every available account, this book is the "bible" of the Kennedy-Johnson poverty corps.

That the Democratic administration would call on a militant Socialist for counsel and advice, and premise a major program on the result, seems improbable, if only for the political risks involved. Yet such seems to be the case. That Harrington is a Socialist is no state secret. He calls himself such, has edited the Socialist weekly *New America*, and is a contributing editor of *Dissent*, an avowedly Socialist quarterly. On the other hand, there is equally little doubt that Harrington was the moving spirit behind the chief political brainstorm of the Liberal regime. *Newsweek* magazine—which being owned by the ADA-oriented *Washington Post* should know whereof it speaks—reports that "the late President Kennedy asked Walter Heller, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, for a copy of Michael Harrington's newly-published nontechnical report on poverty, *The Other*

America, and for the more scholarly analyses by economists like Leon Keyserling and Robert Lampman, a University of Wisconsin specialist on low-income families.”¹⁸ *Newsweek* went on to say that chief poverty battler R. Sargent Shriver’s “brainstormers” included “Defense Department’s Adam Yarmolinsky and Pat Moynihan of Labor, reinforced by intellectuals like Harrington,” offered a quote by Harrington about the inadequacy of what was being planned, and threw in a final reference to Harrington as one who had recently “huddled” with Shriver.¹⁹ *Time* added the intelligence that Harrington’s book “impressed Jack Kennedy, who used the Harrington phrase, ‘the invisible poor’ in his speeches” and that “presidential economic adviser Walter Heller is thoroughly familiar with Harrington’s thin, 191-page volume.”²⁰ Finally, “poverty” spokesmen told an inquiring reporter that Harrington had personally been invited to Washington by Shriver to serve as chief idea man, and that the committee considered Harrington’s book the definitive work on the subject. During the 1964 campaign Harrington returned the favor to the Johnson regime by supporting it against the Goldwater-Miller ticket. *The New York Times*—declaring “Many Socialists Back Johnson, Thomas Will Tour Nation to Support President”—reported that among prominent Socialists backing the Johnson-Humphrey ticket were Irwin Suall, Thomas, and Harrington.²¹

The fact that Socialist Harrington is the chief inspiration of the chief domestic program of the Johnson administration seems clear. And, whatever else this may or may not mean, it certainly leaves the Liberal regime little room for complaint that it is being blackguarded when some critic describes its programs as “Socialistic.”

►► 4. *"Aid" Means Control*

IF ESTABLISHMENT POLITICIANS and ideologues seek to control the economy, how do they go about it? Troops, except on rare occasions, do not go marching about the streets. Newspapers have not been padlocked. Industry is not nationalized. Whence comes the power the Liberal wants to achieve?

The answer can be phrased in many ways, but the version that has become most familiar to Americans is summed up in the two words, "federal aid." By use of the taxing and spending power, the government can effectively evade constitutional restrictions upon the scope of its authority. It can take away from individual citizens the power to dispose of their own resources. It can make individuals and interest groups dependent upon its will for their sustenance. And, finally, it can impose controls upon the recipients of its largess.

Possessed of all these virtues, "federal aid" has become the favored technique of the Establishment. There is no need to

own an industry if it is sufficiently "aided," sufficiently dependent on government; it can readily be controlled in a pinch without any alteration in the form of ownership. There is no need to abolish local autonomies if in point of fact cities and states, dependent on federal handouts, must obey the federal will in all major decisions. There is no need for collectivized agriculture if the farmer, having accepted price supports, has also put on the straitjacket of acreage controls. Through the philosopher's stone of "aid," all aspects of American life can be brought under control of the government in Washington.

This is not to say direct controls, some forms of government ownership, and outright usurpation are altogether ruled out. But it is apparent that "aid" programs offer the most effective, the least painful, and politically the most popular way of getting the job done. Through the magic of "aid" the quest for power becomes a philanthropic mission, in which the affections and the freedom of the citizenry are purchased with their own money. Thus the characteristic Liberal response to almost any problem in our society is to legislate "aid." There is no phase of American life which is not being thoroughly "aided" by one or another agency in the jumble of Washington authorities, which is not in some way dependent upon a contract or a subsidy from government, which is not programmed for still more "aid" in the future, and which therefore is not effectively under the thumb of the federal bureaucracy.

There are many aspects of this problem worthy of consideration. One is the built-in fallacy of states and localities shipping money to Washington, having sizable deductions made there as the cost of handling, bungling, and general overhead, and then receiving back the diminished remainder with thanks as "aid." Another is the false argument that federal taxing resources are more competent to handle modern problems than are state and local resources—a contention

successfully demolished by Roger A. Freeman in his *Taxes For the Schools*. Yet another is the false hypothesis of "need" worked up to justify every such proposal—whether it concerns medical care for the aged or funds for school construction. And still another is the widespread opportunity for graft and corruption presented by the throwing about of such great sums of money, problems which have been all too evident in such things as the urban renewal and farm programs. These matters are too vast and intricate to be examined in full here, although the question of need in a typical Establishment enterprise, and the problem of corruption, will be looked into briefly in succeeding chapters. For the moment, the problem which concerns us is the impact of these taxing-and-spending programs upon American freedoms, the technique by which they put the free citizen under the control of the ADA ideologues and the "masters of the *ad hoc*" who populate the Liberal regime in Washington.

Perhaps the most obvious method of control is in the exertion of the taxing power itself. As such as Schlesinger and Clark make clear, taxation is an effective means of transferring the power to make decisions away from the private citizen and vesting it in the federal government. If the citizen is not allowed to keep the fruits of his labors, he will not be able to buy himself that mauve Cadillac or chartreuse XKE; instead he will have a new federally-supported civic center or an urban renewal project, which is of course much better for him. Indeed, the funds taken from the citizen for such purposes by government amount simply to putting him to work in the government's behalf.

Beyond this, the increasing scope of governmental activities and the vast services which government therefore requires from one business or another, mean an increasing number of people who are in thrall to governmental desires. To consider but one example: In the steel crisis of April, 1962, when President Kennedy sought to bend the industry's

pricing policies to his will, timely if rather heavy-handed use was made of governmental contracts with the industry. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara scarcely troubled to conceal the threat of lost contracts if the steel companies did not come around to the New Frontier's dictates. "I have noted," said the secretary, "that while iron and steel prices have increased by 90% since 1947, the prices of nonferrous metals have increased by only 40%. Therefore, we are particularly studying the possibility for replacement of steel by other materials including the potential of increased research and development in this area."¹ The meaning of this statement could hardly have been missed: Either do what the President tells you, or lose your contract. Anyone familiar with management thinking in large corporations dealing with the government can testify that the same message forms a backdrop for every critical decision. Particularly in areas of public controversy, the fear of losing government contracts rests like a giant hand on the policy-making machinery of American business.

If the mere existence of a government contract provides the elements of government control, it should be clear that the extension of a direct subsidy provides them still more effectively. Any business, any farmer, any community dependent upon government largess must obviously face the same considerations as those spelled out for U.S. Steel in 1962. Action contrary to governmental desires can result in the loss of governmental subvention. That elementary equation alone would be sufficient to introduce the element of control into every scheme of "federal aid." But as it happens there is much more to the business of federal control than the knowledge that resistance may mean the loss of subsidy. For every scheme of "aid" necessarily involves, not simply this negative sanction, but a system of positive, active control, directing and altering the behavior of the recipient in the pattern of Establishment desires. Federal aid, at all times implies this kind of active control.

This is so for a number of reasons. Constitutionally, the Supreme Court has determined that the government has the right to control that which it subsidizes. Practically, it would make no sense for the government to appropriate money for some purpose and then take no effective steps to see the purpose carried out. Morally, the government has no right to take taxpayer's dollars and to distribute them irresponsibly, without maintaining some influence over the way in which they are spent. All of these things provide quite legitimate and necessary bases for "control."

There is, moreover, another reason for control—the desire of the Establishment to have it. This, indeed, is the major reason for Establishment advocacy of "aid" programs—the fact that "aid" *does* mean control, and therefore will enable the federal government to remold American institutions in the pattern of Liberal ideology. Federal aid, as Senator Clark has indicated, supplies a means of breaking past the will of local agencies, of redistributing the wealth, of enacting uniform national programs to supersede diverse local programs.

It is amazing to note that Establishment aid advocates persist in denying that aid means control. There are few facts easier to ascertain, *a priori* or on the historical record. The chief reason for such control was stated some 30 years ago by John J. Tigert, former U.S. Commissioner of Education. "Reason and experience," Tigert said, "both indicate that federal money cannot be expended wisely and efficiently except by exercising federal control and supervision; even then there is considerable waste . . . If we embark upon a program of turning over federal money to schools without any strings attached, it is only a question of time until the waste, extravagance, and misuse of these funds will result in a reaction or a change. The alternative is federal control."²

Congressman John Lesinski (D-Mich.), former chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee, put it that "it is impossible to draft a general federal aid bill which will not contain a great deal of federal control over local school sys-

tems . . . I am convinced, after the hard study we have put to the question, that no acceptable bill preventing federal domination of local schools can be drawn. I reluctantly came to the conclusion, but I had to face the facts.”³ Lesinski’s successor as Chairman of the House Committee, Congressman Graham Barden (D-N.C.) agreed, citing numerous examples of federal interference under legislation to aid schools in federally-impacted areas. Even so respected a member of the Establishment as James Bryant Conant came to a similar conclusion. “To imagine that recurring appropriations of this magnitude can be made without careful budgeting on the part of the administration seems to me to be the equivalent of imagining completely irresponsible government. Careful budgeting will mean, in turn, a strong executive agency which must have access to a mass of factual information about the educational situation in every state . . . The educational committees of the House and Senate will have every reason to examine into details of curricula and school organization, much as committees of the state legislatures now do from time to time.”⁴

And so, invariably, it has turned out. Federal stipends, be they for education or flood control, always carry with them federal “standards” or “guidelines” governing the way in which they must be spent. One community after another has found this out to its sorrow after becoming involved in various federal programs:

Item. Participating in the federal government’s unemployment compensation program, the state of Ohio discovered its own money could not be used in the way it saw fit. Ohio employers had paid some \$30 million in taxes for unemployment compensation, of which \$17 million was to be returned to the state. This \$17 million belonged to Ohio, and was to be administered by an agency of the Ohio government. The federal Department of Labor, however, believed Ohio should adopt two procedural rules governing the dis-

tribution of the money. It withheld the \$17 million until the rules were complied with.

Item. The state of Nebraska decided to accept federal funds for certain educational purposes, in the amount of \$150,000. When the state Board of Education sent along to Washington its plans for use of the money, however, it was informed that "the math and science program" would have to be revised "according to the guidelines sent out by the federal government," if the state was going to receive the money. As one Nebraska newspaper put it, "The federal department will set the terms and the state will follow them."⁵

Item. Various participants in even so innocuous-sounding an affair as the federal school lunch program have found too many controls for their liking. Federal guidelines concerning menus and the matter of who should or should not be served lunch at school often conflict with state and local practices. Result: Many schools, in Los Angeles, Phoenix, Indianapolis and elsewhere, have withdrawn from the program rather than brook federal interference with their local programs.⁶

Item. In the city of Cleveland, Ohio, federal urban renewal authorities commanded the demolition of "structurally sound" buildings for such minor items as burned-out lights, chipped plaster, and rubbish in the basement. Federal authorities also ordered razing of certain buildings because they were not "compatible" with what the planners deemed proper use of the land. Housing codes to determine what is substandard and what is not according to federal conceptions are part and parcel of all urban renewal and public housing programs sustained by federal money.

Item. George Peabody College in Nashville, Tennessee, withdrew from participation in the National Defense Education Act because it found that, to get federal funds, it had to lower its academic standards regarding admissions, was not allowed to make its own changes in the curriculum, was pre-

vented from making changes in personnel, and was subjected to arbitrary conditions about when and how to recruit students for its program.

Item. The President of the University of Louisville testified unhappily that his school had eight doctoral programs, all in science, and all resulting from the shaping influence of federal funds.

Item. When voters in California passed a referendum proposition repealing a state "fair housing" law, the federal government immediately suspended more than \$100 million in urban renewal grants. The Housing and Home Finance Agency, according to the *San Francisco Chronicle*, said "the reason . . . was that federal law demands anti-discrimination guarantees in such projects, and this pledge could be made no longer because of the proposition's passage."⁷

Item. According to a 1962 M.I.T.-financed study, "1,665,000 persons had been or were about to be required to move from their homes" by federal urban renewal programs. "If the program continues to expand, more millions will be displaced in the future." These people are not consulted as to their wishes in the matter. They are forced to leave their dwellings, and usually end up in housing as bad or worse than what the government took away from them.⁸

Item. In March, 1965, the Federal government announced it was holding up "war on poverty" funds destined for the state of Louisiana because "it does not like some of Gov. John J. McKeithen's appointments under the state's anti-poverty program."⁹ Complaints had been lodged that two of the governor's appointees were segregationists—which is not unlikely in view of the fact that the governor himself is a segregationist. It was not asserted that the men in question had done anything discriminatory with respect to the poverty program; they simply *were* segregationists, and that was enough to cause withdrawal of the funds. Federal money, in short, was employed as a lever to obtain conformity in a

matter of personal opinion with no connection, so far as the record at that time disclosed, to the purpose of the project in question.

Every federal program carries with it an infra-structure of controls. Even land-grant colleges, often brought forward as examples of "aid" recipients who have not suffered from controls, have had their curricula angled toward "military science, agriculture, and the mechanic arts."¹⁰ Other more detailed controls are exerted in other programs, including financial audits, specifications for equipment and types of service, guidelines as to who is a proper participant, etc. There is no federal program on record which has not carried some of these controls, and which has not therefore influenced recipients to conform to federal designs.

Other examples, particularly in the field of urban renewal and housing, might be cited at length. But these will suggest the general tendency of the controls resulting from federal "aid"—controls which inevitably follow from the desire of the authorities in Washington to see their legislative and administrative purposes fulfilled. We have cited the preponderance of the examples from the field of education, because it is in education, in training of the minds of the coming generations, that control can be most effective, and should be most feared. It is also in education that the protestations of "no control" from aid advocates have been most vehement.

The fact is that the Establishment *wants* control of America's schools, for a variety of reasons transcending administrative necessity. This can be demonstrated easily enough by noting Liberal opposition to the so-called "tax-credit" idea. Under the "tax-credit" plan, parents of college students and donors to colleges would be allowed to deduct a certain percentage of tuition fees or gifts from their income tax. The result of such a program would be to ease financial hardship on parents and make gifts to higher education a much more attractive proposition.

Such a program would answer the asserted need for more money to higher education. Indeed, it would make more money available for that purpose than would an "aid" program administered in Washington, since there would be no outlay required for administrators, forms, office space, etc., in the national capital. Yet many of the same Liberals who repeatedly stress the urgency of making money available to the colleges have ranged themselves against the "tax-credit" idea. The reason is simple: Under this proposal, there would be no control. The federal government would not allocate the money; it would not be able to determine which schools would get it, or for what purposes; it would not be able to lay down guidelines for the curriculum or oversee administration; it would not be able to threaten withdrawal of funds from a school which did not conform to Establishment ideas.¹¹

That control is what the Establishment is after has also been made clear by such as Senator Clark, in his frank statement that Federal "aid" programs offer an opportunity for reshaping the economic structure of the country, a means of "redistributing the wealth downward." A like opinion has been sent out under the imprimatur of the National Education Association, the Establishment's principal agent in prosecuting the nationalization of American schools. In an NEA pamphlet entitled "The Root Of the Opposition," executive editor John McCormally of the Hutchinson, Kansas, *News*, spelled out the Clark view at length. The real issue in federal-aid-to-education programs, McCormally said, concerns the desire of the "majority" in America to "exert most of its political energy" in the job of "controlling, curtailing, and transforming capitalism into some forms and stages of socialism." Public education is an avenue for such activity, he goes on, but offered no great possibilities "as long as it remained local." "The masses might fill the schools with their children; *but the community leaders*—its business and pro-

fessional men—those concerned with preserving the community's wealth, *controlled the schools*. And they kept them inexpensive." (Italics added.)

Federal aid to education provides a means for getting around this difficulty, and thus the battle over federal aid is "a fight between the people with the wealth and the people with the kids . . . Once public education has been made as much a federal responsibility as national defense or national highways, more money than was ever dreamed of will be spent on it. More than ever of the nation's wealth will be taken from those who possess it and spent on the nation's children."¹²

This statement is notable in several respects—particularly for its class-struggle motif and its avowal that federal aid programs represent a stage on the road to Socialism. Yet the important point is the writer's clear affirmation that what is desired is to take *control* of the schools away from the local authorities; local schools are dominated by the men of wealth; the federal government will put an end to this. The issue is first one of who shall control the schools, and thereafter one of how much money shall be spent.

The opinions of someone in Hutchinson, Kansas, would be only obliquely significant to the national destiny if they were the opinions of but a single man. But the point about Mr. McCormally's creed is that it has been handsomely printed up and mailed out by the National Education Association, chief lobbyist for federal "aid" and ruling force in American public education. Quite obviously, the NEA agrees with Mr. McCormally, and it is the NEA which calls the tune in getting "aid" programs enacted and in administering them once they are on the books.

In early 1961, *The New Republic* and the *Washington Post*—Establishment publications with great influence in Washington—printed a commentary on federal "aid" affirming the Clark-McCormally-NEA thesis. More money would

be spent on education, the article said, but "the question of how this money should be spent, and who ultimately will be the school's masters remains a topic of heated debate." And: "Congress will be told of all the ways in which federal money could be more wisely spent, if the myopic local school boards or the self-seeking state legislators were not in the saddle."¹³ Under local supervision of the schools, the article goes on, such know-nothings as the DAR and local clergymen can exert influence on the curriculum; whereas under federal control the "experts" (that is, the NEA panjandrums who mail out brochures proclaiming the virtues of Socialism) can take charge without fear of local pressures.

Also in 1961, Congressman John Ashbrook (R-Ohio) uncovered an almost identical statement on "local control" within the ranks of the Education Office itself. In a speech on the floor of the House, Ashbrook disclosed:

Carroll Hansen, Director, Publications Services, Office of Education, transmitted an unpublicized memorandum to the Committee on Mission and Organization when it started its work which ultimately wound up in the report in question ["A Federal Education Agency for the Future"; see below]. In it he laid bare the real nemesis of the federal bureaucrats—the tradition of local control. On one hand he referred to this doctrine as a "valuable tradition" but this window dressing was brushed aside completely with these prophetic words: "However, the tradition of local control has been used by certain groups to forestall increased expenditures for education; it has been used to frighten the Office of Education out of areas where the national interest is involved and where the Office does have a legitimate concern. The tradition of local control should no longer be permitted to inhibit Office of Education leadership."¹⁴

These three items draw back the veil from Liberal purposes in promoting federal "aid": To break down local autonomies, notoriously resistant to the prevailing clichés of the Establishment, and to homogenize American schools into a single system, administered in Washington where the Es-

tablishment is in charge. This might well give Liberalism so firm a purchase on the minds of American youngsters that nothing could dislodge it.*

How far have we proceeded toward this objective? Much further, it would appear, than most people would care to believe. In 1963, a House committee headed by Representative Edith Green (D-Ore.) determined that the federal government, through a gaggle of programs administered through seven different agencies, was already spending \$1.8 billion a year on "aid" to education. The committee made the astounding discovery that more than half of America's graduate students (22,000 out of 40,000) were already receiving federal assistance in one form or another, and estimated that by 1970 some three-fourths of them (60,000 out of 80,000) would thus be subsidized. Which means that three-quarters of the future intellectual class of America will be at least in part beholden to the federal government for its advanced educational work.

In April, 1961, the U.S. Office of Education took note of the proliferating aid programs, found them good, but urged that they be consolidated, in so far as was possible, under its own control. Rumors about the agency's report to this effect, "A Federal Education Agency for the Future," circulated about Washington for many weeks; the document was alleged to be a blueprint for federal takeover of the schools. In response to these charges, the education office published the report, saying nothing could be further from its inten-

* When the Johnson administration finally did push a Federal-aid-to-education bill through, it contained many controls indeed. The control features, unsurprisingly, were found good by Liberal commentators. The *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* observed that the bill's insistence on Federally-established "effective procedures, including provision for appropriate measurements of educational achievement," authority given the U. S. Commissioner of Education to disseminate "to teachers and administrators significant information derived from education research," and provision for appointment of a 12-member National Advisory Council on Education for the Disadvantaged, "to keep the program under surveillance," were all necessary "safeguards," "even though some states-righters may raise the cry of Federal control."

tions than a "takeover." Assertions that the report was "a confidential plan to establish federal control of education," said the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, are "completely in error both in terms of the substance of the report and in its publication."¹⁵ A reading of the report, on the assumption that it was not altered between its confidential and public phases, confirms this defense. It seems clear enough that the Office of Education was not *proposing* a takeover; more accurately, it was *confirming* and *proposing* to reorganize a takeover which had already in large part occurred. To cite a characteristic passage: "The last decade has seen added to the historic functions of the Office . . . a variety of new responsibilities; growing responsibilities in the carrying out of established federal policy; responsibility as the federal government's educational auditor; and distinctive responsibility in the field of international education. All three of these functions are an outgrowth of increasingly active national concern for education. All three of these new major functions point to what may be identified as a fourth—extensive involvement in the *formulation* of national policy."¹⁶ The report continues in this vein—that education is now one of the major responsibilities of the federal government, and that a whole new bureaucracy needs to be charted to oversee this responsibility, pass out the funds, and impose the controls. The document does not say a takeover should occur; it begins from the premise that the takeover is already a fact of life and, with a few ritualistic bows to "pluralism," wants to get the whole thing organized on a sensible, businesslike basis. Anyone reading this document with care must come to realize that federal absorption of the educational system is already well begun. And given the NEA-*New Republic* thesis of what ought to be done once the absorption is completed, it is altogether possible that neither our constitutional system nor our free enterprise economy would survive the result.

►► 5. *The Planned Economy*

AS ENVISIONED by the Founding Fathers the federal government was to perform resolutely certain tasks assigned to it by the Constitution, and refrain from tasks not so assigned. James Madison, in *Federalist* No. 45, gave the matter its classic formulation:

The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the state governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. *The powers reserved to the several states will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the state.*¹ (Italics added.)

If we compare that statement to the collectivist aspirations of the Establishment, it is clear Liberalism seeks to turn Madison's ideas inside-out. Just how close the Establishment has come to completing the job is hard to determine with precision. The higgledy-piggledy, piecemeal method of collectivist advance, the consistent effort of the Establishment to disguise what it is doing, and the contradiction and dilution which result from the give and take of the political system, all tend to confuse things.

In general terms, however, it is obvious the program of inversion is well advanced, and is everywhere pressing forward. It would take more pages of this volume than we can spare to list all the areas where the federal government has absorbed the powers of the states and denied the liberties of the individual. There is no exact way of judging the full size and potency of Federal sprawl, but some idea of it may be derived from the following figures:

1. The federal government dispenses over \$125 billion annually by way of salaries, fees, payments for goods and service, direct subsidies, etc. This amounts to about one-quarter of the Gross National Product. As *U.S. News* observes, "tens of millions of Americans—it could even be a majority of those of voting age—are getting something directly or indirectly out of the Treasury in Washington."²

2. In 1934, the national budget was \$6.3 billion. In 1949, it was \$39.4 billion. In 1956, \$66.2 billion. In 1960, \$76.5 billion. For the four years of the Kennedy-Johnson administration, the figures have been \$81.5 billion, \$87.7 billion, \$92.6 billion and \$98.4 billion. And, it should be added, because some expenditures are not included in the official budget, these figures understate the case.

3. In 1926, the average taxpayer paid a federal income tax of \$7. In 1962, he paid federal taxes of \$860—an increase of better than 12,000 per cent.

4. In 1963, American citizens paid a tax load amounting to

almost one-third of their income. According to estimates by the Council of State Chambers of Commerce, the average citizen had to work 118 days merely to pay his taxes, most of these days in behalf of the federal government.

5. The total assets of the federal government, as of mid-1963, were valued at \$315 billion, an increase of 20 per cent over 1958. The federal authorities, moreover, own one-third of all the land in the United States.

6. Direct federal employment, military and civilian, comes to about five million people. Indirect federal employment, through federal contracts, etc., is estimated at 6.5 million. Another seven million or so are employed by state and local governments, many of them in functions related to or subsidized by federal programs. Total government employment, direct and indirect, comes to 18.5 million people, or better than one-fourth of the American work force. The federal payroll in 1963, for civilian employment only, came to \$15.9 billion.

7. The real debt of the federal government, counting trust fund obligations, is \$1.2 trillion, according to a 1962 estimate prepared by Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia.³

The federal government, obviously, has become the dominant force in our society. It is our largest employer, owner of land, consumer of coal, electricity, and water, owner of machine tools, customer for lumber, cloth, shoes, and shirts, owner of motor vehicles, etc. It has woven its web of subsidies through every quarter of our society. Subventions from the national treasury are extended to businessmen through the Small Business Administration and the Area Redevelopment and Urban Renewal agencies; to farmers through the Agriculture Department; to laboring men through unemployment compensation; to young people through aid to education and the Job Corps; to the elderly through Social Security and medicare; to city dwellers through urban renewal and

“depressed areas” legislation; to tenants through public housing, etc.

People employed by the federal government, subsidized by it, or receiving contracts from it are obviously open to federal influence and control. But there are other methods of control as well. These include the previously-mentioned fiscal and monetary powers essential to Keynesian manipulations, and the negative control of taxation which deprives the citizen of his earned income at the whim of Washington’s economic numerologists. They also include a vast network of regulations. Federal regulators set prices of commodities from steel to milk. Through the Anti-Trust division of the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission they can exert life or death power over thousands of businesses. The government regulates the sale of stocks and bonds, hectors the management of the drug industry, polices advertising, dictates terms for packaging and lending, sets the conditions for selling a pack of cigarettes. It determines how much money people will be paid for working and for not working. It decides whom a businessman shall hire and fire, and to whom barbecue stands and hot dog emporiums will purvey their services. It forbids employers to give truthful information to employees concerning unions, and even forbids an entrepreneur to go out of business if he so chooses.

Many of these controls are exercised by federal regulatory commissions—governing bodies responsible to the executive branch, but enjoying the powers of legislative, executive and judiciary combined. These agencies deal in “administrative law,” law created by the commissions, executed by them, and judged by them. There are now some 52 independent agencies extending in every direction across the American landscape. They control almost every variety of private business, railroads and airlines and truckers, power companies, radio and television stations. They are vivid embodiment of everything Madison wanted to prevent.

Lowell Mason, a former commissioner of the FTC, says: "Tyranny comes when the government agency operates under such a broad statutory command that it not only invents the means by which it carries on the duties Congress gave it, but can shape its methods to fit its own, rather than the public end."⁴ Such a point, he argues, has been reached in the administrative law sponsored by the Trade Commission. As an example of the *ad lib* authority exercised by the FTC in the jumble of legislation available to it, Mason says: "As an administrator of two anti-trust laws diametrically opposed to each other, it was not difficult for me to accuse everybody at a trade convention with being some kind of law-breaker. Either they were all charging everyone the same price, a circumstance indicating a violation of the Sherman Act, or they were *not* charging everyone the same price, a circumstance indicating violation of the Robinson-Patman Act."⁵

In addition to the programmatic effort to put more power in the hands of government, there has been a drive to put power, within the government, into the hands of the President.

In his message to Congress of January 11, 1962, President Kennedy requested standby authority to cut taxes on his own discretion and to launch public works programs—both supposedly to combat recession, both in fact unprecedented suggestions that Congress surrender its constitutional powers to the executive branch. A week later, the President requested a five-year authorization to cut tariffs through direct Presidential negotiation with foreign countries. A fortnight later came the Urban Affairs plan and the Kennedy farm program—both of which would have given the executive branch vast discretionary powers over the American citizen. In March, Kennedy asked that many of the functions of the National Science Foundation be placed under his authority. In April he requested sweeping executive powers over the manufac-

ture and sale of drugs, as well as the power to select his own Federal Reserve Board Chairman. The latter proposal would have placed in presidential hands broad powers for political manipulation of the economy, through control of the rediscount rate and reserve requirements, affecting the availability of bank credit.

The Republican Senate Policy Committee, in a statement issued in July 1963, estimated that "during the entire Second session of the 87th Congress, the President made 88 requests for monies, and 29 requests for Presidential powers. In the first six months of this session the President has made 207 requests for monies and 70 requests for Presidential powers." In October, 1964, the Policy Committee ran a similar check on President Johnson's first eleven months in office, and found that he had made no less than 253 requests for money, 110 requests for presidential powers.⁶

Thanks to the relentless initiatives of the executive and the increasingly revolutionary performance of the U.S. Supreme Court, there is today virtually no zone of public life in which federal officials do not claim authority. All of the acts cited above, of course, are violative of the division of powers suggested by Madison. To these are added massive waves of encroachment in one area after another of state authority. It is now maintained, for example, that the federal government can instruct a county within a state to provide public schools to its citizens; that the federal government has the right to superintend the integration of races in those schools; that the federal government has "pre-empted" the field of internal security legislation from the states, although the congressional sponsor of the federal bill in question says precisely the opposite. The central government has also undertaken to expunge prayer from public school classrooms which the states saw fit to leave there. And now, through the decrees of the Supreme Court, it even dictates to the states the composition of their own several legislatures. As Professor Charles S.

Hyneman of Indiana University puts it, "this Court now sees itself as above the Constitution. It is using the Constitution to bring the nation to political practices which the Court thinks to be the ideal—and it can find in the Constitution words to justify its definition of the ideal."⁷

Establishment spokesmen say this gathering incubus of controls is mandated by the growing complexities of the age, and that it does not in fact threaten freedom. As to the first point, such knowledgeable men as Prof. F. A. Hayek have conclusively shown that centralized power is less capable of ministering to the needs of a complex economy than is the self-adjusting mechanism of the free market; and, as we have seen, the argument from "necessity" is a diversion. The Establishment seeks centralization because it *wants* centralization, and pursues it by methods that are not always ingenuous. As to the second point, we can perhaps best determine the impact of the Establishment program on American freedoms by getting down to specific cases.

The Liberal regime's approach to the farm problem is an illuminating chapter in the annals of "democratic planning." It was in a farm case, *Wickard vs. Filburn* (1942), that the Supreme Court laid down the maxim that government can control what it subsidizes; and control in all its aspects has been the leading characteristic of Liberal ideas on farm policy. Under Agriculture Secretary Orville Freeman, Establishment farm programs have included such things as dumping surpluses to break prices and punish recalcitrant farmers, strict acreage controls, a proposal to mete out jail sentences to dairy men failing to keep accurate records, a request that Freeman be allowed to buy up farm land, and blatant use of taxpayers' money to propagandize for Establishment tight-control policies in the 1963 wheat referendum. Commenting on the Kennedy-Freeman 1962 farm bill embracing many of these coercive provisions, American Farm Bureau President Charles Shuman said:

The most startling feature of the proposed legislation . . . is the use of government stocks of wheat and feed grains to compel farmers to accept proposed control programs . . . It is naked coercion to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to dump up to 10 million tons of feed grains and 200 million bushels of wheat to break the market price any time farmers vote against the administration's proposed control programs . . . The . . . [administration] scheme calls for supply management with tight government control of all farms and farmers through milk quotas, feed grain acreage and marketing quotas and a complicated three-price market control plan for wheat . . . The administration contemplates the extension of permanent controls on production and marketing of all major crops and livestock. County ASC Committees would have vast powers to set acreage and yield allotments as well as to regulate the transfer of milk allotments . . . The administration bill authorizes wholesale dumping of the surplus to force a favorable vote in so-called "democratic referenda."⁸

All of this, Shuman said, was opposed to the Farm Bureau's belief in a free American agriculture. In 1963, American wheat farmers showed they agreed by voting down the administration's program.

Some of the controls employed in the agriculture program have been envisioned for rural land-owners everywhere. In his 1961 farm message, Kennedy proposed something called a "rural renewal program." This would establish agencies at the local level called "rural renewal corporations," with power to buy up farm land, consolidate it, and sell it to another owner. The original owner would have no option but to give up his land to the government.

Nation's Business calls attention to a 1962 Agriculture Department report which noted the existence of "idle land and unused buildings on thousands of small tracts in low-income rural areas." This fact, said the report, "calls for positive assistance in redirecting the use and management of the resources involved."

The answer proposed by the Agriculture experts was a "land classification" program, dividing U.S. land into eight categories. Depending upon the way land is classified, it might be used for cultivation or other purposes, with varying degrees of governmental restriction. If it happened to be placed in Class VI, VII, or VIII it could not be cultivated at all. In effect, under this scheme, the federal government would be able to dictate the use of every acre of rural land in the United States.⁹

Such proposals are not needed, however, to make the farm program detrimental to freedom. One farmer, J. Evetts Haley Jr. of Oklahoma, was taken to court and fined for raising grain on his own land and feeding it to his cattle. He had, the government said, overstepped his "allotment" even though he had accepted no subsidy, agreed to no allotment arrangement, did not participate in the farm program in any way—and even though the grain was not sold and never left his own property. James Weir of Arkansas actually lost his farm for a similar transgression. An extra fillip was given stories of federal control in 1964, when it was revealed the Agriculture Department had for years been conducting a "spy in the sky" program, flying over farm land and taking photographs to determine whether farmers were exceeding their allotments.

The American business community has, if anything, been subjected to even more systematic harassment than have farmers. The most notable example was the steel case, when President Kennedy marshalled the entire force of the federal government to compel the steel industry to rescind a price increase.

On April 10, 1962, United States Steel and other leading steel companies announced a price increase of some \$6 a ton—a 3½ per cent increase over the last previous hike in 1958, as compared with a net increase of about 6 per cent in costs during the same period. The following day, Kennedy ex-

ploded with an angry statement in which he attacked "a tiny handful of steel executives whose pursuit of private power and profit exceeds their sense of public responsibility" and who assertedly showed "utter contempt for the interests of 185 million Americans." Other epithets in the statement included "irresponsible," "ruthless," "unjustifiable," "defiance," etc. In rapid succession, Kennedy threatened the steel men with (1) investigation by the Justice Department, (2) investigation by the FTC, (3) investigation by congressional committees, and (4) loss of contracts with the Department of Defense.

Time magazine commented that to Kennedy, "U.S. Steel's price-hike decision was a personal affront . . . it was . . . just as he was counting the credits for achieving wage-price stability in Election Year 1962 that Kennedy got word from Roger Blough. He felt he had been betrayed—and U.S. Steel became an enemy to be smitten at all costs. 'U.S. Steel,' said a White House aide that afternoon, 'picked the wrong President to doublecross. Kennedy can be a hater—and right now I don't think there's any doubt that he hates U.S. Steel.' To exact his revenge, Kennedy called upon all his vast powers as President, including legal retribution, economic reprisal, public threats and covert pressures."¹⁰

Among the last-named was a behind-the-scenes administration campaign to persuade other steel companies not to go along with the price increase. Advances to Inland Steel Co., whose Board Chairman Joseph L. Block was a member of Kennedy's Labor-Management Advisory Committee, proved successful. Inland announced it would not increase prices. Shortly thereafter, Bethlehem Steel, the nation's second-largest producer, announced it was rescinding its price increase "to remain competitive." U.S. Steel itself, only hours later, followed suit.

One steel spokesman, however, was not intimidated. At the annual meeting of Jones & Laughlin, former Board Chair-

man Ben Moreell said: "I know of no law which enables the President to establish . . . prices. If he did not act under the law, where are we headed? What does it mean when the President orders a grand jury impanelled to hear charges against those who set prices he does not like; when contracts are awarded to punish those who thwart his will; and when the FBI routs innocent people out of bed at three in the morning to harass them with questions?"¹¹

What it meant was that the President was prepared to use government power against those who resisted federal dictation. Equally important, it showed how one act of government intervention inevitably leads to another. The pretext for combatting the steel price rise was to "hold the line" against inflation. Yet at the very time Kennedy was offering this argument, his own spending program in Congress was on its way to incurring an inflationary deficit of better than \$6 billion. Short weeks later, he would travel to Yale University to hold forth on the virtues of such deficits; he subsequently suggested still more of them by urging simultaneous tax reductions and spending increases.

While the steel episode was the most flamboyant of the administration's onslaughts against business, it was far from unusual. The Liberal regime has systematically sought to get control over the business community, and has been making full use of the powers already available to it.

Consider, for example, a 1962 bill to give the Federal Trade Commission virtual life-and-death powers over many American industries. Under its provisions, the FTC would be empowered to issue "cease and desist" orders under the various laws it administers—without applying to the courts.

As to what such power would imply, the American Oil Company offers this illustration: "In order to retain some of our jobber accounts in Detroit, we had, in good faith, met the price a competitor offered. In 1940 the FTC charged us with violating the Robinson-Patman Act by this competitive

offer, and the case started its long rounds through the federal courts. Finally, in 1958—more than 17 years later—the U. S. Supreme Court decisively ruled in our favor. The fact that we eventually won the case wouldn't have done us much good, however, if the bill in question had been on the books. The FTC would have had the power to keep us from meeting our competitors' prices all the while the case was dragging its zig-zag way through the courts."¹²

Just how well the FTC would perform with such added powers may be divined from its already arbitrary conduct. The commission has shown every disposition to "discipline" "aggressive private interests" in the Schlesinger manner. *Barron's*, a restrained and responsible voice of the business community, offered this comment: "Under a reorganization plan upheld . . . by Congress, the chairman has gained the whip hand over the Commission, directing its day-to-day activities, and . . . setting policy single-handed. He has decreed that whereas previously anyone could seek redress of the full Commission from a ruling of a trial examiner, such appeal now will be granted only on the motion of at least two members."¹³

The FTC's treatment of certain "private interests" during one 1962 hearing was so flagrantly unfair that it attracted the notice, not only of *Barron's*, but of the American Civil Liberties Union. The FTC had adopted a policy of open hearings, in which "defendant" companies were required to divulge trade information which could be used as the basis of an indictment, and which could conceivably be of great value to competitors. One session involved the question of low-price milk being sold in supermarkets. The ACLU offered this comment:

"There are two civil liberties aspects of this controversy which gravely disturb the Union and which we urge the Commission seriously to consider. One is the holding of an investigatory hearing, analagous to a grand jury investigation,

in public. The second concerns the failure to allow counsel for companies under investigation adequate participation in the hearing in behalf of their clients. Both combine to create a breach of the safeguards embodied in the idea of due process of law, the touchstone of our democratic system which should be especially respected in the relationship between the government and the citizen."¹⁴

Meanwhile, the Justice Department has been paralleling the FTC's work by instigating innumerable "anti-trust" suits against corporations suspected of monopolistic practice. In the year ending June 30, 1962, no less than 73 anti-trust suits were filed—a jump of eleven over the preceding year. If a company loses such a suit, the result can be disastrous and, even if it does not lose, the expense involved in defending itself against the government's tax-supported lawyers is oppressive. *The Wall Street Journal* notes the losses incurred by the Morton Salt Company in defending itself against a price-fixing charge brought by the Justice Department. The case cost Morton Salt an estimated \$420,000—even though it was acquitted. The expense of legal fees, producing records, assignment of company personnel to the case were enormous, even though the company was found innocent of the charge brought against it. If it had simply pleaded guilty, the fine would have been \$50,000.

In a 1963 article, *Fortune* magazine noted some oddities in FTC thinking—oddities for which an unfortunate businessman, should he run afoul of the FTC's desires, could go to jail. For example, the decision that joint advertising by retail druggists which mentioned price would be illegal. Commissioner Phillip Elman, in his dissent, commented: "It seems to me that the Commission, charged as it is with the duty to promote rather than discourage competition, and to strengthen rather than impair the ability of small businessmen to survive, should take a more positive and encouraging attitude toward programs of joint advertising by retailers . . .

The notion that small businessmen should be sent to jail for engaging in such a practice seems to me too fantastic to be taken seriously."¹⁵

Under the Johnson administration, proposals to expand federal activities—and federal controls—have continued to multiply. One of these is a suggestion that the U.S. Employment Service, already immensely powerful, oversee hiring practices of private business. According to the enabling legislation on the subject, the result would be to make all employment decisions "exclusively a public service."¹⁶

Also proposed by Johnson has been an expansion of the considerable powers of the FTC, through a so-called "consumers package," more aptly described as a package of governmental interference. The bill would have federal authorities superintending butchers, cosmetic producers, and commercial advertising. It would extend federal power to various commercial transactions which occur exclusively inside the states, rather than in interstate commerce. It would require lenders to disclose actual annual rates of interest to borrowers. It would enable the FTC, as in the proposal discussed above, to issue cease-and-desist orders to advertisers charged with making false claims—presuming them guilty until proved innocent.¹⁷

In the Johnson era, as in its previous history, the FTC has needed little encouragement to extend the hand of paternalism into the field of advertising. In a decision involving Procter & Gamble advertising, the FTC displayed its disdain for the intelligence of the American consumer. "The housewife," it said, "is easily lured from the accustomed brand by promotion and advertising efforts of rival manufacturers."¹⁸

Nor, since Johnson has assumed office, has the executive branch shown any greater inclination to use its powers with restraint. In one of the most startling cases on record, the National Labor Relations Board ruled that Deering-Milliken Co. could not close down its facilities at Darlington, S.C.,

when a union was trying to organize it.¹⁹ In another decision, rendered against General Electric, the NLRB decreed it an unfair labor practice for GE management to convey to its employees concededly truthful information about the violent behavior of union boss James Carey, since such truthful information would tend to disparage the bargaining agent in the eyes of its "constituents."²⁰

As for the President himself, he has been quite as willing as his predecessor to intervene directly in the workings of the economy. In the 1964 rail dispute, involving elimination of firemen from diesel locomotives, Johnson undertook to wheel and deal in all directions, promising concessions of one sort to both labor and management, and pressuring both sides toward a federally-composed agreement. *The Wall Street Journal* quoted one federal official as saying: "It wasn't collective bargaining that settled the railroad dispute. It was compulsory Johnson."²¹

No doubt James Madison would have been reassured to know that America's government of laws rather than men, so painfully wrought by the Founders of 1787, would some day evolve into a system whose workings could be captured in the noble phrase, "compulsory Johnson."

►► 6. *Affluence—Or Poverty?*

THE URGE toward statism can be justified in many ways. From the populist desire to "soak the rich" to New Deal oratory on the "mature economy," those who favor increased government power have never been at a loss for some theory to support their preconceived desires. The current Democratic administration, however, has managed to distinguish itself by invoking two entirely different reasons for increased government, reasons which contradict each other but which nevertheless combine, in the crucible of Liberal alchemy, to produce a single result.

Under President Kennedy, the country was told it had been getting too fat and too lazy; such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., tirelessly decried the spread of private opulence. Such comfort, it was roundly suggested, was not good for the American soul. The right thing was for big government to step in and tax away the disgusting excess. Under President

Johnson, the approach has been from the opposite direction. Instead of being too fat, we are now expiring in want. We are beset by “poverty,” with untold numbers of humanity, ranging up to 50 million, suffering from privation. The right thing is for government to step in and give aid to those who are in such distressing need. Whatever the affliction, the correct answer, in the Establishment view, is *always* more government control.

These two arguments have not been rigorously divided between the Kennedy and Johnson years. Kennedy, during his campaign for the presidency, had rung some changes on the “poverty” theme, and the initiative toward the “war on poverty” was taken under his administration. And there are still some people around who will tell you “the private sector” of the American economy is getting too big and too prosperous. But by and large, each President has identified himself with a particular approach—Kennedy with affluence, Johnson with poverty.

The “affluence” argument holds that something called “the public sector” of the economy is impoverished, while something called “the private sector” is wallowing in luxury. The “public sector” means government; “the private sector” means individual persons. This was, as Schlesinger made clear in his 1960 campaign study, *Kennedy or Nixon*, a favored theme of the late President. The historian quoted Kennedy as saying “the choice our nation must make” is “between the public interest and private comfort”¹—from which declaration it is but a few short steps to the rhetoric of “ask what you can do for your country.”

This sort of argument was for many months almost a knee-jerk reflex of the ADA and its *confrères* in the Liberal Establishment. Here is the way Adlai Stevenson, for example, put the matter: “Never before in my lifetime—not even in the days of Harding and Coolidge—has the mystique of privacy seemed to me so pervasive. The face which we present to the

world—especially through our mass circulation media—is the face of the individual or the family as a high consumption unit with minimal social links or responsibilities—father happily drinking his favorite beer, mother dreamily fondling soft garments newly rinsed in a marvel detergent, the children gaily calling from the new barbecue pit for a famous sauce for their steak. And, of course, a sleek new car in the background.”²

America, Stevenson says, should have “wider purposes.”³

The intellectual father of “the public sector” thesis is ADA chieftain John Kenneth Galbraith of Harvard, former American ambassador to India. The theory that Americans enjoy private splendor and public degradation was first set forward systematically in Galbraith’s book, *The Affluent Society*. With his characteristic taste for paradox, our angular emissary put the matter this way:

The family which takes its mauve and cerise, air-conditioned, power-steered, and power-braked automobile out for a tour passes through cities that are badly paved, made hideous by litter, blighted buildings, billboards, and posts for wires that long since should have been put underground. They pass on into a countryside that has been rendered largely invisible by commercial art . . . They picnic on exquisitely packaged food from a portable icebox by a polluted stream and go on to spend the night at a park which is a menace to public health and morals. Just before dozing off on an air mattress, beneath a nylon tent, amid the stench of decaying refuse, they may reflect vaguely on the curious unevenness of their blessings.⁴

The problem, Galbraith concludes, is that we have not properly maintained “social balance”—we have not provided the “public sector” with enough funds to keep up with the growth of the private sector. People are spending their money on pleasures and gadgets and extra automobiles which they do *not* need, while neglecting schools, parks, and high-

ways which they *do* need. As a result, “in an atmosphere of private opulence and public squalor, the private goods have full sway.”⁵ Galbraith’s answer is clear: government must increase taxes to take away from people the money they are spending so unwisely (on mauve cadillacs) and spend it for them wisely (on better roads).

As a number of excellent economists have pointed out, Galbraith’s theory is not particularly new: It is, for the most part, a disguised version of the theories of Lord Keynes (who also suggested, *e.g.*, that the problem of production had been “solved”). These economists also point out that the relevant facts contradict the “public sector” argument at almost every turn. During the very years when “private” services, such as television and the telephone and the high-powered automobile, have greatly improved, the “private” sector has been receiving a diminishing percentage of the national patrimony. During the same period, as “public” services, such as roads, schools, and the Post Office, have relatively deteriorated in handling their assignments, the proportion going to “the public sector” has vastly increased.

Galbraith’s lamentations read strangely beside a survey of the actual magnitude of government expenditures today, and the vast tax burden they impose upon the people. As noted, the United States federal government has incurred, according to estimates for 1962, a debt of more than \$1 trillion—an almost incomprehensible figure. Written out, the real obligations of the government—meaning of the taxpayers—amounted to \$1,242,000,000,000.00. That comes to some \$6,642 for every man, woman and child in the United States. For the average family—husband, wife, and two children—it comes to \$27,568.00.⁶

Is a government which imposes an average per-family debt of more than \$27,000 on its citizens too small? Is the “public sector” which has incurred that debt underprivileged? It is noteworthy that the total consumer debt in the “private sec-

tor" was at that time only \$56 billion—an average of some \$299.50 per capita, or \$1,198 per family. It would appear that the people, in their private capacities, have been considerably less profligate than their government.

The true state of affairs is, clearly, the reverse of Prof. Galbraith's lugubrious vision. Since 1927, federal revenues have increased some 20 times over. While mendicant government has been growing by leaps and bounds, the plush individual citizen has moved forward at a much more modest pace. Whereas the federal government's income has increased twenty-fold since 1927, his is only four times higher. Whatever may or may not be wrong with our public services, it can hardly be that they have been deprived of money.

Yet Galbraith's thesis has achieved some popularity precisely because its descriptive passages ring so true: It is quite accurate to charge that public services are, for the most part, inadequate, whereas the private market economy has enjoyed a fabulous splurge of productivity. Those are facts obvious to anyone who has ever driven a high-powered automobile over miserable roads, or telephoned across the continent in seconds because a letter mailed a week ago had not yet been delivered. Yet if government has been all the while absorbing so much of our money, and placing so heavy a tax burden on private citizens and business corporations, why does the disparity arise?

The answer is just the opposite in its implications from that given by Galbraith, Schlesinger, and Stevenson. It is that government, by and large, is an inefficient agency. Its effort to administer segments of the economy from some distant central authority necessarily fails, for the simple reason that it cannot possibly anticipate all the changes and modifications necessary for efficient operation. As Henry Hazlitt notes, the "glut" of private goods of which Mr. Galbraith complains is a glut which people want, and which they consume. But the glut of farm surpluses created by government

“plan” is a glut which no one wants and which is not consumed. It is sheer waste, caused by the inability of the authorities in Washington to legislate supply and demand.

Moreover, businesses operating in the private sector have two powerful incentives toward efficiency; they must compete, and they must make a profit. Modernization of plant and mass production to lower cost per unit of output are the secrets of commercial survival. In private business there is a premium on innovation, improved technology, and efficient administration; the business which did not achieve them would not stay in operation very long.

In the case of government, there are no such incentives. The Post Office is a classic example; there is no need for it to make a profit, and consequently small motive for improved efficiency, or new techniques. Despite the introduction here and there of new procedures (produced by private business), the Post Office plods along today pretty much as it did 50 years ago. And, since private competition with the Post Office has been banned by law, the postal authorities don't have to worry about the customers taking their letters elsewhere.

Add to these elementary factors the built-in inefficiency of the Washington bureaucracy, which spends weeks and even months shuffling papers before any program or any new idea can be put into practice, and the picture is virtually complete. The waste and misdirected effort of the federal government are an appalling tale familiar to anyone who has studied the Washington scene with any care during the past generation.

In sum, the source of Mr. Galbraith's paradox is that “the private sector,” with its emphasis upon competition, decentralization and the free allocation of resources, is properly equipped to produce abundance; “the public sector,” with its intrinsic hostility to competition, its remoteness from the scene of particular transactions, and its vested interest in things-as-they-are-with-more-of-the-same, is properly equipped

to produce poverty. Both are doing the jobs which, in economic terms, they are bound to do. And while the increased transfer of funds to government may hinder the first from doing its job as well as it otherwise might, it cannot substantially improve the performance of the second.

The lesson of Galbraith's complaint is thus the reverse of what he would have us believe: If it is demonstrated fact that private enterprise produces abundance, and government control produces "squalor," the best course would seem to be to minimize government control as much as possible.

That answer would not satisfy Galbraith or the other stalwarts of the "public sector," however, even if they accepted the free market as a mechanism superior to government coercion. For their real point has nothing to do with technique, but with the ends chosen. People like to buy mauve cars; Galbraith thinks they do not need mauve cars. People want barbecue sets and marvel detergents; Stevenson thinks they do not need barbecue sets and marvel detergents. The issue is not *how* best to fulfill choice, but *what* the choice is. Under the free market, people buy for themselves the things they want—whether Galbraith and Stevenson think they need them or not. Under a system of government coercion, the people will take what they "need," whether they want it or not.

The ultimate issue in Mr. Galbraith's theory, then, precisely the same as in the dispute over federal "aid," is: *Who shall decide what the American people do with their money?* The people themselves, buying what they want as free individuals in the open market? Or Galbraith and the ADA, dictating to the people from their citadel of power in Washington?

Just as President Kennedy set out to make war on "affluence" so has President Johnson set out to make war on "poverty." And in place of Galbraith, the new oracle on economic matters is said to be Socialist Michael Harrington.

Quite apart from Harrington's socialism, the "poverty" argument needs to be considered on its own merits. When such consideration is given, several peculiarities begin to emerge—the most apparent of which is the sleight-of-hand by which "poverty" is defined.

President Johnson has told us there are 35 million Americans who, by his standards, live in poverty. Yet when Johnson and John F. Kennedy were campaigning as the Democratic ticket in 1960, Kennedy informed the nation that 17 million Americans went to bed hungry every night—using that statistic as a measure of impoverishment. On the face of them, those figures would seem to suggest that the first four years of Democratic administration had more than doubled the number of poor people in the United States—a point which we may be certain President Johnson is not anxious to make.

The difference in figures, of course, is explained by the different means used to gauge the extent of poverty—all of which tend to dissolve at the touch of pointed inquiry. In Johnson's case, the measuring-line is an income level of \$3,000 a year. Any family whose income falls below this standard, Johnson says, is impoverished.

That benchmark, however, in fact suggests the unprecedented prosperity the United States has managed to achieve under the impulses of the free economy. For this "poverty" figure is actually higher than the average standard of living of the overwhelming majority of the people on earth. Edmund K. Faltermayer, writing in *Fortune* magazine, offers an interesting illustration: In the United States, 44% of the non-white, primarily Negro, population, conceded to be the most impoverished of our citizens, is below the "poverty" line suggested by Johnson; but in Great Britain, one of the great industrial and commercial nations of the world, some 75% of the predominantly white population falls below the Johnsonian standard.

The \$3,000 standard, as almost all disputants acknowledge,

is highly arbitrary. Some families of two or three people and without substantial debts may be able to get by quite well on that amount: larger families with big obligations might be pinched on \$5,000 or more.

Most to the point, Johnson's \$3,000 figure represents poverty by relative comparison to U.S. income figures as a whole. As prosperity becomes the norm in America, our notion of what is or is not adequate income tends to change correspondingly. In 1929, some 31 per cent of the people in the United States had family incomes under \$2,000, some 39 per cent more had incomes between \$2,000 and \$4,000. In 1962, the respective figures were 12 per cent and 19 per cent. The smaller number of persons in these categories and the growing number in the \$5,000 and above range serve to accentuate the plight of those who remain below the line. The very fact that fewer people are poor makes it seem more intolerable that anyone should be.⁷

As the Council of State Chambers of Commerce observes: "In comparison to relatively prosperous Europe, the alleged American poverty line of \$3,000 would represent a reasonable level of well-being . . . The median family income in Great Britain in 1962 was equivalent to \$2,900, and in most major European countries the median family income ranged from \$2,700 to \$3,500 in 1962. The median in Russia was \$2,500."⁸

By the relative comparisons favored by the Establishment there will always be "poverty" in the United States so long as some people make more money than others. At such time as the average annual income is \$12,000, a family with an income of \$10,000 will, relatively speaking, be "impoverished." And there will no doubt be plenty of government proposals seeking to do something in their behalf.

This is not to deny that there *are* in fact people—the exact number is difficult to determine—who are in want. Michael Harrington makes the point that there are plenty of people

in America who, by common-sense observation rather than statistical juggling, are in want. Of this we may be certain. But the answer for these families is quite clearly not to dismantle the productive system which has liberated some 20% or more of the U.S. population from the Johnsonian version of "poverty" in the last generation, but to insure that the system continues to perform its beneficent work. And the increasing pressure of government intervention, with its apparatus of tax, inflation and control and with the resulting ominous decrease in the rate of poverty-reduction in the last several years, is all of an opposite tendency. The problem is not to be solved by demagogic outbursts to the effect that any and every family with less than \$3,000 income annually must be the object of a government dole or of state schemes for improvement.

It can be solved ultimately, if at all, by insuring that the free enterprise economy, which has allowed us the luxury of considering as a low income level what other nations consider a high one, continues to do its job. Under the rational employment of energies and resources afforded by the free market, we can continue to spread abundance throughout society, so that ten years hence other socialists and other politicians can have the thrill of recommending governmental aid to everyone who is not making \$5,000 or \$6,000 annually.*

* An interesting footnote on the "poverty" program came to light in April, 1965, when it was learned that the agency would employ some 45 administrators drawing nearly \$1 million a year among them in salaries, as follows: Director, \$30,000 annually; deputy director, \$28,500; three assistants to the director, \$27,000 apiece; nine other lower-echelon functionaries, \$24,500 each and 20 more, \$18,935 apiece. Obviously, the poverty warriors believe that, in this particular campaign against financial hardship, charity does indeed begin at home.

►► 7. *Inflation, Social Security, and Medicare*

THE FORMULA of increased governmental "aid" is, then, made to order for Establishment purposes, whether the stated pretext is to fight affluence or to fight poverty. With the attraction of a tax cut added in, the resulting package would seem to be irresistible. Various interest groups are receiving bigger and better subventions from government; yet they are actually being asked to pay fewer taxes. All the wonderful benefits actually cost nothing—and they are good for the economy as well! In the alembic of Liberal ideology, all things become possible, including heaven on earth and the task of spending ourselves to eternal bliss on the Big Rock Candy Mountain.

There is, however, one problem—quite apart from the question of centralized power. And that is the fact that as increased spending causes deficits, and as these deficits are accentuated by superimposing a tax cut, inflation is going to

occur. The government is pumping new money into the economy without a corresponding increase in productivity. More dollars are bidding for the existing volume of production, and prices are forced upwards. There are not many people who perceive the responsibility of government for this, and the Establishment labors hard to keep it that way.

Because the workings of inflation are piecemeal and indirect, and because its costs are spread over the economy at large, arguments against deficit finance seldom make much headway. The flamboyant appeal and immediacy of the direct subsidy, compared to the colorless, silent workings of inflation, make this seem a safe bargain for the Establishment—as it has seemed to every government which ever ruined its currency and its economy. So long as people are out in the world making money, the gradual advance of inflation will seem to them merely a better reason for getting still more money, through government subsidy if need be. They will have neither time nor inclination to sit down and figure out that it is the subsidy itself, and not U.S. Steel or General Motors, which has rotted the purchasing power of the dollar.

So it has worked for a generation and more. But a complicating factor has entered in. There are people in this world who are not able to keep up with the treadmill of inflation; as the Establishment pumps in new money, and as prices rise, their incomes do not rise along with them. These people must make do on fixed stipends, on savings or pensions or annuities, which do not have those comfortable “escalation” clauses so knowingly included in wage contracts by the unions whose leaders demand inflationary spending. These unfortunates are usually the elderly, people who have put away money for their later years only to find the price of everything has in the meantime risen enormously. The value of their savings has been taken from them, and they are barely able to meet ordinary expenses, much less extraordi-

nary ones. These people have both the time and the inclination to wonder about what happened to their money. Worse yet, from the Establishment point of view, there are increasing numbers of them in our society—some 18 million and more now—as the life span is extended. And they can vote. Imagine the immense political difficulty if they came to realize the Establishment had robbed them, that all the “free” things given away to all the interest groups were actually paid for out of *their* savings, and that to sustain the political fortunes of Liberalism they had been thrust in their old age into unnecessary hardship. The results could be staggering.

Obviously, the Establishment requires a diversion. It must come up with some tactic to make the inflation it has caused work to its own benefit. It must paint itself as the friend of all these old folks it has victimized, and turn emotional resentment against the conservatives as heartless ogres who care nothing about the problems of the aged.

In pursuing this objective, the Establishment has tried a number of approaches. One of the most prominent has been noted already, in the case of the 1962 steel crisis. By cracking down on the steel companies, Kennedy transferred to the business world the blame which rightly should have been imputed to his own policies. This is, of course, the classic pattern of governments committed to inflation. As their own policies force prices to go up, they try to “hold the line” through arbitrary controls—a technique attempted, on and off, ever since the time of Diocletian. And while it has never halted inflation—which can be stopped only by curtailing the influx of new money into the economy—it has frequently led to the loss of freedom. The steel episode and the so-called wage-price “guidelines” of the current administration are merely recent examples in a long history of governmental diversion in a time of rising prices.

Similarly with the Johnson program of inhibitions to

overseas purchasing, investment, and tourism, intended to check America's "balance of payments" and gold outflow problem: The loss of gold, of course, is occasioned by the deterioration of the dollar through inflation, persuading foreign creditors they would be better off with bullion. While quite ready to demand "restraint" from private businesses and citizens, the Johnson administration is unwilling to practice any restraint on its own part. In an April, 1965, address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Secretary of Commerce John T. Connor flatly rejected proposals to curtail government spending abroad and to adopt a "tight-money" policy through the Federal Reserve Board. As to the true source of the difficulty—deficit finance—not a word was uttered.

Another gambit fixed on by the Kennedy-Johnson regime involves the Social Security program. Elderly people living on Social Security have seen the buying power of their benefits shrinking; should they discover the reason for this shrinkage, political upheaval might ensue. A scapegoat is therefore necessary—and what better candidate than the very conservatives who have for so long battled against inflation? Thus, in 1964, all sorts of horrible consequences for social security were envisioned should Barry Goldwater become President. No mention was made, of course, of the real dangers besetting the system and those dependent on it.

To keep up with constantly rising prices caused by federal red ink, social security benefits and tax levies must constantly be increased. As a result, the program today is obligated to pay out an estimated \$350 billion more than it has on hand or can expect to take in. The system is on the edge of insolvency. Although much is made in Establishment literature of the social security "trust fund," usually estimated at around \$20 billion, this is a fiction, a bookkeeping entry representing nothing more than an obligation on the taxpayers. There is no money in the "fund"; all social security

revenues go directly into the general fund of the United States, and are spent just like other tax money. Social security beneficiaries are paid out of this same general fund, and the "trust fund," along with benefits owing to all those participating in the program, must be met by still other taxes imposed on still other Americans in generations to come.

Even if the trust fund were real, it would hardly make a dent in Social Security's insolvent condition, since obligations against the system are roughly 25 times larger than the amount allegedly on hand. As of 1962, Social Security was reliably estimated to owe benefits in one category or another totalling some \$630 billion. From those now in the system and still paying, an estimated \$280 billion will be forthcoming in taxes. The difference between assets and liabilities is therefore around \$350 billion. This huge sum must be raised somehow, either by vastly increasing the social security tax or passing it on unpaid to future generations. As *U.S. News and World Report* summed the matter up, "this deficit, if it is to be paid, will have to be paid by future workers at tax rates now in the law. Otherwise, persons now in the pension system would have to pay sharply higher taxes."¹

Clearly, there is trouble ahead for Social Security—trouble spurred by the forces of inflation which have eaten away so much of the purchasing power of the dollar, and which will eat away still more if spending continues in excess of revenues. Ironically, as social security outlays increase, they too put inflationary pressure on the Treasury, so that Liberal efforts to adjust benefits to price rises create a kind of treadmill effect, with OASI chasing its tail and never catching it.

Still a third diversion is the "medicare" program—to provide the elderly with hospital and nursing home care at governmental expense. This, the Establishment tells us now, is the solution to inflationary problems, and all who say otherwise are to be condemned as the enemies of the poor and aged.

"Our Blue Cross system," declaims one medicare proponent, "is staggering under the load of both inflation and the demand, and the greatest part of the demand comes from the needs of the older people."² Or, as President Kennedy himself put it, medicare was needed "for those who saved or worked—then get hit."³

As we shall see, the creative power of private enterprise has managed to cope with the problems of the aged in marvelous fashion despite the inroads of inflation. There are, nevertheless, some elderly people in our society, whatever the number, who fit the descriptive passages quoted above. Which makes the problem a real one. The only catch is that the unhappy results of government spending can hardly be cured by more government spending. To engage in deficit finance today to cure the results of yesterday's deficit can lead only to compounded difficulty tomorrow. The Establishment's approach is that of the alcoholic, who seeks to cure his hangover with the hair of the dog that bit him. Which means he will be bitten still more painfully tomorrow. There can be no real answer to the problems of the aged who have inadequate resources to cope with inflation except to stop the inflation. But this, we may be certain, the Establishment is not prepared to do.

While its refusal to acknowledge its own responsibility for inflation is the root fallacy of the Establishment's "medicare" promotion, there are other fallacies as well. These include the arguments that by enacting the "medicare" scheme, tied to Social Security but financed by its own payroll tax, the administration has established a program which is "fiscally sound," which would cause no increase in budgetary appropriations, and which would effectively "aid the needy." Each of these contentions, and particularly the last, is untrue.

Under the medicare program, the wage base for social security-plus-medicare is increased from \$4,800 to \$5,600. This sounds innocuous enough, until we realize that, because of the tremendous costs already imposed on the pro-

gram, social security taxes *without* medicare were scheduled to rise to $9\frac{1}{4}$ per cent in 1969—meaning an annual tax of \$444. On top of this, the administration proposal raises the total tax again. As noted, the social security program is already hundreds of millions of dollars in the red. And insurance actuaries say the Kennedy-Johnson estimate on the cost of “medicare” is too low by half. This means the payroll tax, five years from now, might have to be raised still more.

Even barring this eventuality, in fiscal 1971-72 the wage base will be jumped another \$1,000 to \$6,600, which means the total tax bill will be \$580.00. By 1973, the combined effect of this boost plus the ascending tax rate will be an annual social security levy of \$633. The reason for postponement of this whopping tax increase is clear: To give the impression that the program costs only “a few cents” a month in its early stage. Once the scheme is established and the political benefits have been reaped—*then* will come the skyrocketing tax boost.

These arrangements hardly suggest that the program is “fiscally sound.” Indeed, they open up a vista of endless deficits, and of endless tax increases to keep up with them. That prospect contrasts strangely with the safe-as-Gibraltar approach employed by “medicare” advocates. A pamphlet passed out at a labor union rally on “medicare,” for example, claims the program will bring blessed relief to young couples who have hitherto been helping their parents in time of need. “Few of us,” says the leaflet, “can afford the increasing cost of raising and educating our children properly, and at the same time carry the full burden of costly medical care for our parents. We must not jeopardize the future of our children by draining the family budget to meet these medical expenses.”⁴ But what could jeopardize the future of today’s children more effectively than pyramiding debts in the social security-medicare system, sinking the value of the dollar still further, and mandating vast tax increases for the years ahead?

Under the already-projected increases in the social security system, the average young couple today will soon be paying more social security tax than income tax. Extend the same curve for another generation, and imagine the legacy bequeathed to the children of this young couple, who will have to pay taxes to support twice as many aged folks as there are today, who will have the corresponding burden of galloping federal expenditures for other subsidies, and who will be paid in a dollar that, if they are lucky, will be worth perhaps one-fifth of its value in 1939.

Part of the "medicare" publicity includes a suggestion that young couples, in addition to evading responsibility for their parents, will "build benefits" for themselves through the program. The leaflet quoted above goes on to say that the program will work toward "building health insurance protection upon our retirement at 65."⁵ The idea is diligently put forward that the proposal is some kind of insurance, which will return benefits in proportion to payments. This too is untrue. Money paid in for "medicare" today will not be saved, or invested, or set aside. It will be spent immediately. Future "benefits" accruing to today's young couples will be paid for—not by their "premiums" which will have long since been spent—but by still other taxes paid by *their* children. That is, if the program has not by then been repudiated altogether. The net result can only be a huge loss for those now entering the program; as things stood in 1959, *sans* medicare, those entering social security will pay out, at a minimum, \$1.69 for every dollar they receive—by the OASI's own estimate.⁶ No one coming under social security today can hope to get back as much as he pays in; the program is already too far in the red.

So much for the argument that the medicare idea is "fiscally sound" or that it will require no increase in budgetary appropriations. What of the argument—the real issue at stake—that "medicare" will effectively aid the needy? The indica-

tions, at every level, are precisely of the opposite tendency. To begin with, there is the fact that the social security levy is a "regressive" tax—harder on the poor than on the well-to-do. It is a fixed tax on the lowest income bracket, allowing no exemptions or deductions. This means that a man who actually earns \$5,600 a year would pay the same absolute amount (not merely the same percentage) as does a man making \$100,000 a year. More ironic yet, the man making \$5,600 a year may well pay that tax to provide benefits to a retired, well-to-do man who has no need of them.

Moreover, the evidence is plentiful that the "medicare" scheme would extend coverage to those who for the most part *don't* need it, while withholding coverage from those who do. It would enroll everyone on Social Security, even though the vast majority have private health insurance coverage, but would omit, after 1967, those people on public welfare rolls who are not eligible for Social Security. This anomaly shows quite clearly that the purpose of the legislation is not so much to help anyone as it is to secure votes for the political candidates of the Establishment.

Without the emotional fervor instilled into the elderly in favor of quick passage, it is quite possible the occasion for "medicare" would have disappeared altogether, so rapid has been the spread of private health insurance programs. It was not so long ago that health insurance for the elderly was in short supply. In 1953, only 26 per cent of the aged had private hospital insurance. By 1962 that figure had more than doubled; by 1969, it is expected to reach 75 per cent of the aged population.

As for the "long-range" need, this is even more chimerical. As of December 31, 1961—at the height of the original "medicare" agitation—75 per cent of the civilian population was covered by private health insurance. This figure will reach 90 per cent by 1970.⁷

While future need is not pressing in the aggregate, neither

is present need accurately reflected in the bare statistics of private health coverage. A number of the aged, after all, prefer to pay medical bills out of current liquidity, rather than to carry the administrative costs of insurance. Despite the inroads of government-spawned inflation, many are able to pay their bills who are not counted in the private-insurance figures. Thus, a 1957 survey by the National Opinion Research Corporation found only 9.6 per cent of those interviewed unable to pay a medical bill of \$500.⁸ And an extensive 1960 survey by James Wiggins and Helmut Schoek reveals the vast majority of the aged say they need no medical aid and don't want any. Canvassing some 1,492 people aged 65 and over, Schoek and Wiggins found 92 per cent had no medical needs which were not being taken care of. Moreover, among the remaining 8 per cent, financial barriers to proper medical care "were the least important ones."⁹ The sociologists observe that frequently the fear of risk or trouble, or the advice of family or friends, deterred the respondents from having operations, or obtaining artificial aids. "Only 5 per cent of all respondents in our sample had spent over \$100 for themselves or their spouses in the month preceding the interview . . . Only 1 per cent in our sample reported medical expenses in excess of \$500."¹⁰ Additionally, 64 per cent of the respondents said they had private health insurance. Those who did not were asked how they would take care of emergency medical expenses of \$1,000 or more. Forty-two per cent of those without private coverage said they would pay cash; 11 per cent would borrow on their homes; and 15 per cent would draw on the cash value of insurance or sell stocks and bonds.

These findings were confirmed by the observations of Representative Thomas Curtis of Missouri. "No age group is likely to have as favorable a liquid asset position as the aged," Curtis said, "seventy-four per cent of whom now own liquid assets of one form or another . . . according to the OASI,

almost three of every four beneficiary couples own their own home, most of them free of mortgage. And the median equity in non-farm homes for the homeowner is \$8,360 . . . Only 4 per cent of the aged live in the homes of relatives.”¹¹

It becomes apparent that there will soon be virtually complete coverage of the aged population through private health insurance; that many persons not so covered can pay their medical bills; that there is in consequence no widespread national “need” for medicare; and that the real problem concerns somewhere between 5 and 10 per cent of the aged population—many of whom, not being covered by Social Security, will not be helped after 1967 by the “medicare” proposal.

That there are *some* people who do need assistance, even though they are a small percentage of the population and even though the number is getting smaller with the widening coverage of private medical insurance, seems clear enough. And certainly a humane society should want to see these people do not suffer in privation in their declining years. Under the circumstances, a sensible program would seem to be one which is (a) temporary, to take care of need as long as it lasts; (b) voluntary—so that only those who need assistance will participate; and (c) selective—to reach that segment of the population now unable to meet its medical expenses. Yet the Establishment program is none of these things. In order to treat the problem of perhaps one million people, the program would blanket into its compulsory workings some 140 million people. It would extend “aid” to 90 per cent of the aged who do not need it, while giving no aid to many of the 10 per cent who *do* need it. Instead of a temporary program, the Establishment gives us a *permanent* program to extend indefinitely into the future, irrespective of need; instead of a voluntary program the Establishment gives us a *compulsory* program, blanketing in everyone whether he needs assistance or not; instead of a *selective* program, the Establishment

gives us a *nonselective* program which amalgamates the medical services of everyone, and misses the fraction of the population which stands most in need of assistance.

This is truly, as Representative Curtis says, "like a salvo of grapeshot fired at a smoke-shrouded target."¹² As a medical program it makes no sense at all. As a means of increasing taxes surreptitiously, of gaining another zone of control, and of banging the drums for votes, it makes a great deal of sense indeed.

►► 8. *The Ultimate Scandal*

THE BIGGEST BOMBSHELL of the 1964 presidential campaign was the discovery, October 14, that Walter Jenkins, a veteran aide to Lyndon Johnson, had been arrested in the basement of the Washington, D.C., YMCA on a charge of "indecent gestures."¹

Rumors that some such revelation was in the offing had swept Washington for the preceding two days. When the news broke, Jenkins was spirited away to George Washington University Hospital, assertedly "suffering from fatigue and exhaustion," his resignation was obtained by a presidential emissary, and the nation was staggered by the magnitude of the scandal. The furore was redoubled when it was learned that Jenkins had been arrested on a similar morals charge, July, 1959, listed on the police blotter as "disorderly conduct (pervert)." Despite this previous offense, in a category widely recognized as susceptible to blackmail, Jenkins had

enjoyed a high-level security clearance and, as Johnson's chief aide, handled confidential information coming to the President's office.

When it became known that several reporters were on to the Jenkins case, important White House advisers attempted to have the story killed. Two close friends of President Johnson, Clark Clifford and Abe Fortas, visited the editors of all three Washington newspapers and asked them to suppress the story, on the grounds that it "would have a terrible effect not only on Jenkins but on his family as well."² All three papers reportedly agreed, but to no avail. Someone leaked the matter to United Press International. Within a matter of hours, the story was out.

Concerning the personal shortcomings of the unfortunate Mr. Jenkins, nothing need be said. But concerning the way the case was handled from 1959 forward, a great deal needs to be said indeed. In the first place, the fact that Jenkins enjoyed a top-level clearance for five years after his first arrest is itself a security scandal of major proportions. That he should have had access to major secrets in the White House is shocking, as is the fact that presidential advisers should have attempted to prevent the public from finding out about the case.

Jenkins was a key figure in Johnson's sprawling political and financial empire. He had been an LBJ confidant since 1939, and was a stockholder and treasurer of the LBJ Co., owner of the Johnson TV station. Jenkins has a son named Lyndon; the official biography of Johnson, by Booth Mooney, is dedicated "to Walter Jenkins."³ James Reston says Jenkins was LBJ's "official confidant, the last man to leave the White House in the evening . . ." It is apparent that Jenkins was closely intertwined with Johnson's affairs, private, financial, and political.

Jenkins figured prominently in another embarrassment to the Johnson regime, the Bobby Baker case. According to

witness Don B. Reynolds, Jenkins was the go-between in a transaction whereby a stereo set was given to then-Senator Johnson and an effort was made to have Reynolds buy television advertising time on Johnson's TV station. Jenkins was thus an important figure in the chief scandal to which Republicans had been referring throughout the presidential campaign, and now became the center of still another sensation in his own right.

Greed, negligence, and personal failings have no ideological home. They may be found in any quarter of the political world, Democratic or Republican, Liberal or Conservative. It is not therefore surprising that the Kennedy-Johnson administration should have had a scandal or two on its hands, and the mere fact of scandal has no bearing on the subject of this book. There are, however, aspects of these scandals intimately related to our theme, concerning the nature of big government and the abuses attendant upon it. It is big government which has made these malfeasances possible, and which has allowed responsible officials to conceal what is happening from the American people.

The common theme of the embarrassments afflicting this administration is the mutually-sustaining potency of political influence on the one hand and financial influence on the other. It is a kind of reciprocity which has from the beginning marked the rise to national prominence of Lyndon Johnson.

Johnson ascended to the U.S. Senate in a cloud of controversy in 1948, following a Democratic run-off in Texas in which he defeated Gov. Coke Stevenson. The victory was made possible by a "revised" tally sent in six days late from Jim Wells County, bossed by the famous "duke of Duval," George Parr. Johnson forces asserted that a ballot box in Alice, Texas, precinct 13, had by some oversight not been canvassed. When it was counted, the tally turned out to be 202 to 1 in favor of Johnson, a margin sufficient to give him the election. The matter was contested through the Texas

State Central Committee, where Johnson forces triumphed by one vote, and at the state convention, where Stevenson supporters were barred from the floor altogether. Then it went to the courts. After a see-saw battle, the matter came before Federal Judge T. Whitfield Davidson on September 21, 1948. *U.S. News and World Report*, in a wrap-up on this battle, says:

On that day, the Stevenson forces brought in their witnesses from Jim Wells County. One housewife, said by Stevenson investigators to have been listed as voter No. 842, testified she had not voted. So did a man allegedly listed as voter No. 911. Other witnesses maintained that only 600 ballots had been issued for precinct 13, while 1,028 persons were reported as having voted.⁴

Johnson lawyers questioned the truthfulness of one Stevenson witness, demanded that Stevenson pluralities in other counties be looked into, and challenged the jurisdiction of the court. Judge Davidson, however, ruled in favor of Stevenson and ordered an investigation into the Jim Wells vote and the vote in one other county. Johnson forces led by John Connally tried appeals to the Texas Supreme Court (denied) and to the Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals (accepted, but at a hearing date too late to get Johnson on the ballot). *U.S. News* adds:

In the meantime, new mysteries were developing. Judge Davidson's commissioner, W. R. Smith, found many of the witnesses he sought in Jim Wells County were vacationing in Mexico—and he was unable to locate a copy of the voting list. A precinct 13 official said that two copies of the list had been stolen.

The only remaining copy of the list was said to be in a ballot box. One box, said to be from precinct 13, was opened, but it contained no list. Another box was to be opened the following day.⁵

Johnson's attorneys, meanwhile, flew to Washington to appeal to Associate Justice Hugo Black of the Supreme Court, who ruled that the federal courts had no business deciding elections, and thus overturned Davidson's decision. "Justice Black's order," concludes *U.S. News*, "arrived just in time to prevent the other ballot box in precinct 13 from being opened—and that investigation ground to a halt." Black's ruling turned the tide, and when the Supreme Court as a whole sustained his decision, Johnson was assured of becoming a United States senator.

As Johnson's political prosperity bloomed, so did his family's business fortunes. In the very year that he went to the Senate, the Federal Communications Commission was studying allocation of channels to the then-burgeoning television industry. In 1952, when Johnson held a seat on the Senate Commerce Committee which oversees FCC doings and had in addition become Democratic whip, the FCC decided that Austin, Texas, should have only one TV channel, and that channel was awarded to the radio station then owned by Mrs. Lyndon Johnson.

The Wall Street Journal notes: "After deciding one station would handle all standard television in Austin, FCC had no difficulty choosing who should have it. The agency announced on April 14, 1952, its formal verdict that Austin would get Channel 7; Mrs. Johnson's company had filed for exactly that channel one month earlier, and had already nailed down network affiliation."⁶ The effect of these decisions was to make Austin a one TV station town, with that station owned by the wife of Senator Johnson. The *Journal* notes that the FCC had allotted three channels to the city of Corpus Christi to the south of Austin, which is about half the size of the state capital. As a result of this turn of events, the Johnsons now own a property valued at around \$7 million.

The *Journal's* somewhat tongue-in-cheek account of this story suggests a presentation of the Johnson business saga entitled "How to Put \$17,500 into Broadcasting and Come

Out With Multimillions" (\$17,500 was the price Mrs. Johnson paid for the original radio station in 1943), for which one of the suggested subtitles is, "A Long Run of Luck With Government Rulings Helps Lots."⁷

The *Journal* notes the numerous men who have worked both in a political capacity for the new President and in a business capacity for his wife. These include John Connally, "Jake" Pickle (recently elected to Congress) and J. C. Kellam, who had served with the National Youth Administration when LBJ was its Texas director. Also included was Walter Jenkins, who served both as Johnson's administrative assistant and as treasurer of the corporation which ran the TV station. "Like two young oaks springing up side by side," the *Journal* comments, "the LBJ careers in government and business grew mightily—their trunks rising parallel and branches intertwining . . . The statesman husband at no time held stock in the wife's enterprise. Yet the rising family fortune not only freed him to pursue politics but financed handsome hospitality in surroundings appropriate to increasingly lofty office . . ."⁸

As for the help which politics might have given to business, the *Journal* says: "Unlike most businesses, a broadcasting enterprise can exist and expand only with government approval. From the very beginning and repeatedly thereafter, the fate of the Johnson family fortune has inevitably hung not only upon business acumen but also upon favorable rulings by the Federal Communications Commission. Yet FCC public records show not a single intervention by Representative, Senator, Vice President, or President Johnson in quest of a favor for his wife's company.

"Quite apparently, there was no need for it. Mrs. Johnson was able to present the FCC with a record of solid business success, whenever that was relevant to government decisions. When it was not relevant, she was—as one official of the agency remarks—consistently 'lucky.' The practical effect—disregarding intent—of a long series of FCC rulings has been

to create the Johnson local TV broadcasting monopoly, expand its sphere, and defend it against incursions.”⁹ The article goes on to detail how the FCC, by some rather strange logic, prevented a competitive channel from being beamed into Austin, instead allocating the channel to Corpus Christi—which at the time already had two TV stations in operation.

The Johnson TV station, in addition to being testimony to Lady Bird’s “luck,” was to figure prominently in the saga of Robert G. (Bobby) Baker. Baker, a native of Pickens, S.C., made \$19,000 a year as secretary to the Democratic majority of the Senate. A former page on Capitol Hill, Baker became secretary in 1955 by appointment of Lyndon Johnson. From this position of seeming obscurity but great leverage, Baker built himself a financial empire. When the controversy surrounding him broke in the fall of 1963, he had a net worth, by his own estimate, of better than \$2 million. He held stock in banks, insurance companies, supermarkets, a motel and restaurant, and a pipeline manufacturing company. He owned real estate which he valued at half-a-million dollars. He owned a \$125,000 home in an exclusive section of Washington, and a townhouse near the Capitol which cost \$28,000. Resident in the latter was his secretary, former Tennessee beauty queen Carol Tyler, whom he listed as his cousin.

How did a young man from Pickens, S.C., parlay a \$19,000 a year salary into such opulence? That was the question Senate investigators set out to answer in October, 1963, when they heard testimony from Ralph Hill, a vending machine operator who had filed a civil suit complaining Baker had caused termination of Hill’s services as a supplier to a defense contractor. Baker denied the charges. When the Senate committee moved to question him in the matter, however, Baker resigned. Appearing later before the Committee, Baker took refuge in the Fifth Amendment respecting some 125 questions about his activities.

Baker, clearly, was a bright young man who saw the

labyrinth of governmental pressures there to be used if one knew how. *The Wall Street Journal* commented that "the record of the Senate Rules Committee's investigation so far suggests that this young wheeler-dealer, the eyes and ears of the Senate's Democratic leaders, was cut in on profitable business deals not necessarily because he would or could wield his influence but simply because that influence existed. For example, a vice-president of the two-year-old District of Columbia National Bank recommended a \$125,000 loan to Mr. Baker to buy a house without security, in part because Mr. Baker was 'a gentleman of innumerable friendships and connections.'"¹⁰ Certain witnesses testified that Baker, in addition to radiating an aura of good connections, was on occasion doing something with them. In a story about Baker's appearance before the committee, *Time* magazine summarized some of the relevant testimony:

Last September, Ralph Hill, president of Capitol Vending Co., filed a \$300,000 damage suit against Baker, Ernest C. Tucker, Baker's Washington law office associate, and Fred Black, Jr., a Baker buddy who, like Baker, is a big Serv-U stockholder . . . In the suit, Hill charged that Baker negotiated to get Capitol's machines into Melpar (an aerospace subcontractor), then demanded a monthly kickback. Hill said he paid Baker \$5,600 over 16 months. He also charged that when Baker wanted Hill to sell out to Serv-U and he refused, Baker talked Melpar into dropping its Capitol contract . . .

Hill's suit further contended that Baker told North American lobbyist Black he could help North American get government contracts through his Senate post. This, Hill claimed, led Black to assist Serv-U in getting North American's business. North American President John L. Atwood told the committee that Serv-U vending machines did \$2,500,000 worth of business annually in North American installations . . .¹¹

More sensational testimony yet was to come from insurance agent Reynolds, who succeeded in pointing the developing scandal straight toward the White House. For one thing, Reynolds testified that Fred Black, Jr., had given Baker some \$10,000 in 1960 "to get our man elected." Baker later told him, Reynolds said, that the money was for Lyndon Johnson. And Reynolds' biggest *exposé* concerned that Johnson television station in Austin. Reynolds, in whose insurance office Baker was a silent partner, testified that Baker had been instrumental in a transaction whereby Reynolds gave Lyndon Johnson a stereo phonograph valued at \$585. This was assertedly a token of thanks for two large insurance policies taken out on Johnson's life by the TV station, written by Reynolds. Also, Reynolds testified, Johnson administrative assistant and TV station executive Walter Jenkins had suggested that Reynolds buy \$1,200 worth of advertising time on the station. Jenkins denied this in a sworn affidavit to the committee. Reynolds further said that, having no use for TV advertising in Austin, Texas, he attempted to subcontract part of it to one Albert G. Young, president of the Mid-Atlantic Stainless Steel Company. For his part, President Johnson dismissed the whole matter by saying the stereo set was a gift from "the Baker family."

While the Democratic-controlled Rules Committee seemed satisfied with the Jenkins and Johnson explanations, Iowa's outspoken Rep. H. R. Gross was not. "While the President has given some explanation of the stereo set," Gross told the House of Representatives, "he has said absolutely nothing about the \$1,200 gift of cash money that Don Reynolds says he was pressured into contributing to the LBJ Company radio and television firm. There is no doubt that Don Reynolds paid the money to the LBJ Company for he has the checks to prove it. There is little doubt that someone had to suggest this arrangement, for it is most unlikely that a Maryland insurance man would throw \$1,200 down the drain by

advertising on a station 1,500 miles away.”¹² (Obviously, Representative Gross was not familiar with Lady Bird Johnson’s extraordinary “luck.”)

“If the LBJ Company employees were shaking down this insurance man in this questionable way without his knowledge,” Gross went on, “the President should say so publicly and condemn them. If President Johnson knew about it, then he owes the public an explanation of this transaction.”¹³

Gross also had some harsh words for the Senate Rules Committee, which did not seem anxious to turn up information embarrassing to a Democratic President. Gross noted that Jenkins had not been called to appear before the Committee, nor had Albert Young, who allegedly could corroborate Reynolds’ story about the TV time sale:

The testimony of Mr. Young is the testimony the Senate committee should be seeking if it really wants to find out who is telling the truth in this affair. Also, there is an obligation to call Mr. Jenkins to testify in person, and to be questioned on the details of this whole affair. Mr. Jenkins was an employee of the Senate when these matters transpired, and the fact that he is now the No. 1 assistant to President Johnson should not be a barrier to calling him for questioning under oath. Sherman Adams appeared and testified before a House committee on dealings with Bernard Goldfine and the vicuna coat gift. There is no reason why Walter Jenkins should not testify . . .¹⁴

And:

Mr. Reynolds states that he had a conversation with Jenkins in which Mr. Jenkins produced a letter from a Mr. Huff Baines, of Texas, who indicated that he would buy advertising on the LBJ Company station if he wrote the Lyndon Johnson insurance. Reynolds states he did not buy the advertising on a voluntary basis, but only after being called by Jenkins and told to buy it. Certainly Mr. Walter Jenkins should remember this, if it happened.¹⁵

Gross concluded with this salvo at Johnson himself:

Apparently President Johnson intends to try to shut off all questioning on the subject of his dealings with Bobby Baker. I do not believe that the inadequate statements he made last week before running away from reporters should end it. In fact, his conduct and statements to this point raise more questions than they answer.

There was no word of criticism of Bobby Baker in the statement made by Johnson, so we can probably assume that he still has the same warm admiration for Mr. Baker that he had when they were gift-giving pals back in 1959. If we are wrong he should tell us.

The President explained the expensive stereo set as a gift from the Baker family, and indicated it was merely one of many gifts that passed back and forth between him and his bosom friend, Bobby Baker. I would like to hear more about these tokens of affection that were passing back and forth between the then majority leader and Bobby Baker. It could be most pertinent. Up to this point there has been no demonstration of the government relationships that gave Baker his power to land highly lucrative vending machine contracts in the aerospace and defense industries. He must have had powerful friends who were active and influential in defense and aerospace contract matters.¹⁶

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the testimony of insurance agent Reynolds was making things hot not only for Bobby Baker, but for Baker's former employer, President Johnson. From that fact, the scandal took on a new dimension. Information was "leaked" from the White House to various newspapermen, seeking to discredit Reynolds. The information was said by *The New York Times* to have come from the FBI and military intelligence agencies, and to have been based on records compiled during Reynolds' military service. In some ways, this was the most sensational aspect of an already-sensational case, but since it carries implications of entirely other issues we shall leave it to be examined more fully in the next phase of our discussion.

Similar to the Baker scandal, but even larger in scope, was the Billie Sol Estes case. Estes was a shrewd young man who knew how to cultivate political connections and make them pay off. He found the federal government's farm program waiting for him, and in its interstices discovered an agile wheeler-dealer could go a long way on very little indeed. Within the framework provided by the government, he constructed a fantastic empire valued in the tens of millions of dollars.

Simply put, Estes' operation consisted of three parts: (1) Deals whereby he sold cotton acreage to farmers who in turn leased the land back to him, allowing him to plant ever-increasing quantities of cotton, collecting handsome government subsidies for his burgeoning surplus; (2) Further deals with farmers to supply them, at below-cost prices, with anhydrous ammonia fertilizer which increased the yield of their land for both cotton and grain sorghums used as cattle feed; (3) Still other deals by which farmers agreed to store their surplus grain in Estes storage bins and warehouses. Billie Sol lost money on the fertilizer, but made it back on cotton allotments and storage fees. It was a marvelous piece of work, showing much thought by a mind suited to the times.

In all three of its phases, the Estes enterprise was made possible by the government's system of price supports and acreage allotments. His own working capital came in the first place from the subsidies he received for his cotton; the desire of the farmers for ever-increasing quantities of fertilizer came from the twin facts that the government would pay them for all the cotton they could grow and that they were limited in the number of acres they could plant and so had to increase yield per acre; and with the booming surpluses that resulted, the business of storing excess crops, which was for Billie Sol the ultimate pay-off, became a subdivision of high finance.

Along the way, Estes worked in some side aspects which are also of interest, such as borrowing millions of dollars on the

collateral of fertilizer tanks which weren't there. But most decisive of all, whenever his incredible empire showed signs of toppling, he had been able to get some notable cooperation out of Washington.

With the advent of the New Frontier, Estes' political connections had improved immeasurably. He had been an ardent supporter of Adlai Stevenson in 1956 (having come up with the striking campaign idea of training an entire flock of parakeets to fly across the country chirping "I like Adlai"), and a strong supporter of the Kennedy-Johnson ticket in 1960. *Washington Post* reporter Julius Duschka notes that "from December 1960 to January 1962, a period of only thirteen months, Estes contributed a total of \$12,300 to the national Democratic Party alone. In January 1962 he wrote out a check for \$5,000 for fifty tickets at \$100 each for the Kennedy Inaugural anniversary dinner in Washington's National Guard Armory. Among his guests at the dinner were Texas Senator Ralph Yarborough, members of the Senator's staff, and employees in the office of Vice President Lyndon Johnson."¹⁷

In late 1961, when his empire began to crumble around the edges, Estes had occasion to call upon his political connections for assistance. And as various trains of investigation were pursued, it became apparent these connections were extensive indeed. Among those who made inquiries at Agriculture when the going got rough were Vice President Johnson, Senator Yarborough, Congressman Jim "Slick" Rutherford (both Yarborough and Rutherford being recipients of substantial campaign donations from Estes), Congressman Carl Albert of Oklahoma, and Congressman Bob Poage of Texas. Within the Agriculture Department itself, Estes approached Under Secretary Charles Murphy, who had been appointed by President Kennedy early in his administration with, as Duschka notes, "the strong political backing of Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson."¹⁸ It was Murphy who had to

pass upon Estes' sale-lease arrangements with farmers in order to increase his cotton allotments, which, the evidence indicated, were simply devices allowing him to buy the allotments outright. In October, 1961, it was reported that Department investigators were well on their way to declaring the allotment deals illegal; and Estes flew to Washington to raise cane and stress his political connections to several members of the Department.

One official to whom he talked, Wilson Tucker, told Senate investigators that Estes "made some very general statement concerning the use of his personal airplane in helping in behalf of the Kennedy-Johnson campaign,"¹⁹ underlined the power of his associations and threatened to make trouble for the administration. Although fiddling with a great many documents, Tucker said, Estes failed to show the contents of most of them. "He did permit me to glance quickly at one letter which I believe was from the National Democratic headquarters in Washington, and at the bottom of the letter was a pen note stating something like this: 'Check mailed . . . day,' and from a quick glance I believe it was \$1,000 but may have been \$10,000 or some other amount. I was not given time to really see what was written."²⁰

Tucker referred Estes to another official, Emery E. (Red) Jacobs, formerly active in the Liberal Farmers Union and an associate of the late Senator Robert Kerr, Democrat of Oklahoma. A week after Estes' conversation with Jacobs, the two met in Dallas and went on the famous shopping spree in which Jacobs bought \$1,311 worth of expensive clothes at Neiman-Marcus—clothes which, according to Jacobs, he had paid for in cash out of his own pocket. When testimony about this episode came out the following spring, Secretary of Agriculture Freeman requested Jacobs' resignation.

In late December, 1961, Under Secretary Murphy handed down a ruling that Estes' cotton allotments should be cancelled. But, as Duscha notes, on the same day "he decided to

reappoint Estes to the Cotton Advisory Committee, despite an adverse recommendation from the Department's personnel office."²¹ Estes called on Rutherford and Yarborough to salvage the allotments, and on January 6, 1962, the two legislators and their generous constituent met in Murphy's office to discuss matters again. Murphy decided to give Estes another chance to prove the legality of the allotment transactions. The Department dispatched still other investigators to Texas to check the allotments out again, one of whom testified that Jacobs had asked him "to send me a report containing every justification that you can find to permit the retention of these allotments," and said that Under Secretary Murphy would be "amicable, agreeable or even desirous of permitting the retention of these allotments."²² Both Jacobs and Murphy denied these allegations.

Other Agriculture officials who went on shopping trips with Estes were Assistant Secretary James T. Ralph and his administrative assistant William E. Morris. Morris had formerly been an aide to GOP Congressman H. Carl Andersen, who sold Estes some stock in a mining company, and had introduced Estes to the Minnesota legislator. Estes had bought Morris a \$100 hat at Neiman-Marcus. Although a clerk testified that Ralph had been fitted for a suit of clothes, there was no evidence introduced that Estes had bought him anything. The FBI did discover, however, that Ralph had used Estes' credit card to make personal telephone calls, a finding which was followed by Ralph's being asked to resign from the department. At Christmas, 1961, Estes sent \$100 money orders to both Morris and Ralph. The two men told House investigators they had sent these gifts to the Democratic National Committee as campaign contributions. In April 1962, Morris was asked to resign. Yet another to feel the warmth of Estes' friendship was Assistant Secretary of Labor Jerry T. Holleman, former President of the Texas AFL-CIO. When it was discovered that, Estes had sent

Holleman \$1,000, the Labor Department official was also asked to resign.

As it developed, all of Estes' connections could not forestall the inevitable. He fell from grace, as did almost all those associated with him. Appointed officials were fired, and the voters dealt with some of the elected ones. Democrat Rutherford and Republican Andersen, both having to seek reelection that same year, were summarily dumped from office. While it lasted, however, Estes showed he knew how to make his weight felt. Duscha notes: "Through January, February and March the case dragged on, with no effort by the Agriculture Department to bring it to a close. Ever since Estes had brought to bear on Under Secretary Murphy the influence of his political friends in Texas, the Department had slowed down its efforts to terminate the case and penalize him."²³

The exact extent of Lyndon Johnson's association with Estes is something of a mystery. As Duscha notes, one of Johnson's aides called Murphy at the height of the Estes crisis to ask about the "status of the case." In late 1960, Johnson had written Estes a "Dear Billie" letter, signed "Lyndon," which read as follows: "It was certainly good to hear from you. As you can imagine, I have been receiving thousands of letters and telegrams in the last few weeks and I haven't been able to answer them as soon as I would like to have. I do want you to know, however, that I have put your suggestion in the hands of the people who will make the final decision on this matter and I hope the outcome is favorable. I'll let you know if there is anything else that can be done."²⁴ A spokesman for Johnson, Charles Boatner, confirmed that this letter referred to William P. Mattox, who had been recommended by Estes for appointment to a position in the Kennedy-Johnson Agriculture Department, and who was to figure in a bizarre mystery which will be considered in a subsequent chapter of this essay. The day prior to Johnson's letter, another LBJ

subaltern, Clifton Carter, had written Estes, referring to his "fine letter about Bill Mattox," and saying "I'll see that it gets in the proper hands."²⁵

Mattox was subsequently named Vice Chairman of the County Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Committee in Reeves County, Texas, where Estes lives. In May 1962, Mattox was suspended from his job and in June was dismissed altogether. He was charged with having flown to Washington, on official business, at Estes' expense.

There is much more to the Estes case than this—the mysterious death of an Agriculture official who was investigating the legality of Estes' cotton allotments; proved subornations to lower Agriculture officials in Texas; and other odds and ends. But the major scandal transcends all these particulars.

What emerges most clearly from the Estes and Baker episodes is the fact that the federal Establishment in Washington is made to order for smart operators in search of ready fortunes. The leverage of governmental power was used by knowledgeable individuals to make a fast buck; in the Estes case, in particular, the resulting affluence, or appearance of it, was used to shore up political connections, woo officials, and keep the machinery running. On top of this, the resultant power combinations, in the Baker, Estes, and Jenkins scandals alike, have made it possible for government officials to impede the development of public information concerning the scandals, and to put pressure on those who would blow the whistle on their operations.

The complex of malfeasances wrapped up in these scandals, in short, was made possible by the very labyrinth of big government Liberals have sought to create as an answer to all our ills. The individuals involved would have been what they were, no doubt, under other circumstances as well; but it was the fact that massive, complicated, and far-reaching governmental programs existed, each involving billions of dollars of taxpayers' money to be dispensed in the right way by those

who knew the ropes, which lay at the bottom of the matter.

This, in the final analysis, is the real scandal—the network of payrolls, contracts, subsidies, controls, pressures, and outright coercion which is the federal government today. The sprawling bureaucracy of the welfare state, in addition to its other demerits, is increasingly demonstrated to be an El Dorado for con men and those who would shield them from public scrutiny.

►► *Part Three*

LIBERALISM AND LIBERTY

THE

LIBERALISM AND LIBERTY

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►► 1. *Freedom for Whom?*

OUR OBJECT has been to demonstrate the drift of the Establishment toward the total state, an enterprise in which the desires of pragmatic politicians and collectivist ideologues are perfectly united. The society Liberalism seeks for us is a society covered by a vast network of subsidies, controls, and regulations, through which the government wields indefinite authority over a race of obedient pensioners.

The natural question which arises when we view such a system is: What happens to freedom? America's founders tried to create a union of decentralized and limited powers in order to defend the liberty of the citizen. By turning the system inside out, doesn't Liberalism put freedom in jeopardy? To a certain extent, that question has already been answered in the affirmative. We have suggested some of the results of Liberal policy, in which farmers and businessmen have lost the freedom to dispose of their property as they see

fit, etc. In the interstices, we have seen the growth of venality sealed off from censure and correction, itself a species of encroachment as it plunders the citizen for the purposes of private greed.

All of this would seem to suggest Liberalism's disregard for the American design has led precisely to the result the founders apprehended: The progressive decay of liberty. To the mind of a Madison, an Adams, or even a Hamilton, the present scope of federal interference in what were once private matters would have seemed inconceivable; it far exceeds, in fact, the brand of interference practiced by the 18th-century king and Parliament against whom these men rebelled. The Liberal Establishment has abandoned the ideals of freedom for which the United States is supposed to stand. Equally to the point, it has abandoned the reputed meaning of Liberalism itself—which has to do with the liberty of the person.

Establishment spokesmen, however, deny these conclusions. They still employ, on given occasions, the rhetoric of personal freedom, and still regard themselves as defenders of individual liberty. It is the conservative, they charge, who threatens freedom and the Liberal who is truly concerned to protect it. As may be expected in the assertion of so paradoxical a position, the argument is a little complicated. Its main elements, however, seem to include the following:

1. Living in the 20th century, we are on a higher plateau of understanding than were the Founding Fathers. We are educated and sensitive enough to preserve human liberty without the restraints and impediments to effective government built into the American system to begin with.

2. Part of our improved understanding includes the perception that "freedom" has a new and broader meaning; it now signifies freedom from want, hunger and fear. Only by use of the concentrated powers of government can these freedoms be conferred.

3. What were once conceived as freedoms, particularly the ability to dispose of one's own property, are not freedoms at all. These things must yield to the new conception of freedom mentioned in point No. 2.

4. Of the old liberties desired by the Founding Fathers, one vestige remains. This is freedom of religion, speech, press, the right to dissent, to be afforded due process, to participate in political decision-making. These are "preferred rights,"¹ and Liberal allegiance to them is testimony that the Establishment is still libertarian.

5. Because these particular rights are covered by the First Amendment to the Constitution, Liberals say that amendment is sacred. It, and other parts of the Bill of Rights which touch on similar matters, must be preserved inviolate. No incursion upon its guarantees is permissible.

6. With respect to First Amendment rights, the Liberal triumphantly concludes, the conservative is the true offender. He is always trying to silence dissenters, put heretics in jail, impose his views on others. It is the Liberal who stands up for heresy, protects honest men in government from conservative witch-hunts, etc.

We must pass over the aspect of this argument which attempts so abruptly to change the meaning of "freedom"; the Liberal wants to make the word mean exemption from the compulsions of circumstance, rather than from the caprice of tyrants. And while that point is an interesting one, it is of a philosophical turn which cannot be encompassed in the present volume. To most people, to the men who wrote the American Constitution and to ranked generations of Western society, "freedom" has meant the absence of arbitrary human restraint exercised outside the known and regular guidelines of the law. And, in fact, that is precisely what it means to Liberals themselves when they talk about "preferred rights" and "civil liberties" and protection of the First Amendment.

It is apparent that Liberalism's fealty to freedom in this

sense stands or falls on the question of "preferred rights." The right of dissent, of free speech and a free press, is the key point, and the First Amendment is the central text. The Liberal attitude toward these things assertedly proves, despite everything we have set down in the preceding section, that Liberalism is devoted to freedom, is not going to impose a despotism on America. It is possible, Establishment spokesmen would have us believe, to take away a man's right to dispose of his property, but leave him inviolate in the expression of his opinions. So long as that latter freedom remains, everything will be all right. The citizen can always speak out against anything he doesn't like and have it changed.

But how does the citizen retain this latter freedom if power has become centralized beyond the point of effective restraint, and if he is dependent on the whim of government for his livelihood? In these circumstances, his freedom obviously depends on the willingness of government to let him enjoy it. Let that willingness contract, let it be withdrawn from those departments of society government finds displeasing, and "parchment barriers," as Madison called them, can do little. And, even in those areas where government still smiles upon free speech, it can hardly be characterized as a "right," since it exists only by sufferance of the authorities. In a subsequent chapter, we shall examine some cases in which precisely this kind of contraction has occurred.

Liberalism has its priorities reversed. Once the citizen's right to dispose of his energies and resources is sufficiently diminished, the job of eliminating "preferred rights" becomes a mopping-up operation, to be pursued according to the leisure and inclination of the ruler. "Preferred rights" themselves will not be able to do much about it. If property rights are kept intact, however, and if the central government is hedged about by alternative centers of decision, then the rights of free speech, free press, and so forth will be undergirded by something more than theory. A man secure in

his home, in the enjoyment of earnings gained in employment of his choice, has a place to stand; he has a base from which to enter the give and take of political disagreement. A newspaper which buys its newsprint and machinery in the open market, choosing among competitive suppliers, is relatively immune from government coercion. But a man who owes his dwelling and his daily bread to government, a newspaper which gets its machinery and newsprint from the state, may both be silenced in a moment by withdrawal of the material elements of life and enterprise.

The Liberal view on "preferred rights" is equally contradictory on constitutional grounds. The Establishment has told us the Constitution is outmoded, that we cannot be guided by the sentiments of the 18th century, and that constitutional restraints must be judged by the needs of the moment. If all this is so, whence comes the deification of the First Amendment? How does it happen that this portion of the Constitution alone is to be interpreted strictly, minimizing the reach of governmental power, while the rest of it is interpreted loosely, maximizing that power? Liberal jurisprudence on these two contradictory points is merely the rationalization of pre-conceived ideas, with relevance neither to consistency nor to the canons of law and reason.

These are some of the theoretical objections which might be elaborated against the Liberal's argument that he favors "dissent" even while dismantling restraints upon the abuse of power; and in a theoretical work, still other objections might be cited. For our present purpose, however, it will do to examine Liberalism's claims on an empirical basis.

Establishment subsidiaries like the American Civil Liberties Union, Americans for Democratic Action, and the Fund For the Republic never tire of proclaiming the sacredness of "civil liberties," or warning the nation about the danger presented to these liberties by the minions of the American right wing. It is in the name of "civil liberties" that the

Establishment, for example, opposes prayer in the public schools, demands improved treatment of accused and convicted criminals, berates law enforcement agencies for "brutality," insists that Communist "dissenters" not be put in jail or barred from speaking on American college campuses, crusades against security procedures in government, etc.

Abstractly put, the goals of this activity seem unexceptionable—however at variance they may be with the Liberal performance in other areas, or however shaky the theoretical ground supporting them. Surely it is desirable that dissenters not be persecuted for disagreeing with the majority, that the First Amendment be preserved intact, that blameless men should not be hounded from government. No one who believes in the objectives of the American Constitution could favor such things, although we might legitimately ask why the Establishment, in view of its overall performance, *doesn't* favor them. Certain questions, however, insistently suggest themselves.

First of all, are the issues to which the Establishment has affixed itself really the way we have been describing them? Are Liberals, in expunging prayer from the schools, merely defending the Constitution? Or are they up to something else? In their seemingly endless war with the House Committee on Un-American Activities, anti-Communist legislation and government loyalty programs, are they championing the right of dissent? Or are they defending something other than dissent? In resisting efforts to oust alleged "security risks" from government, are they standing up for individual freedom from persecution? Or are they doing something altogether different?

Secondly, does the Establishment really believe what it says about "preferred rights" and "dissent" and the rest of it, or does it only talk of these things when the matter up for discussion is congenial to Establishment ideas? Does it adhere to its expansive theories when the dissenter in question turns

out to be a right-winger, or the good man in government is opposing Liberal programs, or when the exercise of preferred rights and due process is inconvenient to Establishment purposes? Is Liberalism really willing to countenance dissent *against itself*?

To complete and clarify the issues raised in the first section of this essay, we must suggest some answers to these questions. We must determine what it is that the Establishment is, characteristically, protecting when it talks of "dissent," and, conversely, the way it acts when it is confronted by something that really is dissent—that is, dissent against Liberalism. When we have done so, we will be in a better position to judge whether Liberalism's drive toward the total state can be limited to matters of "property rights," as the Establishment tells us it will be, or whether it will at last bring all our freedoms down in an impartial ruin.

►► 2. *The Law-Breakers*

EVERYONE but the most frenetic anarchist will concede that government has *some* function in society. Advocates of the purest *laissez-faire* acknowledge the need for the traffic-policeman state, maintaining an arena of order, insuring equal administration of the rules of the game. Without peace, without the suppression of crime and violence, there could be no liberty. Every man would be prey to the whim of his neighbor. Society would disintegrate into the war of each against each.

That is only common sense, as well as the studied observation of political sages from Aristotle to Locke to Blackstone. As the Supreme Court put it 100 years ago: "The great object and duty of government is the protection of the lives, liberty, and property of the people composing it, whether abroad or at home, and any government failing in the accomplishment of that object, or the performance of that duty, is not worth preserving."¹

This general proposition was well understood by the men who built the American nation, and was the principal reason for their meeting in Philadelphia to construct a Federal Union. It was precisely to insure the maintenance of peace, to preserve order among the states, and to obtain equal administration of laws constitutionally enjoined upon it that our central government came into being.

It is therefore curious to note that, while government today is taking on functions never remotely envisioned for it by America's founders—from setting the price of milk to superintending our cultural pursuits—it seems increasingly unable to handle the most elementary tasks of civil authority. Even as Liberal ideologues propose to legislate us into utopia, they are incapable of preventing the rampant increase of crime, growing contempt for the law and those who enforce it, and the disintegration of the moral and legal codes which permit our society to function in an orderly manner.

When Senator Goldwater brought up this subject during the 1964 campaign, he was charged with everything from racism to irrelevance to violation of his own principles. By what right did Goldwater raise the matter of crime in a presidential election? Was he suggesting prevention of crime was a *Federal*, rather than a state or local responsibility? How did this fit with his states' rights position? The paradox suggested by these questions, as it happens, might better be turned on the questioners themselves. Since they want the Federal Government to intervene in every zone of American life, why *don't* they want the Federal Government to do something about crime and violence? Whence their constitutional objections on this, of all points? Why have government do everything it is not supposed to do, but refrain from doing the things some government must do if society is to survive?

The answer, of course, is two-fold: First, the Liberals *do* want the Federal Government to engage in police action in those cases where their own sense of outrage is piqued, *e.g.*, racial violence against "civil rights" enthusiasts in the South.

They do not, however, want such action where their sense of outrage is, at best, subdued, *e.g.*, racial violence by "civil rights" enthusiasts in the North. Second, the true need of the situation is not for the Federal government to pre-empt local police functions, but for the government and the Liberal Establishment generally to stop doing things which lend encouragement to the forces of moral and legal disintegration.

The issue of law and order has a relevance to the Liberal-conservative face-off so profound that its dimensions can hardly be explored in the superficial exchanges which do service as political debate in America. The question goes deep, to contrasting views of man and his nature, and of the ethical universe in which man has his being. It has to do with the pulverization of values and standards, with the idea that man is a product of material forces devoid of responsibilities, with disregard for the known and fixed guidelines of the law and the Constitution, and with the idea that discipline and achievement are of less concern than social homogenization and the gospel of adjustment.

These are the final issues between Liberalism and conservatism. They involve the whole agenda of bland and permissive nostrums aimed at elasticizing moral standards, pulling down values, and obliterating distinctions. For a generation and more, the main thrust of Liberal policy has been to drain from the American consciousness its last few vestiges of piety. The Liberal view of things is, characteristically, that religious truth is at best a kind of convenient superstition, that the world as we know it is the product of physical stress and material impulse, that the best policy is not what is right, but what works. It says values are not fixed or certain, but "relative," that in matters of public policy we must be guided, not by the strictures of the Constitution, but by the necessity of the moment. Materialism and agnosticism derived from Freud and Marx and Darwin; annihilation of value derived

from Nietzsche and James and Dewey. These are the root precepts of Liberal philosophy.

In the academy, where Liberal thought is imparted in its most concentrated form, this "relativism" has had some striking results. In *Changing Values in College*, Philip Jacob tells us the typical result of higher education in America today is to induce rejection of "moral taboos" and "skepticism of the supernatural as a determining force in human affairs." Under the pressure of society at large and of his college environment, the student is nudged toward a "*Liberal attitude, refusing to let fixed moral standards or ingrained prejudice govern his relations with other people.*"² Other surveys of college youth confirm this. In the late 1950s, two sociologists at Queens College, New York, questioned 225 students about the celebrated Charles Van Doren TV quiz scandal case. Most of the students considered Van Doren, not as a culprit, but as a "tragic hero." Eighty-six per cent were sympathetic to him. Twenty-six per cent found nothing wrong with his behavior.

Similar results outside the academy were indicated by studies of soldiers who broke under the pressures of Communist brainwashing in Korea. The typical brainwashee, said Major William Mayer, the Army psychiatrist who examined returning prisoners, "was an individual who based his sense of security and often of superiority on transient, materialistic values, and was a man who, if deprived of material sources of support, would prove to be insecure, easily manipulated and controlled, lacking in real loyalties and convictions."³

It is acknowledged by most observers that our society is suffering from ethical impoverishment; that frivolity and vulgarization have tended to displace spiritual and moral precepts which once informed our national consciousness. Waxing materialism and skepticism have gone hand in hand with a crime rate that has been increasing at better than five times the increase in the rate of population growth. We are

beset by an accelerating secularization, a corresponding decline of moral energy.

It is somehow appropriate that the Establishment, surveying this scene, should decide that now is precisely the time to extirpate religious observance from the education of American youth. In the name of "civil liberties," the Establishment has brought its program of secularization to a triumphant climax. In the Supreme Court prayer decisions, saying we must construe the First Amendment to the Constitution with elaborate punctilio so that not even a hint of arbitrary power may endanger our liberties, we find in its concentrated essence the kind of "freedom" the Establishment would confer upon us. Not, to be sure, the freedom of the farmer to plow his ground and reap his produce, or the freedom of the worker to seek employment unhindered, or the freedom of the businessman to stay out of jail. But the freedom, instead, of the atheist not to hear the Lord's Prayer recited by believing Christians; the freedom of children to be compelled to spend the intellectually active hours of their formative years in schools devoid of religious sentiment. That, all too exactly, is the notion of freedom which animates the Establishment.

It is, in a word, *freedom from religious authority*, the variety of freedom sought by the materialist, the pragmatist, the relativist. It is this the Establishment is after and not, as some Liberal spokesmen would have us believe, strict observance of the Constitution. On this point, we should be absolutely clear. The Liberal resort to strict construction is a pretext, a device for getting at the real objective.

This is so for at least three reasons. First, America's Founding Fathers did not intend, when they enacted the First Amendment, to banish religious observances sponsored by the states. Their sanctions were imposed against *the Congress*, and they were aimed, not at mere religious ceremonial, but against erection of an established church. Thus, even were strict construction of the First Amendment the real

point, the Liberal position would be open to serious argument.*

Second, as noted, the Liberals themselves are inveterate advocates of—not strict construction—but loose construction. Their characteristic plea is for an interpretation of the Constitution which will *increase* the scope of governmental authority. Strict construction is reserved by the Establishment for those special cases in which it takes a particular interest. It is a device, not a principle, and when it is invoked it is generally to serve some larger ideological interest.

Third, it is clear that *constitutionality* cannot be the point. This was shown conclusively when opponents of the Court decision attempted to launch a constitutional amendment which would make prayer in the classrooms of America allowable on the option of local authorities. The Establishment rose up *en masse* against this proposal. Yet opposition to *the amendment* could not have been constitutional, since the amendment process is itself the final and incontestable arbiter of what *is* constitutional. The objection was against prayer in the classroom, constitutional or not. The objection was to religious observance.

If Establishment performance on this specific point were not sufficient, the Supreme Court has also set an instructive example of disregard for the fundamental purpose of the law when the law stands in the way of Liberal aspirations. It is a fact known to all students of our Constitution that our central government was to be one of limited powers. The Su-

* The Liberal rejoinder on this point is that, by way of the 14th Amendment, the whole of the Bill of Rights is "incorporated" into the Constitution's restraints upon the states. This was the assertion of Justice Hugo Black in the 1962 prayer case. That position, however, is refuted by a long series of Supreme Court decisions dating back to Reconstruction. As the late Justice Felix Frankfurter put it, "the notion that the 14th Amendment was a covert way of imposing upon the states all the rules which it seemed important to 18th-century statesmen to write into the Federal amendments was rejected by judges who were themselves witnesses of the process by which the 14th Amendment became part of the Constitution." (*Adamson v. California*, 1947)

preme Court, after much Liberal hectoring and change of personalities, has employed certain ambiguities of phrase within the document—principally the general welfare and commerce clauses—to reverse that intention. Whereas the Constitution as a whole was meant to be an investiture of limited power, phrases within it are interpreted as grants of *unlimited* power. In short, the phrases are employed as pretexts to avert the purpose of the law, the supreme law which is supposed to bind the government itself.

In justification of this course, various Liberal sages, including several on the Supreme Court, have favored us with specimens of opportunistic reasoning. It was a Supreme Court Justice who imparted the noble datum that one cannot eat the Constitution. It was another Justice who opined that his own preference for champagne over dishwater was irrelevant to the topsy turvy of the cosmos. It was a Supreme Court Justice who told us that, when the law does not conform to present necessity, we must twist the law to suit our circumstances. Even so Liberal a commentator as Kenneth Burke professes “demoralization” as the Court subjects the Constitution to “casuistic stretching” to “supply new legal fictions to encompass new material arising since the Constitution was framed.”⁴

All this, the Liberal will rejoin, is necessary—else how could we survive under the complexities of the present age? It is not our purpose to enter that argument here. The point is that such “casuistic stretching” of the law, such obvious twisting of the Constitution this way and that, bespeaks a system in which will and desire take precedence over the text of law.

Nor does corrosion by example end there. In a preceding chapter we have canvassed the ascendant corruption of the present regime in Washington. We have seen flagrant disregard for morality and timely bending of the law for purposes of private gain. Direct violations of the law have been

committed, moreover, in an effort to conceal these misdoings from the American public. In the Baker case, for example, the administration "leaked" confidential information to reporters in an attempt to discredit a key witness. "In several instances," reported Cabell Phillips of *The New York Times*, "individual newsmen and news executives have been read excerpts from what purported to be reports by either Air Force intelligence or the Federal Bureau of Investigation."⁵ Such use of confidential material is contrary to law. In another episode involving a witness hostile to the Kennedy administration, government officials appeared before a congressional committee and gave false testimony, later retracted when the facts threatened to come out.

Other flagrant violations of the law have occurred in the field of foreign affairs and defense policy. For years, Congress mandated expenditure of appropriated funds for development of the B70 bomber. Because it did not agree with the Congressional will in this case, the administration refused to use the money as directed, in violation of the rightful authority of the legislature.

Similar disregard for the intent of Congress and therefore for the law has been manifested in the matter of allied trade with Communist nations. The executive branch has repeatedly failed to comply with Congressional efforts to prevent trade and aid to Communist nations. The Battle Act, the Johnson Act, and Public Law 87-128 forbid trade with Communist countries, aid to nations in default of their debts or to nations which are trading with Communist countries. Specific laws and riders to foreign aid bills have been passed mandating cutback of aid to Yugoslavia and Poland, and a cutoff of aid to nations trading with Communist Cuba. Every one of these prohibitions has been flouted by the executive branch or evaded by verbal subterfuge. The wheat deal with the Soviet Union, for example, was in violation of the Latta amendment to the 1961 agriculture act, which forbids sale of

subsidized farm commodities to Communist countries. President Johnson's response to a congressional mandate to cut off aid to countries trading with Cuba was to lop off a few thousand dollars in meaningless aid to France and Britain, leaving major aid recipients funneling goods to Castro untouched.

The executive branch has added insult to injury by refusing to tell the legislature what it is or isn't doing in such cases. In matters pertaining to censorship of military officers, trading with the enemy, administration of the foreign aid program, and others, it has claimed "executive privilege" and thrown dust in the eyes of congressional investigators.

The lesson is clear enough: *If you don't agree with the law, ignore it.* Figure out some expedient for getting around it. Or, failing that, simply say the law is "wrong" and violate it. The latter course was chosen by Democratic senatorial aspirant Pierre Salinger and the Democratic hierarchy of California in 1964. Salinger was not a resident of California when he decided to run for the Senate there. When incumbent Clair Engle died, Democratic Governor Edmund G. "Pat" Brown moved to appoint Salinger to the vacant seat. California law, however, requires that a Senate appointee must be an "elector" of the state, meaning someone qualified to vote there. Although Salinger was not so qualified, Brown appointed him anyway. State Attorney General Stanley Mosk ratified the choice (as did the Democrats of the United States Senate), asserting that the state law which would have barred Salinger was "invalid." In an exchange reported by the *San Francisco Chronicle*, Mosk made a most interesting assertion: "Asked by a reporter whether it was unusual for an attorney general to testify that the laws of his state were invalid, Mosk said: 'We have on occasion confessed error.'"⁶

It was with this sort of precept and example that Senator Goldwater concerned himself during the '64 campaign—not with suggestions that the Federal government take over the functions of the states and localities. Indeed, one of his main

points was precisely that the Federal government, through the Supreme Court, had been stripping local authorities of their rightful and necessary powers to handle law enforcement, and that this trend needed reversing.

Perhaps the most famous Supreme Court decree in this field was the 1957 Mallory case, in which a convicted rapist, Andrew Mallory, under sentence of death, was turned loose by the high court on the grounds that the police had waited too long (over night) to bring Mallory before a magistrate. Three years later, Mallory was arrested once more on a rape charge, of which he was acquitted, and was convicted of assault and burglary and sentenced to a prison term of 10 to 20 years.

During his presidential campaign, Goldwater called attention to some other less well-known but equally important cases:

Three years ago five members of the Supreme Court decided that state courts must follow Federal rules of evidence whether they wanted to or not. Specifically, no evidence could be used if police investigators made some mistake, any mistake, in gathering the evidence. This rule must hold even if it means an obviously guilty defendant will go free . . . In an earlier case, the Supreme Court ordered that a criminal conviction should be reversed, no matter how guilty the defendant, if it were shown that some technical violation of constitutional rights occurred anywhere in the course of investigation and trial . . .

The trend has now reached its logical end. Five justices of our Supreme Court have held that a voluntary confession made by a state prisoner was inadmissible because his lawyer was not present when it was made. This was held despite the fact that the prisoner admittedly knew of his right to remain silent. . . . There was no question in these cases that confessions were extorted or untrue. Such confessions have long, and rightly, been invalid. This is a new rule. It seems to say that a criminal defendant must be given a sporting chance to go free, even though nobody

doubts in the slightest that he is guilty. No wonder our law enforcement officers have been demoralized and rendered ineffective in their job.⁷

If the example set by Liberal government and the aid and comfort rendered by the Supreme Court were not enough, Establishment spokesmen have repeatedly spoken out in extenuation of demonstrators engaged in "civil disobedience," mass marches, and outright race riots. It was only when the fear of a "white backlash" caused some second thoughts that Liberal spokesmen backed away from these expressions of support and extenuation. Consider, for example, the 1963 statement made on national television by President Kennedy as he discussed the integration of the University of Alabama and the introduction of what was to become the "Civil Rights" act of 1964.

"The old code of equity law under which we live," he said, "commands for every wrong a remedy, but in too many communities, in too many parts of the country, wrongs are inflicted on Negro citizens for which there are no remedies at law. *Unless the Congress acts, their only remedy is in the street.*"⁸ (Italics added.)

Any "civil rights" demonstrator listening to that statement could only conclude (1) that until Congress acted, he was justified in seeking his "remedy in the street," and (2) that should Congress fail to act, he would be entitled to indulge the "remedy" with even greater force and frequency. In a word, the technique of marching and mass demonstrations blending into outright violence was being ratified by the highest conceivable authority, the nation's chief magistrate himself. Kennedy in effect was using such activity as a club over the head of Congress, telling them that if the bill were not enacted, riots would ensue. In the succeeding year, citizens in New York City, Rochester and Philadelphia were to see a great deal of this "remedy," and were perhaps to be

forgiven if they did not understand it to be mandated by the old code of equity law.

Kennedy's statement was reinforced by similar utterances from others high in the Liberal administration. In a 1964 address at Colby College, U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson told his student audience that, "In the great struggle to advance civil and human rights . . . even a jail sentence is no longer a dishonor but a proud achievement."⁹ In a less flamboyant statement, then-Senator Hubert Humphrey said that while "civil rights" demonstrations might be "technically" in violation of state laws, "that was not the point": "When Negroes have full rights and full protection of the law . . . then the demonstrations, technically legal or not, will cease."¹⁰ This cavalier attitude toward "technical" legality seems a little odd, since it is on the basis of far more "technical" points that the courts have been turning loose criminals upon the nation. Evidently technical violations of the law are of less concern to the Establishment than technical errors in procedure by those trying to enforce it.

All of these things, and several others which space does not allow us to mention, are part of the Federal Government's general apparatus of support and example for those who would evade the law, take it in their own hands, or violate it openly when they find its strictures inconvenient. But none of them is quite so direct, or so blatant, as the new concept of federal-aid-to-civil-disobedience unveiled by a report of the New York State Senate.

The New York legislators had cause, during the closing months of 1964, to look into an organization called "Mobilization for Youth," a social and political agitation group operating in New York City. MFY garnered a few fleeting headlines in 1964 when its workings were examined by the *New York Daily News*. The paper charged that MFY, sustained by taxpayers' money at the local and national levels, was infiltrated by Communists and other agents of the far left. The

issue failed to catch fire, however, because national media were too busy alerting the nation to the menace of "extremists" on the right. It was therefore necessary to wait for the New York Senate report to get the full story.

In essence, the report discloses that MFY was indeed heavily infiltrated by the ultra left, and had an identified member of the Communist Party on its governing board. The committee took testimony indicating that the Communists considered MFY a major target for penetration, and instructed their operatives to seek positions in it.

More to the point of the "law and order" issue, the committee confirmed what had been reported earlier, that MFY was deeply involved in promoting the celebrated New York "rent strike," in which tenants of apartment buildings refused to pay their rent until landlords met their demands for repairs and improvements. MFY also encouraged school boycotts and was engaged in other "civil rights" protest activity.

Among MFY's projects was a so-called "Adventure Corps," complacently described in a federal report as a "paramilitary" group, in which youngsters would drill in imitation of military maneuvers. One Liberal social worker voiced shock at the corps' "focus on military drill, including uniforms and rifles, and a general kind of Bundist rigidity."¹¹

In addition, the *New York News* disclosed that MFY had paid for and printed a handbill advertising a "mass rent strike rally," which was distributed at the scene of "civil rights" agitation in New York City in 1964. The leaflet, according to the *News*, had been ordered by MFY employee Ezra Birnbaum, and told residents of the lower East Side that "Harlem tenants organized rent strikes and are getting results—we can do the same."¹² The New York Senate committee discovered a memorandum by Birnbaum, however, indicating the motive of the "rent strike" drive was something other than improved living conditions for tenants. The

memo advocated action to “organize tenants as a political force,” and said, “we will no longer work with individual tenant complaints unless the tenant is prepared to help organize his building.”¹³

All of this activity, lending encouragement to the forces of civil disorder, has been subsidized by the Kennedy-Johnson Administration, to the tune of more than \$6 million of taxpayers’ money. Moreover, it was subsequently learned that the Johnson regime had hired former MFY Director George Brager, who says MFY’s “soundness has been affirmed” and who characterizes charges concerning infiltration of the group as “a collection of rumors,”¹⁴ to work in connection with the “war on poverty.”

►► 3. *The War Against Security*

LIBERAL CONCERN for “civil liberties” is manifested chiefly in cases involving the internal security of the United States. In the Establishment view, efforts to rebuke and control the Communist conspiracy within the United States amount to attacks on “free speech,” and safeguards against security and loyalty risks in the American government are little better than a medieval inquisition.

The Smith Act, the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Attorney General’s list of subversive organizations, the House Committee on Un-American Activities, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, and the FBI—all have felt the lash of Establishment disdain. Loyalty oaths, passport regulations, and anti-propaganda ordinances are particularly anathema. In the Establishment view, true “civil liberties” demand that profession of Communist opinion be looked upon as a matter of political dissent, and that efforts to deprive someone of

governmental employment on security grounds be treated as a criminal proceeding in which the full weight of proof is on the "prosecution." Unfortunately, neither of these presuppositions fits the facts.

Participation in the Communist global enterprise is something more than "dissent," or an exercise in free speech. Communists are not troublesome because of their opinions, because of things they *say*. They are troublesome because they are the agents of a hostile foreign power trying to destroy the United States. They are a fifth column whose allegiance in the struggle for world survival is with the enemy—a fifth column trained to use any and every means, including violence, which serves the cause of the Bolshevik conspiracy. Sanctions against them therefore concern, *not* their speech, but their systemic commitment to the enemy. Such sanctions are not a domestic problem so much as a problem of national defense. Our government's mandate to deal with them is part of its mandate to protect American citizens from a foreign adversary—the most elementary of its functions, without which there could be no United States and no freedom for its citizens.*

The Establishment view of security measures in government is equally misleading. There is, after all, no such thing as a *right* to a government job. The Liberal argument is equivalent to saying the government—that is, the individuals who constitute the government—should be sealed off from surveillance by the citizenry. The government does not have rights; the people who work for government, in that

* Some Liberals have clearly recognized this point. *Vide* Prof. Sidney Hook, in *Heresy Yes—Conspiracy No*: "It is Communism as an international movement whose capital is Moscow which is the enemy of American democracy; and the American Communist Party, no matter what its size or influence (which is not entirely inconsiderable), is an integral part of that movement . . . It is not the speech of members of the Communist Party which makes them dangerous but their organizational ties, for this in effect makes them a para-military fifth column of a powerful state, ready to strike whenever their foreign masters give the word."

specific capacity, have *privileges* extended to them by the citizen, revocable under terms the citizen chooses to establish for his own protection. The question of continued government employment, therefore, is not commensurable with prosecution for a crime. The burden of proof is not on a "prosecution," seeking to put a man in jail, and doubts are not to be resolved in favor of the "accused," who is to be presumed "innocent" until proved otherwise. *It is the individual citizen who has rights over against the members of the government, and who in particular has a right to be certain public servants who are "risks" of one sort or another in the Cold War are not employed in the government.* Where there are reasonable doubts, these doubts should be resolved, not in favor of the public servant, but in favor of the citizen's right to have the best possible representation in government and to be secure against foreign enemies.

Both these points are fairly well settled in the laws of our nation.* Yet the Establishment continues to view Communism as a question of "free speech" and internal security in government as a field in which "rights" are all on the side of the public servant. The result has been a long and systematic campaign against every form of internal security measure seeking to protect the nation from Communism or from those whose background makes them, as government employees, unacceptable as "risks."

The Supreme Court under Earl Warren has been the most powerful instrument of the Establishment program in this field. The Warren Court has laid level internal security statutes and regulations in almost every sector of American life. It has struck down state sedition laws (the Nelson case), emasculated the Smith Act (the Yates case), hampered Congressional investigating committees (the Watkins case), forced opening of security files to Communist defendants

* Justice Holmes, a Liberal's Liberal, put it that "the petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."

(Jencks case), upset executive department security procedures (Service case), and hindered efforts to prevent Communist entrance to and exit from the country (Kent case). The Court has erased from the books almost every sanction the United States has against the internal activities of the Communists.

The Court's method has not always been ingenuous. The Nelson case striking down the sedition law of the state of Pennsylvania, for example, was based on the notion that the Federal government, by passage of the Smith Act, had pre-empted the internal security field; the states didn't need to handle internal subversion because Federal authorities, operating under the Smith Act, would do it for them. Yet one year later, the same Supreme Court virtually cancelled out the Smith Act, eliminating the very law whose pre-emptive potencies supposedly made state action unnecessary.

On those occasions where the Court has after much tedium affirmed the constitutionality of an anti-Communist measure, other zones of the Establishment have stepped in to do the work of nullification. In October, 1961, after 10 years of litigation, the Court upheld a requirement of the Internal Security Act of 1950 that the Communist Party of the United States register as a "Communist-action" group. This ruling made it unlawful to issue passports to members of the Communist Party. The restriction was immediately done away with by a State Department order that anyone whose passport was challenged had the right to confront witnesses testifying to his Communist affiliation and to see the evidence upon which the denial was based. The effect of such action would be to dry up sources of information about the Party and to disclose information security officials had about its activities. Since security officers are reluctant to "blow" their information sources, "the real effect of the regulations," as the Internal Security subcommittee put it, "was to assure the issuance of passports to many, if not most, Communist applicants."¹

Establishment lenience toward internal Communism, and its desire to rid the nation of effective internal security measures, may be discerned in the related matters of Lee Harvey Oswald and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, of which Oswald was a member. In both instances, the readiness of the Establishment to confer freedom of movement upon those deeply compromised with America's Communist adversaries played an important role.

The web of circumstance tying Oswald to the international Communist conspiracy is convincing. According to his own statement, he took to Communism at the age of 15, when someone gave him a pamphlet defending Communist spies Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. His interest aroused, he turned to Karl Marx's *Das Kapital*, and began slipping by degrees into the fringes of the far left. He wound up by going to Russia, renouncing his American citizenship, taking a Russian wife, and declaring: "I affirm that my allegiance is to the Soviet Socialist Republic."² According to a 1959 interview with Aline Mosby of United Press International, Oswald was convinced capitalism and the American free enterprise system were finished. "Capitalism has passed its peak," he said. "Capitalism will disappear as feudalism disappeared."³ In 1962, after supposedly putting in service as a factory worker at Minsk, and improving his marksmanship as a member of a "rifle club," Oswald returned to America. He was allowed repatriation by State Department authorities, reportedly on the technical grounds that his citizenship, though renounced by him, had not been formally revoked. The U.S. embassy also lent him \$435.71 to pay his travel expenses.

All of this, it was subsequently revealed, took place over the vehement protest of J. W. Holland, an immigration official who opposed granting Oswald a visa, saying "a substantial amount of derogatory security information" had been developed concerning him, and that Oswald's profession of a change of heart was "not sufficient to relieve doubts which have arisen regarding his loyalty to the U.S." Here, then, was

a committed Marxist, a defector to Moscow who had renounced his citizenship, received special training from the Communists including training in marksmanship, who was married to the niece of an MVD agent, and whose record excited suspicion on the part of a responsible State Department officer. Yet when Oswald asked repatriation to America, U.S. officials in Moscow not only decided in his favor, but financed his return.

Moreover, according to Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott, Oswald obtained another passport to go to Russia five months before he assassinated President Kennedy. "This was done," say the reporters, "without the customary 'name check' required for persons known to be Communists or to have Communist associations. . . . [His] incriminatory State Department file apparently was completely ignored in giving Oswald a passport to Russia the day after he asked for it."⁴

The passport issue pops up again in the matter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, with which Oswald became involved on his return to America. Oswald's Fair Play membership card was issued May 28, 1963. In the summer of 1963 he participated in a pro-Castro demonstration in New Orleans, and was booked by police there after a scuffle with anti-Castro Cubans. On August 21, he appeared on a New Orleans radio program and defended the Castro dictatorship. In their investigation of Oswald's apartment, Dallas police found letters to him from a man in New York City, on stationery of the Communist Party USA, offering advice on how to conduct himself in Dallas. One instructed him on how to set up a Fair Play for Cuba chapter. The FBI also learned Oswald had been receiving mailings in Dallas from the "Fair Play" group under the name "A. Hidell."*

* For some reason the Warren Commission gave only perfunctory attention to Oswald's left-wing connections. It correctly noted, as indicated in chapter 2, part I, that Oswald was not influenced in any way by right-wing activity, and that he *was* influenced by left-wing activity. Yet in its discussion of organizations which might have had some bearing on the Kennedy assassination, the report devotes some seven pages of text, in *The New York Times*

The Fair Play for Cuba Committee had long been under investigation by committees of Congress and by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Jay Sourwine, chief counsel for the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, has said: "We have sworn testimony on the record that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee was initiated with the assistance of money which came from Castro in Cuba. This is Communist money. The committee has evidence that some of the persons active in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee itself are Communists. The committee has information that old line Communists, all across the country, are helping [FPCC] in its demonstrations and organization."⁵

In its annual report for fiscal year 1961, the FBI said: "The Fair Play for Cuba Committee is one of the main outlets in this country for pro-Castro propaganda . . . The Bureau during the 1961 fiscal year determined that certain funds used by the committee to pay for a newspaper advertisement had come from a Cuban official assigned to the United Nations, a fact later admitted by a committee member in testimony before a congressional committee. FBI investigations have also

edition (pp. 271-78), including a full-page reproduction of an ad critical of Kennedy placed in the *Dallas Morning News*, to right-wingers, explaining at length the formation of the conservative group which placed the ad, the individuals composing it, and the identity and background of another rightist spokesman who printed up an anti-Kennedy leaflet. None of this, by the report's own statement, had the slightest connection with Oswald. By way of contrast, the report devotes only 2½ pages (269-271) to the Fair Play For Cuba Committee, limiting its discussion to the bare essentials of Oswald's own involvement with it. No mention is made of the people composing the Fair Play For Cuba Committee, the extensive investigations of it by congressional committees and the FBI, or its certified status as a Castro-subsidized front. Why the inordinate attention to the right-wing agitators in no way connected with Oswald, and the total lack of attention to left-wingers who were connected with him? In similar vein, reporters Allen and Scott disclose that the Warren Commission refused to accept for its public report a letter from Congressman John Pillion (R-N.Y.) spelling out alleged connections of Oswald with the Soviet secret police, and claiming that the record showed Oswald's "entire Communist background and training had conditioned him to kill." (*Indianapolis News*, Sept. 24, 1964)

shown that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee has been heavily infiltrated by the Communist Party and Socialist Workers Party, and these parties have actually organized some chapters of the committee.”⁶

Further light was cast on FPCC in the spring of 1963 by the Senate Internal Security subcommittee. The Senate body released the testimony of Vincent Theodore Lee, Fair Play national executive secretary who signed Oswald’s membership card. Lee’s testimony is marked by consistent resort to the Fifth Amendment—the plea that one cannot be forced to answer a question if a truthful reply would be incriminating, or would lead through a chain of other questions to something incriminating. Lee invoked the Fifth with respect to where and when he was born, where he went to school, whether he was a member of the American Civil Liberties Union, etc. He also refused to answer all of the following questions: “During your lifetime have you ever received compensation from the Communist Party USA?” “When did you last receive money from the Communist Party USA?” “Are you presently a member of the Communist Party of the United States?” “Are you presently a member of the Communist Party of Cuba?” “Are you the same V. T. Lee who in the capacity as head of the Florida unit of the FPCC attended a national conference of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New York City in July 1961?”⁷ In each of these instances, Lee replied: “I respectfully decline to answer that question, invoking my privileges under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.”⁸

Among Lee’s predecessors at FPCC was Robert Taber, a former CBS newsman. According to Senator Thomas Dodd, Taber has a criminal record, “which includes a conviction for armed assault and kidnapping,”⁹ left the United States with \$19,000 in committee funds, went to Cuba where he “covered” the Bay of Pigs invasion for the Castro press, and served, by his own account, in the Cuban militia. According

to the Cuban Communist magazine, *Bohemia*, Dodd noted, Taber in fact worked with the Red secret police. Taber next travelled to Prague, Czechoslovakia, using a Cuban passport because his American passport had expired. In March, 1962, despite all this, Taber walked into the American consulate in Hamburg, Germany, and had his American passport renewed, as Dodd says, "without any difficulty."^{*10}

The Fair Play for Cuba Committee began with an assist from several big-name Liberals and was turned into a "civil liberties" folk hero of sorts when one of these, critic Kenneth Tynan, was called to testify before the Senate Committee. Dodd commented on the peculiar receptivity of the Establishment toward the organization:

The Fair Play for Cuba Committee has been the chief public relations instrument of the Castro network in the United States. It has succeeded in befuddling and deceiving many thousands of Americans who are certainly not Communists, and it has enjoyed an inexplicable vogue on some of our campuses.

It is a commentary on our society that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee has been able to retain a substantial non-Communist following despite the demonstrated facts that Castro agents played an important role in its organization, and that it received secret funds from the Castro government.

To me this suggests the existence of a stubborn and unreasonable innocence on the part of some of our non-Communist Liberals. But despite the widespread tendency to cling to illusions, I

* Reviewing the record of this former CBS newsmen, Dodd concluded: "It is something to ponder that a man like Taber would worm his way into a top position on the CBS staff, get himself assigned as CBS correspondent in Cuba in the period preceding the Castro takeover, and then have his totally pro-Castro presentations purveyed to the American public by one of our two great television networks.

"It is my earnest hope that the story of Robert Taber, as here presented, can do something to persuade our news media that their correspondents cannot be selected on the sole basis of their ability as newspapermen or cameramen or commentators—that it is their duty to the American public to conduct a somewhat closer check into character and basic loyalties than was conducted in the case of Robert Taber."

believe that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee would have gone out of business a long time ago if the American press had made it a point of duty to expose it to the public.¹¹

Despite the information unearthed by Dodd, by the FBI, and by Congressional committees, Attorney General Robert Kennedy did not put the FPCC on his list of subversive organizations. The given reason: Thanks to inhibitions imposed by the Supreme Court, no organization has been placed on the Attorney General's list since 1955.

Oswald and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee are only the most prominent beneficiaries of the Establishment notion that "dissent" covers a multitude of leftist sins. And the elasticizing of passport regulations is only one among many steps taken by the present administration to dismantle the country's internal security system. The Senate Internal Security subcommittee, inquiring into the passport matter, also discovered the Kennedy State Department had taken steps to dismantle and/or emasculate that agency's office of Security. Among these steps were abolition of the office of Physical Security, reduction in the number of Security employees, and demotion of top security expert Otto Otepka. These moves were defended in the name of "economy," although additional personnel had to be brought in to take over the continuing workload of the department, and although new officials were appointed to handle, among other things, the duties formerly discharged by Otepka. And although, it might be added, the same administration seeking "economy" in the Security office was running the U.S. Federal budget to record heights by expanded spending elsewhere in government.

In November, 1961, Otepka testified that the New Frontier had abolished some 20 out of 123 jobs in the Washington security office.¹² Additionally, he said, the Kennedy State Department had resorted to the practice of waiving security

clearance when an employee was first hired, then backdating his clearance once it got around to checking up on him. "Evidence in our record," said the Internal Security Subcommittee, "makes it clear . . . that some offices in the Department, apparently without the Secretary having full personal knowledge of the merits of each case, have resorted to the indiscriminate use of waiver provisions. In many instances employees were known to be working in sensitive areas and had access to classified defense information before they had any specific security clearance from responsible persons in the Department." The subcommittee found that, under waiver procedures, no fewer than 616 people were hired between January 23, 1961, and May 17, 1962, "to work on classified material if necessary."¹³

With respect to episodes in which the Department had been "waiving the pre-appointment investigative requirement,"¹⁴ Otepka testified:

SOURWINE. It must be true that there are many people working in the State Department with access to classified material who have not been investigated.

OTEPKA. That is correct.¹⁵

* * *

SOURWINE. I asked you . . . whether you ever knew of anyone at the Assistant Secretary level or higher who was appointed under a waiver.

OTEPKA. There have been some waivers at the Assistant Secretary level.¹⁶

* * *

SOURWINE. The committee has been advised, Mr. Otepka, by another officer of the department who communicated with a member of the committee, that you recently informed Mr. Boswell [William O. Boswell, Director of Security, Otepka's immediate superior] respecting the antedating of security clearances. Can you tell us how many cases of that nature there were in the information you gave Mr. Boswell?

ОТЕПКА. I identified in that memorandum something like 30 cases.

* * *

SOURWINE. Now, you distinguished a while ago between the waiver procedure in the case of officers in the department and the waiver procedure in other cases. In the case of employees other than officers, what is the difference in the waiver procedure?

ОТЕПКА. The Department of State, because of the competition it has encountered from private industry and other government agencies for the services of qualified clerks, has found it necessary to waive the full-scale investigations required for clerical personnel, GS-4 and below, in order to secure these people immediate employment.

SOURWINE. So all these, GS-4 and below, are appointed with blanket waiver?

ОТЕПКА. Yes, sir.¹⁷

Under President Johnson, the program of security demobilization continued. In September, 1964, it was revealed the Johnson State Department had ordered the destruction by burning of security records in local offices around the country. This step was justified in the name of "efficiency," although local agents testified it would hinder them in their work and although it had the effect of centralizing control of security completely in the hands of those who had set out to dismantle the Washington security office.¹⁸

Among these various cases, the Otepka demotion was particularly significant. As Deputy Director, Otepka was one of the crack security team brought into State by the late Scott McLeod, who had headed the office under John Foster Dulles. Otepka's post-Dulles superiors put into his care two special security cases—John Stewart Service and William Wieland. With Otepka handling these complex matters above and beyond his regular duties, his superiors argued he was not in fact performing the functions of a "Deputy Director," one of them alleging this as a "phony" job description

for Otepka's position.¹⁹ Otepka was therefore demoted to the post of chief of evaluations division. Since higher-ups ignored Otepka's evaluation on both Service and Wieland, the only result emerging from all this was to get Otepka demoted.

The Kennedy State Department next proceeded to "reorganize" things so that personnel were transferred away from Otepka's office and into another division. Otepka was then assigned out of the Security office altogether, his superiors feeling a tour with the National War College would enable him to have his "vistas broadened."²⁰

The Senate Internal Security subcommittee felt Otepka's problem might have been that he was a stickler for security regulations.*²¹ Reviewing his record, the senators said:

"The conduct of Mr. Otto Otepka in the Wieland case and other cases, and his insistence upon what he considered good security has, without fault on his part, brought harm to his career in the State Department . . ."²²

Yet another step in the Liberal campaign to maximize "civil liberties" was the New Frontier's 1961 action suspending an "intercept" program aimed at propaganda from Iron Curtain countries. Under both Truman and Eisenhower, addressees in America were asked if they wanted to receive Red mail from abroad; the vast majority said "no." Under the Kennedy order, however, the mail was delivered automatically and, under international postal agreements, delivered

* The committee reached these conclusions: ". . . Boswell's plans, with the assistance of his new executive officer, were designed not to eliminate unessential operations, but as events seem to bear out, were directed at individuals so that Boswell could reorganize and entrench the entire security organization under Foreign Service control . . . Boswell and others in the Department were quick to defend cutbacks in the domestic operations of the Office of Security to the extent of 25 positions (almost all persons cut were veteran civil service employees) while increasing the number of security officer positions at posts abroad, all under the Foreign Service . . . Boswell further sought to justify the domestic cuts on grounds of decreased workloads. The fact is that not only have workloads not decreased but all of the abolished domestic positions have been restored in order to enable the Department to handle increases in investigative caseloads . . . The reduction in force in the Office of Security was not followed by any drop in the workload . . ."

free. Congressman Glenn Cunningham (R-Neb.) subsequently introduced a rider to a postal bill to cut off this free delivery of Red mail, adopted by the House with only two dissenting votes. Questioned about this action Kennedy said the free mail agreement was a "reciprocal matter," accruing to the benefit of the United States: "I think in the last twelve months ending March 31, 1961, we sent a total of 16 million pounds of mail of all types to the Iron Curtain countries, and a lot of it went to friends and relatives in Iron Curtain countries, and food packages and all the rest, and we were only receiving 2.3 million pounds."²³

That statement did not do credit to the President's vaunted memory for detail. According to the Post Office Department, 2.5 million pounds of mail, not 16 million, were sent from America to Iron Curtain countries that year, and 1.6 million pounds, not 2.3 million, were received from those countries. Even that tabulation, however, was grossly misleading. For much Communist mail entering the country was not tabulated at all. As Cunningham put it:

Customs Bureau inspection units were located at only three ports; they were and are woefully undermanned; they did not attempt to stop material going to colleges, schools, libraries, newspapers, government offices, foreign embassies, consulates, etc. Thus a great amount of the material was never subject to any action by the Customs Bureau. The fact remains, however, that of those persons who were asked by the Customs Bureau if they wanted material addressed to them, fewer than 10% replied affirmatively.²⁴

Cunningham's amendment sought to exclude Communist propaganda from the convention under which international mail is delivered free of charge within the recipient country. The amendment did not affect our participation in the postal union *per se*, nor did it alter the present status of first-class mail delivery. "It would require inspection," Cunningham

said, "just as mail is now inspected (including suspect first-class mail) for obscene and pornographic matter, material which advocates the violent overthrow of the government, and material involving mail fraud. Nothing in the amendment will upset the present law which requires a search warrant before first-class mail may be opened without the addressee's permission."*²⁵

The fundamental point—despite the cries of "censorship" thrown up by the Kennedy regime and its supporters—was the character of the Communist challenge: There can be no such thing as a "reciprocal" agreement with the Communists, because the Communists honor such agreements only in the breach. It is impossible, after all, to mail anti-Communist literature into Communist countries, and have it delivered—first class, second class, free or prepaid. Magazines and newspapers from the Free World are barred from Soviet-dominated countries; broadcasts into Communist countries are jammed as a matter of course. In view of all this, it can hardly be argued that the United States is under reciprocal obligation to deliver Communist propaganda, free of charge, into American homes.

While executive department security regulations have been worked over at length, the Establishment has not neglected its long-term war against the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Among those spearheading this drive is Americans for Democratic Action, which from its inception has been hostile to the House Committee. In 1950, the ADA platform said: "While we recognize the right of Congress to conduct investigations, the House Committee on Un-Ameri-

* Congress passed Cunningham's amendment over executive protests. Cunningham subsequently charged the administration was getting around the law, saying: "You have certainly not carried out this law, and you are looking for loopholes." (House Postal Operations subcommittee hearings, June 20, 1963). In 1964, a panel of three Federal judges in California decreed the Cunningham amendment was unconstitutional in a case brought by the American Civil Liberties Union.

can Activities has proved itself a threat to freedom of political opinion. We therefore call for its abolition.”²⁶ For several years thereafter, when anti-anti-Communism became unpopular, ADA dropped this plank from its platform. In 1964, however—and this is a measure of Establishment progress in recent years—the group cast off its reticence and plumped once more for abolition, throwing in the Senate Internal Security subcommittee and the Attorney General’s list for good measure. In its platform recommendations to the 1964 Democratic convention—the same convention which nominated ADA panjandrum Humphrey for Vice President—ADA urged adoption of the language, “First and foremost, we pledge the abolition of the House Un-American Activities Committee.” It also called for emasculation of the Smith Act and the Internal Security Act of 1950, and “abolition of the Attorney General’s list of subversive organizations.”²⁷ In its own 1964 platform ADA said: “We urge that the Un-American Activities Committee of the House of Representatives be discontinued . . . We urge the abolition of the Attorney General’s list of subversive organizations.”²⁸

The abolition fight in the House of Representatives has been led by ADAer James Roosevelt, D-Calif., a key legislative lieutenant of both Kennedy and Johnson and editor of the controversial foreign policy volume, *The Liberal Papers*. Roosevelt was among the defenders of the students who rioted in May, 1960, against the House Committee in San Francisco, and a critic of the committee’s film, *Operation Abolition*, which depicted that episode. The institutionalized fury which erupted over *Operation Abolition*, with editorials springing up in Liberal newspapers from Coast to Coast and Liberal spokesman fulminating from lectern and pulpit, was a good example of Establishment mobilization in times of crisis. The film depicted the House Committee in a good light, and the students, agitated by Communists, in a bad one. It was therefore necessary that the film be discredited,

and to this end Establishment spokesmen went heartily to work, trumpeting alleged inaccuracies of narrative and film sequence. In point of fact, the bulk of the "distortions" alleged by HUAC's critics were misrepresentations by the left.²⁹

Operation Abolition was based, for the most part, on a report prepared by FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover, entitled "Communist Target—Youth." Critics of the film therefore had to undertake an attack on Hoover as well, a task from which they did not shrink. Hoover has been even more troublesome to enemies of internal security than has HUAC, because of the high and universal esteem in which his countrymen hold him. That esteem, however, has made him difficult to attack, and the job of "getting" him has been conducted mostly under the rose. In late 1964, however, the attack on the FBI came increasingly to the surface. One of Hoover's most vocal critics, Fred J. Cook, assumed national prominence and prestige by having one of his books, an attack on Barry Goldwater, distributed by the Democratic National Committee. This despite the fact that Cook had been discharged from his job at *The New York World Telegram and Sun* for participating in a hoax "bribe" story to build readership for an article series he had co-authored with another reporter.^{30*} While Cook's anti-Goldwater volume was being dispensed by the Democratic Party, his anti-Hoover volume was prominently displayed in bookstores across the country.

Simultaneously with the appearance of Cook's opus on the FBI, the Warren Commission released its report containing criticism of Hoover's agency, and militant "civil rights" leaders stepped up their complaints about alleged FBI inaction in the South. When Hoover responded by countercriticizing the Warren report and calling Martin Luther King "the

* Cook said he had told his city desk of the alleged bribe offer, which the paper denied. The other reporter, Eugene Gleason, subsequently said he had told Cook of the "offer," and Cook repeated the charge believing it to be true.

most notorious liar in the country," the long knives flashed in earnest. Almost immediately, the ADA-oriented magazine, *Newsweek*, came up with a cover story saying Hoover was in hot water at the White House, and describing President Johnson as a "disenchanted [Hoover] fan" "who had decided . . . that he must find a new chief of the FBI." *Newsweek* added that "the search is on for a replacement." Relations between Hoover and former Attorney General Robert Kennedy had been tense, the magazine said, quoting one Justice Department spokesman as follows: "When we had problems with the FBI, Bob would tell us, 'Take it easy, take it easy,' and you got the impression that after January 1, 1965, Hoover wouldn't be around any more. They'd make him an ambassador or something somewhere." On this point, *Newsweek* said: "Yet President Kennedy had no intention of taking such a step until after the election of 1964; indeed, with an eye to the campaign, he took to inviting Hoover to the White House for luncheon *à deux*."³¹

This story drew a quick denial from the White House, at least with respect to the intentions of President Johnson, and a blistering retort from the FBI. *Newsweek's* close connections with the Democratic regime make it apparent, however, that its account represented, at a minimum, the views and wishes of *someone* high up in authority in Washington.

Interestingly, the attack on the FBI was picked up by Americans for Democratic Action itself, which charged the agency was "not wholeheartedly determined to enforce the civil rights laws," and "not able to do the job," urging that its functions in this regard be turned over to some other department of government. ADA's Joseph L. Rauh appeared before the New York Civil Liberties Union and charged FBI Director Hoover was hostile to civil rights, a supporter of states' rights, and "the wrong man for the job."³²

The net impact of these actions is clear enough. In the name of "civil liberties," the Establishment seeks to strike

down all legislation inhibiting domestic Communist activity, refuses to take action against the pro-Communist Fair Play for Cuba Committee, fights against security regulations which would prevent the free movement in and out of the country by such as Oswald and Taber, opens the floodgates to tax-subsidized delivery of Communist propaganda, dismantles necessary precautions against security risks in the American government, crusades against anti-Communist investigating committees and the FBI.

If the Establishment succeeds in its program, as it very nearly has, there will not be a single law, executive regulation, congressional or other agency left standing to impede the work of the Communist enterprise in America.

Granted that, in each of these categories, all possible precautions should be taken to prevent abuse of power, unfairness to individuals, neglect of appropriate forms of due process. To guard against such things is a legitimate, indeed a mandatory, concern of those who want to maintain "civil liberties." But the sweep and thoroughness of the Establishment attack makes it clear the object is not simply to rid the security program of abuses; it is to rid the country of the security program. It is to have the nation stop defending itself against the Communist apparatus. It is, in short, to relinquish an important aspect of the most essential task of government—to protect American citizens against the initiatives of a powerful and determined enemy.

►► 4. *Four Cases*

THAT ESTABLISHMENT REPRESENTATIONS about “civil liberties” often disguise neglect of fundamental security requirements may be more clearly demonstrated by examining some individual cases. This section will explore the background of people who have been beneficiaries of Establishment protection against charges of security default. Each has been powerfully sustained by the Liberal apparatus in one or more of its departments—the media, government agencies, individuals high in government, the Supreme Court, the President himself. Each has been depicted as a martyr to witch-hunters, and therefore as an example of Establishment zeal in protecting “civil liberties.” Each to this day enjoys the esteem of Establishment spokesmen, is honored and/or consulted in Washington, has friends highly placed there, can gain access to Establishment media, etc. A little exploration in each case will tell us whether this fact bespeaks allegiance to freedom or neglect of duty.

1. *J. Robert Oppenheimer*

Easily the most illustrious of these four figures is Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, pioneer in the atomic bomb project during World War II, favorite of such Liberal spokesmen as the Alsop brothers, and universally revered in Establishment circles as a combination scientist, sage, and prose-poet. Symbolic of Oppenheimer's exalted standing is the fact that President Johnson, soon after assuming his high office, bestowed on the physicist the Enrico Fermi award, carrying a stipend of \$50,000, taxpayer's money.

Presentation of the award was made a grand occasion at the White House, with innumerable officials, family members and newsmen on hand to record the event for posterity. Oppenheimer, after a gracious speech by the President, stepped forward to receive his bauble. He opined that it was a sign of great character and courage that the United States government should be making this award to him. The reference was an ironic one in view of the fact that Oppenheimer, whose clearance to handle secret data was suspended by the Atomic Energy Commission in 1954, is still officially categorized as a "security risk" on the grounds of "character." That the American government should bestow so cherished an honor upon a man under this shadow of reprobation is indeed an unusual reversal suggesting extraordinary qualities in the government capable of it.

The *Washington Post* declared that the award's "greatest significance lies, perhaps, in the altered climate of American opinion which it denotes . . . The America which honors Robert Oppenheimer seems a great deal healthier than the America which dishonored him a decade ago."¹ Similar comment was forthcoming from *The New York Times*. From these remarks, one would gather that Oppenheimer was an American Dreyfus, the innocent victim of willful men in government. For the sake of a balanced record, it would be

well that the American people know the other side of the story about the man who so recently pocketed \$50,000 of their money.

Dr. Oppenheimer's "security risk" status was conferred upon him by a three-man panel headed by Gordon Gray. The Gray Board compiled a 992-page record in which it heard testimony both pro and con from a galaxy of witnesses, and, addressing itself directly to Oppenheimer, came to the following conclusions:

"It was reported that in 1940 you were listed as a sponsor of the Friends of the Chinese People, an organization which was characterized in 1944 by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as a Communist-front organization.

"The Board concludes that this allegation is true . . .

"It was further reported that in 1938 you were a member of the Western Council of the Consumers Union. The Consumers Union was cited in 1944 by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as a Communist front headed by the Communist Arthur Kallet.

"The Board concludes that this allegation is true . . .

"It was further reported that you stated in 1943 that you were not a Communist, but had probably belonged to every Communist front organization on the west coast and had signed many petitions in which Communists were interested.

"The Board concludes that this statement was made by Dr. Oppenheimer, and the Board had before it considerable evidence indicating Dr. Oppenheimer's membership in, and association with, Communist-front organizations and activities on the west coast . . .

"It was reported that in 1943 and previously you were intimately associated with Dr. Jean Tatlock, a member of the Communist Party in San Francisco, and that Dr. Tatlock was partially responsible for your association with Communist front groups.

"The Board concludes that this allegation is true . . .

"It was reported that your wife, Katherine Puening Oppenheimer, was formerly the wife of Joseph Dallet, a member of the Communist Party, who was killed in Spain in 1937 fighting for the Spanish Republican Army.

"The Board concludes that this allegation is true . . .

"It was further reported that during the period of her association with Joseph Dallet, your wife became a member of the Communist Party . . .

"The Board concludes that this allegation is true . . .

"It was reported that your brother Frank Friedman Oppenheimer became a member of the Communist Party in 1936 and has served as a party organizer and as educational director of the professional section of the Communist Party in Los Angeles County.

"The Board concludes that this allegation is true . . .

"It was further reported that your brother's wife, Jackie Oppenheimer, was a member of the Communist Party in 1938.

"The Board concludes that this allegation is true . . .

"It was reported that you have associated with members and officials of the Communist Party, including Isaac Folkoff, Steven Nelson, Rudy Lambert, Kenneth May, Jack Manley, and Thomas Addis.

"The Board concludes that this allegation is substantially true." (Oppenheimer admitted associations with Folkoff, Nelson, Lambert, May, and Addis, and that he knew the first four were Communists and that Addis "was either a Communist or close to one." The Board found no evidence concerning association with Manley.)²

The Board in addition found Oppenheimer had made contributions to the Communist Party, that a number of Communist functionaries described him as a Communist, that he had secured jobs in the atomic energy project for Communists Giovanni Rossi Lomanitz and David Hawkins, that he

failed to report to authorities an approach by his friend Haakon Chevalier soliciting information about the A-bomb project, and that his friendly association with Chevalier continued long after this effort was made:

The Board concludes on the basis of testimony and other information before it that Dr. Oppenheimer made periodic contributions through Communist Party functionaries to the Communist Party in San Francisco area in amounts aggregating not less than \$500 nor more than \$1,000 a year during a period of approximately four years ending in April 1942. As of April, 1942, Dr. Oppenheimer had been for several months participating in government atomic energy research activities . . .

The Board concludes that Dr. Oppenheimer was responsible for the employment on the atom bomb project of Giovanni Rossi Lomanitz at Berkeley and David Hawkins at Los Alamos.

The Board concludes that Dr. Oppenheimer asked for the transfer of David Bohm to Los Alamos, although Bohm was closely associated with the Communist Party. In his answer, Dr. Oppenheimer admitted that while at Berkeley he had assigned David Bohm to a problem of basic science having a bearing on atomic research . . .³

Thus it develops that:

1. Oppenheimer gave up to \$1,000 annually to the Communist Party for a period of four years, overlapping both the Hitler-Stalin pact and the commencement of Oppenheimer's participation in the atomic energy project.
2. Responsible officials in the Communist Party in the San Francisco area said Oppenheimer was a Communist.
3. Oppenheimer's wife had been a Communist, and had been married to a Communist prior to her marriage to him.
4. Oppenheimer's "intimate friend," Jean Tatlock, was a Communist.
5. Oppenheimer's brother, Frank, was a Communist.

6. Frank's wife, Oppenheimer's sister-in-law, was a Communist.

7. Oppenheimer's close friend, Haakon Chevalier, was a Communist fellow traveler.

8. Steve Nelson, a well-known Communist, was a frequent guest in Oppenheimer's home.

9. Oppenheimer lied either to a military intelligence agent, or to the Gray Board itself, about an attempt by Chevalier to obtain information about the atomic bomb.

In addition, the Gray Board arrived at these conclusions:

1. "We find that Dr. Oppenheimer's continuing conduct and associations have reflected a serious disregard for the requirements of the security system.

2. "We have found a susceptibility to influence which could have serious implications for the security interests of the country.

3. "We find his conduct in the hydrogen-bomb program sufficiently disturbing as to raise a doubt as to whether his future participation, if characterized by the same attitudes in a government program relating to the national defense, would be clearly consistent with the best interests of security.

4. "We have regretfully concluded that Dr. Oppenheimer has been less than candid in several instances in his testimony before this Board."⁴

The report containing these conclusions was signed by Gray and by Thomas Morgan. Dr. Ward V. Evans, the third member of the Board, filed a minority report, urging that Oppenheimer's clearance be reinstated. Evans denied none of the findings of his colleagues, but argued that: "Most of this derogatory information was in the hands of the Commission when Dr. Oppenheimer was cleared in 1947. They apparently were aware of his associations and his left-wing policies; yet they cleared him. They took a chance on him because of his special talents and he continued to do a good job." Dr. Evans added that "there is not the slightest vestige of infor-

mation before this Board that would indicate that Dr. Oppenheimer is not a loyal citizen of his country. He hates Russia. He had communistic friends, it is true. He still has some. However, the evidence indicates that he has fewer of them than he had in 1947.”⁵ Therefore, Dr. Evans asked, why not clear him now if he was cleared in 1947, and if no one doubts his loyalty?

The obvious answer, of course, is that commission of egregious error in 1947 constitutes no reason for repeating that same error in 1954 or 1964; that even “some” “communistic” friends are too many for a man who has access to the most terrible and most precious secrets his country possesses; and that the issue is not subjective loyalty, but the objective standards which render a man a security risk. And if those conditions ever existed in the case of anyone, they surely existed in the case of Robert Oppenheimer.

The full Atomic Energy Commission, passing on the Gray Board’s report, accepted the majority conclusion and rejected Dr. Evans’ extenuations. Indeed, the AEC statement on Oppenheimer was more vehement than the Gray Board’s. Commissioners Lewis Strauss, Eugene Zuckert, and Joseph Campbell offered the following observations on the case:

“We find Dr. Oppenheimer is not entitled to the continued confidence of the government and of this commission because of the proof of fundamental defects in his ‘character’ . . . The record shows that Dr. Oppenheimer has consistently placed himself outside the rules which govern others. He has falsified in matters wherein he was charged with grave responsibilities in the national interest . . .”⁶

And: “The work of military intelligence, the FBI, and the AEC—all, at one time or another, have felt the effect of his falsehoods, evasions, and misrepresentations. Dr. Oppenheimer’s willful disregard for the obligations of security is evidenced by his obstruction of inquiries of security officials . . .”⁷

And: "We find that his associations with persons known by him to be Communists have extended far beyond the tolerable limits of prudence and self-restraint . . . These associations have lasted too long to be justified as merely the intermittent and accidental revival of earlier friendships."⁸

More vehement still was a fourth commissioner, Thomas E. Murray, who said in a concurring opinion:

"Dr. Oppenheimer occupied a position of paramount importance: his relationship to the security interests of the United States was the most intimate possible one. It was reasonable to expect that he would manifest the measure of cooperation appropriate to his responsibilities. He did not do so. It was reasonable to expect that he would be particularly scrupulous in his fidelity to security regulations. These regulations are the special test of the loyalty of the American citizen who serves his government in the sensitive area of the Atomic Energy program. Dr. Oppenheimer did not meet this decisive test. He was disloyal."⁹

The fifth commissioner, Dr. Henry DeWolf Smyth, dissented. Like Dr. Evans, he did not deny any of the findings of fact reached by the Gray Board; but he minimized their importance, stressing that Oppenheimer's associations with Communists were random and infrequent, that it had never been discovered that he had divulged secrets, and that his potential contributions to the atomic energy program far outweighed possible dangers from his shaky security background.

In short, the mass of evidence about Oppenheimer's associations and curiosities of judgment was not denied even by his most ardent defenders. It was simply dismissed, on the theory that the government *ought* to take some gambles in order to secure the services of so talented a man. But this stance is directly contrary to the received measure for loyalty-security cases, which is that a reasonable doubt about security must be resolved in favor of the citizen, not the government

employee. An employee of the government is an agent of the people, and must fulfill the contractual obligations they through their representatives establish. They, the citizens, have a right, over against the government and its employees, to be certain that no "gambles" are taken with their security in the struggle against an enemy which all government employees are pledged to combat. To say Oppenheimer despite his record has a "right" to government employment is to say the citizens of the United States do not have a right to be assured of the integrity of their government.

Oppenheimer defenders Joseph and Stewart Alsop, also acknowledging the matter set forward above, take a different tack. Oppenheimer was wronged, they say, because his several critics in the security process took different grounds for opposing him: One, early on, alleging he was "a Soviet agent," the Gray Board faulting him for opposition to the Hydrogen bomb, and the Atomic Energy Commission finding against him for "defects of character." Taking only the Gray Board and Commission allegations, it is difficult to see why the fact that different sets of people found different sets of reasons for revoking Oppenheimer's security clearance should be a disabling objection. It is not out of the ordinary for a case, going from one tribunal to the next, to be concluded with a similar verdict on different grounds. Supreme Court justices within the same tribunal, in fact, do the same kind of thing all the time. Even more to the point, the inconsistencies alleged by the Alsops, even if we grant them full force, hardly constitute an exoneration of Oppenheimer. His record, acknowledged by all, is still there.

Finally, it should be noted that the Establishment argument about Oppenheimer's great talents is disingenuous; for exactly the same supposition—that the "rights" are all on the side of the suspected employee—is routinely invoked by Liberals in loyalty-security cases where no question of scientific or other genius is involved.

2. *Owen Lattimore*

Second only to Oppenheimer in Establishment "civil liberties" mythology is Asiatic scholar Owen Lattimore, formerly of Johns Hopkins University, now of the University of Leeds in England. Twice during the early 1950s Lattimore occupied the "civil liberties" spotlight: Once when he was attacked by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wis.), and again when he was indicted for perjury, and acquitted, in connection with his testimony before the Senate Internal Security subcommittee. On both occasions, in the interval between them, and in the years succeeding, Lattimore has been a high favorite of Liberals in government and in the media.

He is published in Establishment journals; has important friends who have served in high capacities with both Kennedy and Johnson; and as late as 1961 was reportedly consulted on Asian matters by the government. In that year, Lattimore popped up in Ulan Bator, capital of the sparsely populated Soviet satrapy of Outer Mongolia. His visit coincided with a deal being worked up by our government to have Outer Mongolia admitted to the United Nations, and amid rumors that the Kennedy regime was going to extend recognition to the Mongolian government.

Because Lattimore's field of specialization encompasses Outer Mongolia, and because he had long been on record as an advocate of U.S. recognition, some spokesmen, like Senator Thomas Dodd, thought it a curious coincidence that "at the very moment when there was a big drive on to persuade the State Department to grant recognition to Outer Mongolia, Owen Lattimore should arrive there as a VIP visitor."¹

It is reasonable to conclude that Lattimore was in Mongolia, if not at the direction, at least with the cooperation, of the Kennedy State Department. Fulton Lewis, Jr. reported: "Lattimore's visit is shrouded in secrecy. Travelling on two

grants, Lattimore's ostensible purpose was to study Mongolian 'progress.' State Department officials admit they knew of Lattimore's visit, but deny that he was dispatched on official business. They say that they will consult with the Baltimore professor upon his return."²

This same Owen Lattimore, curiously enough, had been publicly disparaged by John Kennedy in 1949, and by the Senate Internal Security subcommittee in a 1951 report on the Communist-infiltrated Institute of Pacific Relations which devoted an explicit and highly unflattering section to him. He was, the report said, "one of the most influential public figures in the Institute of Pacific Relations. His role within the IPR was of the highest importance."³ The subcommittee thought Lattimore important for other reasons as well. "Throughout the hearings," it said, "Owen Lattimore's connections and associations with the Communist international organization have been shown to be so pronounced, and his misrepresentations before the subcommittee have been so frequent, that the committee has elected to devote a short section to him as a personality."⁴

Lattimore's connections also extended into the U.S. government. From 1942 to 1944, he was Deputy Director of the Office of War Information in Charge of Pacific Operations. He accompanied Vice President Henry Wallace on his official visit to China and Siberia in 1944. He was a close friend of John Carter Vincent, Director of Far Eastern Affairs for the State Department, and also of Lauchlin Currie, President Roosevelt's executive assistant in charge of Far Eastern matters. In 1942, Lattimore gave the address where he could be reached four days a week as "Lauchlin Currie's office, room 228, State Department Building."⁵

In the post-war years, Lattimore became one of a coterie of writers dedicated to brushing up the "image" of the Chinese Communists. As an old China hand, he cranked out numerous articles and books promoting the line that the

Communist Party of China was a "peasant's party" comparing favorably with the evil Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek.

The Senate subcommittee remarked that "the literary output of Owen Lattimore may be an index of his influence upon public opinion in the United States. The Library of Congress lists 11 of his books and over 40 articles. By his acclaim of certain books and his criticism of others, Lattimore, as a book reviewer, was in a position to exercise further influence on the success of books on the Far East."⁶ The fashion in which Lattimore wielded this influence is instructive. In *The China Story*, Freda Utley devotes a chapter to Lattimore and his writings. Miss Utley's expertise on China is at least as great as Lattimore's and her credentials to assess Communism considerably better. Lattimore's views on the virtue of Chiang Kai-shek, she notes, altered radically in the post-war years—as did the Communist line:

The one subject on which Owen Lattimore has shown no tendency to "shift" his views, at least since 1937, is the Soviet Union, which is consistently represented in his writings as peace-loving, progressive, powerful, and as having given the Russian workers and peasants such a happy life that they are envied by all their neighbors.

The drift of his first short popular book, *Solution in Asia* (1945) was indicated on its jacket, which stated: "He shows that all the Asiatic peoples are more interested in actual democratic practices, such as the ones they see in action across the Russian border, than they are in the fine theories of Anglo-Saxon democracies which come coupled with ruthless imperialism."

And inside the covers we read, in Lattimore's own words, that "In Asia the Soviet Union has a major power of attraction, backed by a history of development and body of precedents . . . To all of these peoples . . . the Russians and the Soviet Union have a great power of attraction. In their eyes—rather doubtfully in the eyes of the older generation, more and more clearly in the eyes of the younger generation—the Soviet Union stands for

strategic security, economic prosperity, technological progress, miraculous medicine, free education, equality of opportunity, and democracy: a powerful combination."

It is hardly surprising that the Communist *New Masses* called *Solution in Asia* a "must book not only for our San Francisco delegates but for every one of us."⁷

Lattimore, of course, did not say *he* thought all those wonderful things about the Soviet Union. It was just the natives of Asia, interviewed by him, who thought those things. He was simply presenting *their* opinions, which happened to coincide with the Communist Party line. Other aspects of his career, however, will not yield so easily to facile extenuation. There is, for example, the Senate subcommittee's discussion of Lattimore, which tells us that:

The former editor of the *Daily Worker*, Louis Budenz, testified to five episodes which he experienced within the Politburo of the Communist Party that involved Lattimore as a full participant in the Soviet conspiracy. The episodes took place between 1937 and 1945, during which period Budenz was a high official in the Communist Party . . .

A brigadier general in the Soviet military intelligence and one-time assistant to General Berzin, who was the head of Soviet intelligence during the 1930s, testified to a conversation that he had with General Berzin in 1935 wherein he was told that Lattimore was one of "our men" . . . The general, Alexander Barmine, was told this again in 1937 by General Krivitsky who had been head of the Western European intelligence for the Soviets . . .

On the basis of these facts and others, including (but without limitation) Lattimore's editing of *Pacific Affairs*; his recommendations on policy to the State Department, coinciding as they do with Lawrence Rosinger's . . .; his falsifications about his close association with Lauchlin Currie . . .; his conference with the Soviet agent, Rogoff . . . and the Soviet embassy official Gokhman . . .; and his subservience to Soviet officials in Moscow in 1936 . . .

the subcommittee can come to no other conclusion but that Lattimore was for some time, beginning in the middle 1930s, a conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy.⁸

The 1961 pressure for recognition of Outer Mongolia and Lattimore's simultaneous journey there assume additional interest when we reflect that one of Lattimore's specialties, during the period the committee inspected, was urging recognition of Outer Mongolia. The committee report says:

A former counselor to the Soviet foreign office . . . testified he was present at a meeting in the Soviet Foreign Office in 1936 or 1937 when a board of Commissars presided over by Litvinov passed a formal resolution putting Lattimore in charge of a campaign to represent Outer Mongolia to the democratic world as a country entitled to membership in the League of Nations . . .⁹

The report also says:

The record shows that Owen Lattimore contended many times that Outer Mongolia was a free and independent country . . . Yet the record shows conclusively that Lattimore knew in 1936 Outer Mongolia was Soviet-controlled, and that he repeatedly sought from Soviet authorities permission to visit it . . .¹⁰

It would seem Senator Dodd was justified in raising the question: Was Lattimore's 1961 visit to Outer Mongolia—at the very time the Kennedy State Department was negotiating the U.N. "deal"—merely a coincidence?

Among other items of interest about Lattimore included in the subcommittee report:

Lattimore was not able to explain to the subcommittee why he conferred for several hours, during the Hitler-Stalin and Russo-Japanese alliances, on the subject of his approaching assignment as President Roosevelt's adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, with the

then Ambassador for the Soviet Union, Constantine Oumansky . . . Here again, Lattimore told untruths about significant facts. He testified there had been a great deal of publicity about his appointment; and yet it was shown conclusively that there was no announcement in the press until 11 days after the conversation . . . and there were indications that the Chinese embassy did not know of it until more than a week later.¹¹

And:

The evidence shows conclusively that Lattimore knew Frederick V. Field to be a Communist; that he collaborated with Field after he possessed this knowledge; and that he did not tell the truth before the subcommittee about this association with Field.¹²

Lattimore, the subcommittee concluded,

. . . testified falsely before the subcommittee with reference to at least five separate matters that were relevant to the inquiry and substantial in import.¹³

On the technical point that "pro-Communism" was too difficult to prove, Lattimore escaped conviction for perjury. For the rest of it, the substantive conclusions of the committee stand.

Despite this heavily-documented record, Lattimore was most emphatically *not* abandoned by the Establishment. On the contrary, he was acclaimed, in the words of William F. Buckley, Jr., as "the first lady among American witches." He continued to hold down his teaching post at Johns Hopkins, continued to publish articles in some of the best magazines (*The Atlantic* made its pages available for a run-down of his latest excursion to Mongolia), and continued to enjoy the cooperation and favor of the American government.

A sign of Lattimore's durable purchase on Establishment

favor appeared in *Newsweek* magazine early in September, 1962. Since its purchase by the *Washington Post*, *Newsweek* has become a reliable indicator of sentiment in the ADA sector of the prevailing regime, and a journal in high sympathy with the beliefs and actions of the Democratic administration. It was therefore intriguing to note that, in a feature on Communist China, the magazine should see fit to devote part of its "Where Are They Now?" department to Lattimore. Reviewing Lattimore's status as an "expert" on the Orient, and noting that he was still active as a lecturer on Asiatic history, *Newsweek* went on blandly to assert that "his biggest headlines came in 1950, when Senator Joseph R. McCarthy branded him 'pro-Red.' (He later was completely cleared by a federal court.)"¹⁴ Thus did *Newsweek* add its mite to Lattimore's rehabilitation.

From what has gone before, it is evident that Lattimore has been "completely cleared" of nothing by the Federal Courts; the perjury charges against him—which, incidentally, had nothing to do with Senator McCarthy—were dropped on technical grounds. As to the substantive justice of the "pro-Red" charge, the findings of the Senate Internal Security subcommittee (unmentioned by *Newsweek*) hardly give rise to the blithe assertions of this Establishment publication. Indeed, the subcommittee's charge that Lattimore was "a conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy" is if anything stronger than the imputation of which, in *Newsweek's* version, Lattimore was assertedly cleared. (Some weeks later, *Newsweek* rendered similar and more elaborate service to a Lattimore *confrère*, Edgar Snow, who was also the subject of critical testimony in the subcommittee's hearings.)

Apart from his Mongolian trip, his article in the *Atlantic*, and the friendly notice in *Newsweek*, there are additional hints that Lattimore stands well with the current administration. In fact, several of his friends have occupied positions of influence in it.

Among these have been the late Edward R. Murrow, of CBS and USIA, and White House confidant Abe Fortas, both of whom receive bouquets in Lattimore's book *Ordeal by Slander*. Fortas is a close associate of President Johnson, an almost daily visitor in the White House, who acknowledges that he has received "certain assignments" from the President. Among these, as noted in a previous chapter, was the job of attempting to hush up the Walter Jenkins case, with all of its own damaging implications for internal security. Here is what Lattimore says of this Johnson intimate, who served as his attorney during the Tydings hearings and the Senate subcommittee investigations: "The story would have been different, and more tragic, if it had not been for the law firm of Arnold, Fortas, and Porter; and particularly for Abe Fortas, who after weeks of exhausting work on the 'case' still had wisdom and patience left to give me counsel on the book."¹⁵

3. *John Stewart Service*

Among the many spokesmen in and out of government who adopted the Lattimore line on Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists was a Foreign Service officer named John Stewart Service, also attacked by McCarthy and also made the object of long and effective solicitude as an Establishment "civil liberties" hero. Service was the beneficiary of Establishment protection in no less than four separate categories: When McCarthy named him as a security risk, he was accorded the full treatment in sympathetic Liberal media and pictured as a hard-working diplomat hounded by fanatics. When his case was processed by security authorities in the State Department, he was given the benefit of every possible doubt and cleared innumerable times. When the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board "uncleared" him and he was discharged, the Supreme Court stepped in to order his reinstatement. And, finally when he returned to the State De-

partment, he was given an important assignment despite a skeptical report as to his "suitability" by security evaluations officer Otepka.

Service was sent to China in the 1940s, where he served as a diplomatic adviser to Gen. Joseph Stilwell and Gen. Albert Wedemeyer. In this capacity, he kept up a running fire of criticism against America's ally Chiang Kai-shek, contrasting his "Kuomintang" regime unfavorably with that of the Chinese Communists. The following quotations, taken from Service's memoranda during this period, suggest how far he was willing to go in such advocacy:

We need not fear the collapse of Kuomintang government . . . any new government under any other than the present reactionary control will be more cooperative and better able to mobilize the country . . . The example of a democratic, non-imperialistic China will be much better counter-propaganda than the present regime . . . The key to stability must be a strong, unified China. This can be accomplished only on a democratic foundation . . . Chiang's main supports are the most chauvinist elements in the country . . . We need feel no ties of gratitude to Chiang; . . . we cannot hope to deal successfully with Chiang without being hard-boiled; secondly, we cannot hope to solve China's problems without consideration of the opposition forces, Communist, Provincial, and Liberal . . . We should not be swayed by pleas of the danger of China's collapse . . . There may be a period of some confusion, but the eventual gains of the Kuomintang's collapse will more than make up for this . . .¹

And:

The Generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek] shows a . . . loss of realistic flexibility and a hardening of narrowly conservative views. His growing megalomania and his unfortunate attempts to be a sage as well as a leader . . . have forfeited the respect of many intellectuals. Criticism of his dictatorship is becoming outspoken. . . . On the internal political front the desire of the Kuomintang

leaders to perpetuate their own power overrides all other considerations. The result is the enthronement of reaction . . . On the economic front the Kuomintang is unwilling to take any effective steps to check inflation which would injure the landlord-capitalist class. It is directly responsible for the increase of official corruption . . . It fails to carry out effective mobilization of resources . . .²

While Service presented Chiang in this way, his view of the Communists was all hearts and flowers:

With [a] great popular base, the Communists cannot be eliminated. Kuomintang attempts to do so by force must mean a complete denial of democracy. This will strengthen the ties of the Communists with the people. A Communist victory will be inevitable . . . From the basic fact the Communists have built up popular support of a magnitude and depth which makes their elimination impossible, we must draw the conclusion that the Communists will have a certain and important share in China's future . . . I suggest the future conclusion that unless the Kuomintang goes as far as the Communists in political and economic reform, and otherwise proves itself able to contest this leadership of the people (none of which it yet shows signs of being willing or able to do), the Communists will be the dominant force in China within a comparatively few years.³

These missives, written by a diplomat accredited to a wartime ally, openly sought to undermine that ally in a period of crisis. Moreover, according to those who have reason to know, the particulars were blatantly incorrect. Wedemeyer, for example, testified it was not Chiang, but the Communists, who were ineffective in the struggle with Japan.

Service also pressed the thesis that the Chinese Communists were "independent" of Moscow. In one report he said: "Any orientation which the Chinese Communists may once have had toward the Soviet Union seems to be a thing of the

past. The Communists have been working to make their thinking and propaganda realistically Chinese, and they are giving out democratic policies and they expect the United States to approve and sympathetically support it—they believe the U.S. rather than the Soviet Union will be the only country able to give economic assistance.”⁴ A copy of this particular report was seized by the FBI in 1945, from the offices of a magazine called *Amerasia*. Editor of this IPR-associated publication was a man named Philip Jaffe—identified under oath as a Soviet agent. The magazine was a cover for a vast traffic in government documents, and the exposure of it launched in 1945 showed that John Stewart Service did not confine himself to composing memoranda.

On June 7, 1945, the FBI arrested Service, Jaffe and four others for alleged violation of the Espionage Act. The other four were Emmanuel Larsen, also of the State Department; Lieut. Andrew Roth, liaison officer between Naval Intelligence and the State Department; Kate Louise Mitchell, an editor of *Amerasia*; and journalist Mark Gayn. Freda Utley sums up the case as follows:

The FBI revealed that it had found a hundred files in the *Amerasia* offices, containing top secret and highly confidential papers stolen from the State Department, from the War and Navy Departments, the OSS and the OWI. It also found a large photocopying department, which could not possibly have been required by *Amerasia* for publishing purposes, and was almost certainly used for the photostatting of stolen papers for transmission to Moscow. The secret papers found in *Amerasia*'s offices concerned such subjects as the Navy's schedule and targets for the bombing of Japan; the disposition of the Japanese fleet; a detailed report showing the complete disposition and strength of the units of the Chinese Nationalist armies, with their exact locations and the names of their commanders.⁵

The FBI confiscated hundreds of stolen documents—documents which, according to OSS agent Frank Bielaski,

bore the stamp that possession of them was a violation of the Espionage Act.

For several months before the arrests, the FBI had been shadowing the principals in the case, including Service. It noted meetings among them, and recorded conversations between them. On April 19, 1945, Service held the first of several meetings with Jaffe. According to FBI agent Myron Gurnea, Service took along to that encounter a classified report he had prepared for the State Department. Jaffe found the report interesting, according to Service, and asked to see still others. Service, "after some hesitation," consented. On April 20, the two men met at Jaffe's room at the Statler Hotel in Washington, where Service turned over copies of his reports on China. The FBI, which had planted a microphone in the room, recorded a Service-Jaffe conversation about military and political matters in China. At one point Service said: "Well, what I said about the military plans is, of course, very secret." On another occasion, Jaffe asked Service if United States forces would land in China. Service answered: "I don't think it has been decided. I can tell you in a couple of weeks when Stilwell gets back."⁶

Two days after the arrests, the FBI was told to hold its fire until conclusion of the United Nations conference in San Francisco. Disclosure of the *Amerasia* thefts, it was said, would offend the Soviet government. Simultaneously, a bitter campaign was launched against the Justice Department for pressing the case. One Liberal spokesman proclaimed that Service's arrest "brought some exceedingly powerful people within the Government to his defense."⁷ The matter was hushed up, and the prosecution allowed the defense that *Amerasia's* possession of secret documents was merely a case of "journalistic zeal." Service was not indicted, and Jaffe and Emmanuel Larsen escaped with fines.

When the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board declared Service a "loyalty risk" in 1951, however, it hinged its decision on the *Amerasia* matter, in particular on what it viewed

as Service's indiscretions with Jaffe. The Board canvassed some 18 documents which Service conceded "were or may have been lent by him to Jaffe"—one week after he had returned to the United States from China. The Board made this comment:

"From our examination of these reports, it appears to us that they were for the most part such as a newspaper reporter on the spot might transmit to his newspaper. Some of them, however, appear to us to be of a nature which no discreet person would disseminate without express authority, and some of them were dated within four to six weeks of the time they were lent to Jaffe, and the originals had not been in the hands of the State Department for more than a week."⁸

Concerning Service's conversations with Jaffe, the Board said:

We have no knowledge of what information Service may have imparted to Jaffe and others orally during these meetings in New York, or during the evening parties he went to with Jaffe and others in Washington on April 19th and 20th and May 8th and 29th. These indicate that there was some conviviality, and that Service talked very freely, discussing, among other things, troop dispositions and military plans which he said he had seen and which he said were 'very secret.'

This intimacy of talk appears to have continued unabated, though from the first Service felt that Jaffe was unduly inquisitive and evidently suspected that Jaffe might be a Communist, having after the meeting of April 20th asked Lieutenant Roth whether Jaffe was a Communist, to which Roth replied that he did not believe Jaffe was a Communist but that he was extremely sympathetic.⁹

Service's loquacity and open-handedness with Jaffe about "very secret" matters contrasted strangely with his behavior toward a non-Communist writer, Brooks Atkinson, who said Service never showed him classified material. Atkinson,

moreover, was a close personal friend of Service, whereas Jaffe and Service had never met before April 19, the day before Service started turning over documents.

The Review Board concluded: "We are not required to find Service guilty of disloyalty, and we do not do so, but for an experienced and trusted representative of our State Department to so far forget his duty to his trust as his conduct with Jaffe so clearly indicates, forces us with regret to conclude that there is reasonable doubt as to his loyalty."¹⁰ The Board handed down its order: "The employee, John Stewart Service, should be forthwith removed from the rolls of the Department of State."¹¹

When the Supreme Court declared the Secretary of State had acted summarily in discharging Service and ordered his reinstatement, evaluations chief Otto Otepka was called upon to examine the case. His conclusions, less harsh than those of the 1951 review board, were nevertheless skeptical about Service:

My recommendation was that insofar as the security standards and principles were concerned, that I found that Mr. Service was not disloyal, that he was not a Communist, but that there were other factors relating to his judgment and conduct which I felt must be considered under the regulations pertaining to the performance and conduct of members of the Foreign Service of the United States.¹²

Otepka's reservations, however, were ignored by his State Department superiors:

In my analysis and conclusions on the case, I made a specific recommendation as to security and suitability. That recommendation was reviewed by the then Director of the Office of Security who concurred with one of my recommendations and disagreed with the other . . . The case then, following in the normal course, channel of review, next went to the administrator of the Bureau

of Security and Consular Affairs. He in turn disagreed with all of us and he made a recommendation to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration . . . who cleared Mr. Service on all counts.¹³

Otepka also revealed that, although the State Department had announced Service would be given a “nonsensitive” job, nothing of the sort had happened. “All positions in the Department of State,” Otepka said, “are sensitive unless they are specifically designated as nonsensitive by the administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. I never saw the designation as nonsensitive of the position occupied by Mr. Service.”¹⁴

Service in point of fact was placed in the Office of Operating Facilities, where he handled “all matters attendant to the travel of Department personnel to and from abroad.”¹⁵ At the time of Otepka’s testimony, Service was employed as U.S. consul general in Liverpool, England, a highly responsible post he occupied until his resignation in August, 1962.

4. *William Wieland*

Our final case from the annals of Establishment “civil liberties” enthusiasm is less celebrated than those we have been discussing, but a man of distinction nonetheless. He is William Wieland, a State Department official who, by testimony of several U.S. ambassadors and by the findings of a congressional committee, played a crucial role in suppressing information about Fidel Castro’s ties to Communism, materially assisted Castro’s drive to power, falsified questionnaires required of him for State Department employment, and who—despite all this—received a nationally televised *ad lib* security “clearance” from the President of the United States.

The “clearance” occurred at a January 1962 press con-

ference, when a reporter named Sarah McLendon asked President Kennedy about Wieland and another State Department employee, both of whom she characterized as "security risks." Obviously angered, Kennedy expressed his confidence in the two men. Of Wieland he said: "I am familiar with Mr. Wieland and I am also familiar with his duties at the present time." Wieland, the President averred, could carry out his State Department duties "without detriment to the interests of the United States, and I hope without detriment to [his] character by your question."¹ State Department spokesmen followed up by declaring Wieland had been checked and cleared. Thus was Miss McLendon rebuked and another victory chalked up for the cause of "civil liberties."

It developed, however, that Wieland had in fact *not* been cleared, and that steps to nail down his clearance were instituted, by an odd coincidence, the day *after* Kennedy's assertions. It also developed that, in hearings before the Senate Internal Security subcommittee, no less than four United States ambassadors had voiced doubts about Wieland, three of them documenting his activities in behalf of Castro. In October 1962, the subcommittee issued a report lacing together the numerous threads of Wieland's curious career, citing it as "a case history which illustrates most of what is wrong with the State Department from a security standpoint."²

The Wieland saga is indeed a bizarre case history of the things which are permitted within the Liberal Establishment in the name of "civil liberties." It is a history best begun by consulting the testimony of the Hon. Robert C. Hill, former American Ambassador to Mexico, as he is questioned by Senate Internal Security subcommittee counsel Jay G. Sourwine:

SOURWINE. Are you acquainted with Mr. William Wieland?

HILL. I have met him.

SOURWINE. Who is Mr. Wieland?

HILL. William Wieland, at the time I was Ambassador of the United States to Mexico, could be properly classified as my superior because he was in charge of the Cuban-Mexican affairs. It is interesting to note that during the period of time I was Ambassador of the United States in Mexico, I heard from Mr. Wieland only twice by telephone and once or twice through the mail. He did come to Mexico on several occasions, accompanying Dr. Milton Eisenhower, who was there often as a guest of the Mexican Government.

SOURWINE. What has been your experience with Mr. Wieland?

HILL. It is most unsatisfactory.

SOURWINE. What do you mean by that?

HILL. Well, I did not regard him a competent officer or a man who could be trusted. I was warned by members of the Foreign Service about Mr. Wieland; that he was an opportunist and a dilettante and that I should be very careful in my dealings with him.³

Hill, who was in Mexico from 1957 to 1961, related his difficulties in getting through to President Eisenhower the seriousness of the Cuban situation. By going through Milton Eisenhower, Hill thought, he might be able to sound the alarm:

SOURWINE. Surely you had some way of getting this information from the State Department other than through Dr. Eisenhower.

HILL. We had the normal, diplomatic channels and we utilized those channels.

SOURWINE. With what result?

HILL. We had no positive results. It concerned us greatly.⁴

Hill got his briefing with Milton Eisenhower in August 1959, but found himself battling William Wieland to put his point across. "When the briefing started," he testified, "it was opposed by Mr. Wieland because he gave the impression that we were misrepresenting the situation in Cuba."⁵ Hill had asked along his counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs,

Raymond Leddy, to give the facts about Castro. But, he said,

. . . soon after we took off from Mexico City I spoke to the doctor and I said: would it be possible for us to utilize the time between Mexico City and Mazatlan to give him our point of view regarding the problem of Communism in Cuba. He said, "fine." Then we sat down together. It was a C-47 airplane that had a divan in the middle and bucket seats along the side. The doctor was seated on the divan with Mr. Leddy so he could personally view some of the documents. Mr. Wieland was seated on the divan. Mr. Leddy started to give his report based on his judgment and based on his experience . . . Each time Mr. Leddy would say, "This is Communist dominated" or "This man is a Communist" he was met with Mr. Wieland saying, "It is not true."

In the middle of what turned out to be quite a long discussion, Colonel Glawe, who was the air attaché, came back and joined in the discussion and became involved in supporting Mr. Leddy's point of view. Each time that communism was mentioned and its control of the situation in Cuba, it was discounted by Mr. Wieland.

Mr. Leddy had an intelligence report for the month of June 1959 which supported many of Mr. Leddy's contentions. It was obvious to me that Mr. Wieland had not read the report, although he was directly responsible for the area. But when Mr. Leddy attempted to project the actual documents into the picture, an argument ensued, not a serious one, but I mean men disagreeing on the issues.⁶

"In every instance where we tried to present Communist infiltration in the government of Castro." Hill concluded, "it was met with a rebuff by Mr. Wieland."⁷

William D. Pawley, former ambassador to Peru and Brazil, and an American businessman with considerable acquaintance in Cuba, provides another chapter in the Wieland case history.

"I had a man with me," Pawley testified before the Senate subcommittee, in September 1960, "by the name of Wieland."

SOURWINE. You say "with" you, where was that?

PAWLEY. He served with me as press attaché in Rio when I was Ambassador there . . . His activity there was of a nature that was displeasing to me, being conscious of this communist problem probably more than most Americans as early as that, just having come from Asia, and it was of sufficient worry, although there was nothing specific that I could put my hands on—it was conversations that I would hear him have with other members of the press in press conferences and things of that kind—to give me a squirmy feeling regarding his activities, and I made it known to various officials from time to time—it has been a long time ago, so to say to whom would be difficult for me right now—that I didn't believe that Wieland was particularly useful to the U.S. Government.

I later found out, I lost track of him for years, that he had taken a Foreign Service examination and had come along in the Foreign Service, and I then came in touch with him when he became the area officer over Cuba, Haiti, and Santo Domingo and he has been there for several years.

SENATOR KEATING. You mean he is in the Department here?

PAWLEY. He is in the Department.

KEATING. But under the Latin American desk.

PAWLEY. He is a junior to the Assistant Secretary.

SOURWINE. He presently heads the desk for the Caribbean and Mexico.

PAWLEY. He is more than the desk officer. He is area officer for the Caribbean, including Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.

Concerned about Wieland, Pawley attempted to set his misgivings before State Department officials, including an Ambassador Mallory, a deputy in charge of Latin American affairs:

In this discussion I said, "I would like to do something that I know you people don't particularly like but I think it is important that I do it. I have great misgivings of the wisdom to have had and to continue to have William Wieland in a critical post. His close association with Herbert Matthews of the *New York Times* and the activities having to do with this whole Cuban episode in which he is in charge, and has a great deal to do with the policies that come out, this man should not be there, and he should not have been there for a long time." Mallory said this to me—this can be corroborated by Senator George Smathers who was present—he said, "I am sorry that I am having this pressure put on me regarding Wieland because I might have changed him to some other post; but now with this pressure, I will not change him." And I said to Mallory, "I don't understand that. I am a former U.S. Government official, I worked in this Department for 5½ years. I was trying to be useful by pointing out something that I think is of value to the Department, and you put it on the basis that I am bringing pressure. It just doesn't make sense." . . . The man is still there, and I understand he was even invited to participate in the foreign ministers' conferences which have just taken place. I am not positive of that but I have heard that he went.⁸

Ambassadors Arthur Gardner and Earl E. T. Smith, whose successive terms as American envoy to Cuba spanned the period of Castro's ascendancy, supplied still other aspects of the Wieland story.

Gardner, who was in Havana from 1953 through 1957, said Wieland served for a short time in the Embassy there. "I think he was in the economics section," Gardner said. "But I am not certain. But I mean—I can tell you—I was very glad to see him go."⁹ Smith, who was sent to replace Gardner because the latter was too "biased" against Castro, expanded on Wieland's merits and his attitudes on American policy in Cuba.

SOURWINE. Is it true, sir, that you were instructed to get a briefing on your new job as Ambassador to Cuba from Herbert Matthews of the *New York Times*?

SMITH. Yes; that is correct.

SOURWINE. Who gave you these instructions?

SMITH. William Wieland, Director of the Caribbean Division and Mexico. At that time he was Director of the Caribbean Division, Central American Affairs.

SOURWINE. Did you, sir, in fact see Matthews?

SMITH. Yes; I did.

SOURWINE. And did he brief you on the Cuban situation?

SMITH. Yes; he did.

SOURWINE. Could you give us the highlights of what he told you? . . .

SMITH. We talked for 2½ hours on the Cuban situation, a complete review of his feelings regarding Cuba, Batista, Castro, the situation in Cuba, and what he thought would happen.

SOURWINE. What did he think would happen?

SMITH. He did not believe that the Batista government could last, and that the fall of the Batista government would come relatively soon.

SOURWINE. Specifically what did he say about Castro?

SMITH. In February 1957 Herbert L. Matthews wrote three articles on Fidel Castro, which appeared on the front pages of the *New York Times*, in which he eulogized Fidel Castro and portrayed him as a political Robin Hood, and I would say that he repeated those views to me in our conversation.¹⁰

The connection between Matthews and Wieland, Smith alleged, was close. "I would say that Mr. Wieland and all those who had anything to do with Cuba had a close connection with Herbert Matthews. I will go further than that. I will say that when I was Ambassador, that I was thoroughly aware of this, and sometimes made the remark in my own Embassy that Mr. Matthews was more familiar with the State Department thinking regarding Cuba than I was."¹¹

Concerning the effect of the Matthews-Wieland outlook on Cuba, Smith further stated:

The fact that the United States was no longer supporting Batista had a devastating psychological effect upon the armed

forces and upon the leaders of the labor movement. This went a long way toward bringing about his downfall.

On the other hand, our actions in the United States were responsible for the rise to power of Castro. Until certain portions of the American press began to write derogatory articles against the Batista government, the Castro revolution never got off first base.¹²

He concluded with the blunt statement: "Without the United States, Castro would not be in power today."¹³

Smith later disclosed, in his book, *The Fourth Floor*, that "in early January 1958, Wieland visited the American Embassy in Havana and showed us a paper he had written, which depicted the economy of Cuba as crumbling and *recommended that the United States apply pressure on the government of Cuba to hasten its downfall.*"¹⁴ (Italics added).

Supporting testimony was given by Ambassador Gardner, who said Batista's troops "got so discouraged by the position we had taken about not giving them arms and so on that they just didn't want to fight."¹⁵ Ambassador Hill confirmed Smith's judgment as to the reasons for Castro's rise. "Individuals in the State Department," he said, "and individuals in the New York *Times* put Castro in power."¹⁶

Ambassador Smith was asked to pinpoint the matter.

SENATOR EASTLAND. Who were the individuals in the State Department . . . that were slanting the news that way; that were telling falsehoods; that were pro-Castro?

SMITH. There were quite a few, Senator.

EASTLAND. Who were they?

SMITH. I repeat again, do I have to mention names?

EASTLAND. Yes. We have reasons, Mr. Smith.

SMITH. Yes, sir. You see my point, I do not want to get people in trouble either.

EASTLAND. Well, I know that.

SMITH. Because I do not believe that they are dangerous.

EASTLAND. I am not certain about that.

SMITH. All right, sir.

EASTLAND. We have sources of information.

SMITH. Yes. I believe Wieland, William Wieland, and that is as far as I would like to go in the State Department.¹⁷

Ambassador Hill's testimony on the Eisenhower conference summed it up this way:

HILL. Colonel Glawe [air attaché at U.S. embassy in Mexico] referred to Mr. Wieland as either a damn fool or a Communist . . .

THE CHAIRMAN. The man said Wieland was either a damn fool or a Communist?

HILL. Yes, sir; that was said in the temper of the moment. I don't believe Wieland is a Communist.

SENATOR KEATING. You didn't comment on the other part of the description.

HILL. Do you think it is necessary, Senator?¹⁸

And Ambassador Pawley, to round out the picture, put it this way:

SOURWINE. I think this question should be asked for the record: Have you any reason to believe that William Wieland is a Communist?

PAWLEY. No, I don't have any reason to believe that. I only know that many of these men, that get involved in this type of thing over the years that I have had any connection with, are serving the cause of our enemies, that is all.

SOURWINE. You think he is doing this wittingly, intentionally?

PAWLEY. I have got to say that he is either one of the stupidest men living or he is doing it intentionally.¹⁹

Still further testimony about Wieland was given by security officer Otto Otepka, who had reviewed the case for the security office. "I felt and I specified each instance," Otepka said, "that I thought there were questions, serious questions

of the man's integrity, and I felt that such questions since they had did not relate to the issue as to whether or not he was disloyal, was a Communist or subversive, the question of integrity should be reviewed and adjudicated under the Foreign Service regulations of the Department of State."²⁰

Concerning statements by Wieland before the subcommittee, Otepka added that "we prepared an analysis bringing out various matters where there were disparities between the testimony of Mr. Wieland and the testimony of others we thought were credible, and we raised the question specifically as to which of those were to be believed."

SOURWINE. Are you telling us in your judgment Mr. Wieland lied?

OTEPKA. I think Mr. Wieland lied; yes sir.

SOURWINE. And you said so in plain language in the report you sent up there?

OTEPKA. I did not use the term 'lie' but certainly the inference was plain. There were such words as 'misrepresentations' and 'false statements.'

SOURWINE. Your judgment was that Mr. Wieland lied to this committee?

OTEPKA. I identified those instances where I thought he did not tell this committee the truth.²¹

On October 16, 1962, the subcommittee released its report dealing with Wieland, tying together the testimony of the four ambassadors, of Wieland himself, and of various other witnesses. It came to these conclusions about Wieland:

"He was appointed without any security check.

"(His appointment actually was effective before he even filled out any form of an application).

"He falsified his job application by omission.

"When he later filled out an expanded personal history form, he falsified that by direct misstatement.

"Mr. Wieland had a hand in shaping our policy with respect to Cuba both before and after Castro's takeover.

"He held a position which by definition made him one of the State Department's experts in Latin American affairs, and Cuban affairs particularly. One of the things the Department paid him for was his expertise—his own judgment based on his own experience.

*"Yet he never told his superiors officially or wrote in any Department paper, down to the very day when Fidel Castro stood before the world as a self-proclaimed Marxist, what he told his friends privately as early as 1958, or earlier, that Castro 'is a Communist,' and 'is surrounded by Commies (and) . . . subject to Communist influences.'"*²² (Italics added.)

Moreover, the subcommittee said, Wieland had access to considerable information concerning Castro's connections with Moscow: "To Mr. Wieland's desk came, over a period of years, great quantities of solid intelligence respecting the Communist nature and connections of the Castro movement, of Castro himself and his principal lieutenants. The committee was unable to document a single instance in which Mr. Wieland passed any of this material up to his superiors or mentioned it as credible in any report or policy paper."²³

On the contrary: "Mr. Wieland became an active apologist for Fidel Castro, even to the extent of openly contradicting intelligence officers who were attempting to brief Dr. Milton Eisenhower . . . respecting Communism in the Castro regime."²⁴

Wieland's performance before the subcommittee was marked by an almost total lapse of memory. He maintained he had no way of knowing Castro was a Communist, or even Communist-dominated, until it was too late. Confronted by particulars which contradicted this story, his most characteristic response was: "I don't recall." He could not remember the discussion in the airplane in which, according to testi-

mony from several witnesses, he openly contradicted intelligence reports showing Castro's ties to the Kremlin. He refused, however, to challenge adverse testimony on this episode:

SENATOR KEATING. . . . Your recollection seems to be hazy on this subject. Do you challenge the statements of all three of these witnesses in substance, that they said you must be either a Communist or a fool?

WIELAND. Sir, if three witnesses say such a remark was made, I don't challenge it, no. I don't recall.²⁵

Despite Wieland's loss of memory, the subcommittee was able to establish certain things as follows:

1. Wieland was in Bogota, Columbia, during the Communist-inspired riots of 1948. ". . . he admitted that before July of 1949 he knew that Castro had been active in the Bogota uprising . . ." ²⁶ But "when Wieland was examined about whether he filed any reports with the State Department concerning Castro's participation in the Bogotazo, he again had memory trouble." ²⁷

2. Wieland knew, according to his own testimony, that Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, had attended a Communist Congress in Prague, Czechoslovakia. ²⁸

3. Wieland knew of "Che" Guevara's activity in the Castro movement, and said: ". . . that he was a Communist was certainly our conclusion." ²⁹

4. Wieland told Samuel Shaffer of *Newsweek*, sometime in late 1957 or early 1958—according to Shaffer's uncontradicted testimony—that "Fidel Castro, who many of you newspapermen are romanticizing, is surrounded by Commies . . . I don't know whether he is himself a Communist, but I am certain that he is subject to Communist influences." ³⁰

5. Wieland told his friends, Mr. and Mrs. Frank Becerra, in 1957, according to Becerra's uncontradicted testimony:

"Fidel Castro is a Communist. Fidel Castro will be the ruination of Cuba if he gets into power. Fidel Castro was one of the leaders of the famous Bogota uprising in Bogota in 1948 at the time when Gaitan was assassinated."³¹

6. U.S. Ambassadors in Latin America repeatedly warned that Castro was in league with the Communists, if not actually a Communist himself. The subcommittee says: "Such information would certainly be required reading for Mr. Wieland as the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs and later as the Director of the Office of Caribbean-Mexican Affairs."³²

7. Wieland was informed by other means—including reports of the Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI, and authoritative sources within Cuba—regarding Communist activities in Cuba, and Fidel Castro's role in those activities.

Wieland did not deny having seen the reports from the ambassadors, the CIA or the FBI, nor did he deny that various Cubans and others had personally warned him of Castro's Communist associations:

SOURWINE. You must know those FBI reports were consistent in referring to Castro as a Communist and his regime and his movement as a Communist regime and a Communist movement? That is true, is it not?

WIELAND. I don't recall them, sir, specifically.³³

Despite the wealth of evidence that Wieland knew Castro was tied in with Communists, and despite his own statement that Castro "was a greater threat to Cuba itself, as well as the United States, than the government of Batista," the subcommittee found, as noted, that Wieland "became an active apologist for Fidel Castro." He did not inform his superiors of Castro's connections, and he took an active part in forming policy decisions which brought about the downfall of Batista and put Castro in control of Cuba.

And that is the story of William Wieland—a man sheltered by the Establishment notion of “civil liberties,” of whom President Kennedy approvingly remarked: “I am familiar with Mr. Wieland and I am also familiar with his duties at the present time.”

►► 5. *Four Other Cases*

WHEN ESTABLISHMENT SPOKESMEN talk about "civil liberties," they do not always refer to legitimate cases of dissent and individual freedom; conversely, when authentic cases of "dissent" arise, Establishment spokesmen are sometimes silent about civil liberties.

One such episode arises out of matter discussed in the preceding chapter. It involves State Department security official Otto Otepka, who played a role in both the Service and Wieland cases, and testified before a Senate committee about the dismantling of the State Department security force and the practice of "waiving" and then backdating security clearances.

1. *Otto Otepka.*

With Otto Otepka, we reach a sort of continental divide for students of the Establishment mentality. It is acknowl-

edged by all sides of the dispute that Otepka was a true expert in his field, a diligent worker, careful in his evaluations and scrupulous in his concern to maintain proper security standards. The Senate subcommittee concluded Otepka's only misdemeanor was his interest in good security precautions, and that for these reasons he was demoted and subjected to unusual harassments. Otepka did not fit in with the Liberal notion of "civil liberties" in government, which meant he did not believe security checks should be taken lightly or that people with dubious backgrounds should be given positions of trust. It therefore followed, in the logic of the Establishment, that Otepka himself could and should be deprived of *his* "civil liberties."

Otepka's insistence on security precautions did not endear him to the officials of the State Department. Reporters Robert Allen and Paul Scott disclose, for example, that Otepka tangled with Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland and other officials of the Kennedy administration. Cleveland allegedly had appointed certain people of questionable security status to an advisory committee on staffing of Americans in international organizations. According to Allen and Scott, Otepka protested to his State Department superiors. "When the State Department's daisy chain tipped off Cleveland that he was being watched," say the reporters, "he retaliated swiftly by having John F. Reilly, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, place Otepka under surveillance. This was quietly arranged through the office of Attorney General Robert Kennedy, a personal friend of Reilly."¹

Also objectionable to State Department chieftains were Otepka's assertions about security "waivers" and emergency clearances. Called to testify about these charges, Department officials denied everything. Otepka countered by producing documents in corroboration of his statements, initialed by the same men who claimed to know nothing about the matter. His rebuttal, according to subcommittee members, was "ironclad."²

Having thus proved his veracity, Otepka was put on notice of dismissal. Department officials could not accuse him of deception, since they were caught dead to rights in a deception of their own. So they charged him with a violation of security. He had allegedly breached security regulations by producing the documents before the Senate subcommittee! This was the supreme stroke of irony, coming as it did from men who had been steadily pulling apart all security precautions, and aimed as it was at the man who had struggled to maintain some semblance of order in clearing people for sensitive positions.

New Frontier harassment of Otepka, then, included demotion and displacement from his office, reduction in the staff assigned to him, a suggestion that he "broaden his vistas" by leaving the Department for the National War College, and an outright effort at dismissal because he gave truthful evidence of security delinquency to properly authorized members of Congress. As his discussions with the Senators developed, other methods were employed as well. One of these was the ransacking of his "burn bag," a depository for papers which are no longer wanted and which should be destroyed, to discover what kind of information he was passing along to the senators. Another was an effort to tap his telephone.

Not content with this performance, three New Frontiersmen also testified falsely about the program of harassment. In July and August 1963, the Senate subcommittee called before it State Department officers Elmer Dewey Hill, David I. Belisle, and John F. Reilly, and questioned them about the bugging of Otepka's telephone:

SOURWINE. Do you know of any single instance in which the Department has ever listened in on the telephone of any employee? I am talking about his office telephone—the telephone that does not belong to him; it belongs to the State Department . . .

HILL. I cannot recall such an instance.

SOURWINE. Do you know of any instance where a listening device has been placed in an employee's office?

HILL. Not to my knowledge.

* * *

SOURWINE. Specifically, did you ever have anything to do with tapping the telephone of Mr. Otepka, the Chief of the Division of Evaluations in the Office of Security?

HILL. No, sir.

SOURWINE. Did you ever have anything to do with placing a listening device in Mr. Otepka's office?

HILL. No, sir.

SOURWINE. Did you have any knowledge of it, if it was done?

HILL. No, sir.³

Subsequently, the subcommittee made known it had independent evidence that just such steps had been taken to bug Otepka's telephone. Hill suddenly found occasion to "clarify" his testimony. On March 18, 1963, he wrote the subcommittee, "Mr. John F. Reilly, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, asked me to explore the possibility of arranging some way to eavesdrop on conversations taking place in Mr. Otepka's office. Mr. Reilly explained to me that he would only consider such a technique if other investigative methods failed . . .

*"That evening Mr. Schneider and I altered the existing wiring in the telephone in Mr. Otepka's office. We then established a circuit from Mr. Otepka's office to the Division of Technical Services Laboratory by making additional connections in the existing telephone wiring system . . ."*⁴ (Emphasis added.)

In short, Hill's "clarification" was an admission that he had lied under oath.

The subcommittee had put similar questions to Belisle, counsel Sourwine asking: "Do you have any information with respect to the tapping of the telephone of Mr. Otto Otepka, the Chief of the Division of Evaluations of the Department of State?"

BELISLE. No sir.

SOURWINE. Do you know whether this was done?

BELISLE. No, I do not.

SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the placing of a listening device in Mr. Otepka's office?

BELISLE. I did not, sir.

SOURWINE. Do you know if this was done?

BELISLE. I do not.⁵

On November 6, 1963, Belisle decided he would like to "amplify" his testimony. He disclosed that Reilly had mentioned these events to him, but "only after the events occurred." He added that "at the time the events took place, I was in Costa Rica in connection with the visit of the President and the Secretary to that country. I had, therefore, no first-hand information concerning these events, and it was for this reason that I answered Mr. Sourwine's questions as I did."⁶ Like Hill's clarification, Belisle's "amplification" is simply an admission of falsehood. For Sourwine had not asked him whether he had "first-hand" information, but merely whether or not he "*knew whether this was done.*" Belisle knew it had been done; he testified he did not.

Finally, the subcommittee also questioned Reilly, who had taken over the State Department security office:

SOURWINE. Have you ever engaged in or ordered the bugging or tapping or otherwise compromising telephones or private conversations in the office of any employee of the State Department?

REILLY. No, sir.

SOURWINE. Specifically in the case of Mr. Otepka you did not do so?

REILLY. That is correct, sir.

SOURWINE. Did you tell Mr. Jerome Schneider to install an electrical device to compromise Mr. Otepka's telephone?

REILLY. No, sir.

SOURWINE. So that audible conversations in his office could be heard whether or not that phone was on the hook?

REILLY. No, sir.

SOURWINE. Did you know this had been done?

REILLY. No, sir.⁷

Thus Reilly's testimony in August, 1963. On November 6, he too, decided he would like to "amplify" his remarks with a letter to the subcommittee:

On March 13, 1963, I discussed with Mr. David I. Belisle, my special assistant, a variety of investigating techniques which might be used to determine whether my suspicions [about Otepka] were accurate. As a result of these discussions, I concluded that the best technique would be to recover and examine Mr. Otepka's classified trash from his burn bag. On March 14, Mr. Otepka's burn bag was recovered, but an examination of its contents revealed nothing of significance.

On March 18, while Mr. Belisle was in Costa Rica in connection with the visit to that country by the President and the Secretary, I asked Mr. Elmer D. Hill, Chief of the Division of Technical Services, to undertake a survey of the feasibility of intercepting conversations in Mr. Otepka's office. I made it clear to Mr. Hill that I was not authorizing the actual interception of any conversations. Rather, I desired to know whether this technique could be used without undue risk or detection in the event that subsequent examination of Mr. Otepka's bags continued to reveal nothing of significance.

On March 19, Mr. Hill told me that he and Mr. Clarence J. Schneider had discussed the means by which conversations in Mr. Otepka's office might be intercepted and had conducted a feasibility survey by connecting spare telephone wire from the telephone in Mr. Otepka's office to the Division of Technical Services Laboratory. Mr. Hill told me that the system attempted had not proven successful when he and Mr. Schneider had tested it and that they were uncertain whether it could be made to work.⁸

Subsequently, Reilly said, he found the information he was looking for—that Otepka was giving information to Sourwine

—in Otepka's burn bag, so that further experiments with phone-tapping were unnecessary. He then ordered the device removed. "No conversations," he added, "were intercepted as a result of the events described above." And: "Other than these events, I know of nothing which could have given rise to the belief that Mr. Otepka's office was being 'bugged' or that his telephone was being 'tapped'."⁹ In other words, Reilly could not think of anything which would give rise to the suspicion that Otepka's office had been bugged or that his phone had been tapped unless it was this effort to bug his office and tap his phone!

Despite Reilly's puzzlement, the fact of the matter is, in his case as in Hill's and Belisle's, his "amplification" is an admission that he had testified falsely. Sourwine did not ask him whether he had *succeeded* in "intercepting" conversations, whether he had left a listening device in the office for more than two days, or whether he was prepared to use the device as a first rather than a last resort. He asked Reilly, instead: "*Have you ever engaged in or ordered the bugging or tapping or otherwise compromising telephones or private conversations in the office of any employee of the State Department?*" To which Reilly flatly replied: "No, sir." Sourwine asked: "Specifically in the case of Mr. Otepka you did not do so?" To which Reilly flatly replied: "That is correct, sir."

Reilly had ordered Hill to set about the business of "compromising" Otepka's telephone; Reilly testified that he had not done so.

Summarizing the events ranging from the Wieland case to the Otepka case, then, we get the following:

1. State Department official William Wieland covering up for Castro, helping steer the U.S. into diplomatic calamity.
2. New Frontier officials including President Kennedy himself covering up for Wieland.
3. State Department officials manipulating the record to

justify retroactively Kennedy's impromptu "clearance" for Wieland at his January 24, 1962 press conference.

4. State Department efforts to dismantle the security apparatus of that agency, and to cover up for their own laxness in hiring employees, both high and low, without proper clearance procedures.

5. State Department reprisals against Otto Otepka for having told the truth about these matters.

6. State Department denial of the true facts about security laxness in rebuttal to Otepka's testimony.

7. State Department reprisals against Otepka for producing documentation that their testimony was untrue.

8. State Department harassment of Opteka in general, including demotion, reduction of his staff, and bugging of his telephone.

9. State Department falsehoods to cover up tapping Otepka's telephone.

At no point along the way, needless to remark, did Establishment spokesmen for "dissent" step forward in Otepka's behalf.

2. *Michel Struelens*

A further test of Establishment fealty to the "preferred right" of free speech occurred in the fall of 1961, as the Kennedy State Department wrestled with the Gordian knot of the Congo.

Our State Department at that time was pledged to all-out support of a United Nations campaign to reunite the Congo by forcibly bringing the "secessionist" province of Katanga back into the fold. Because the Katanga action had involved aggression by U.N. and central Congolese forces, and because Katanga was an anti-Communist state while the central government ranged in its affections from "neutralist" to pro-Soviet, this policy was a controversial one, a topic of hot

dispute in the press and in the halls of Congress. Signs abounded that the American people were growing restive.

The Katangese government of Moise Tshombe at that time maintained in New York an information officer, a Belgian named Michel Struelens. Like all public relations officers of all governments, Struelens attempted to get a favorable hearing for the Katanga side of things, and supplied information to congressmen and members of the press. Since almost all news coming out of the Congo was then being funneled through official U.N. sources, Struelens was often the only opposition spokesman who had some first-hand facts at his command. That this single focus of resistance should actually be operating on American soil, contributing to dissent against its policies, was apparently intolerable to the State Department. It therefore launched a free-swinging campaign to discredit Struelens and all those in the United States who protested Establishment policy.

State Department spokesmen and sympathetic voices in the press began attacking Struelens as an evil figure buying favorable publicity, hinting broadly that opponents of official policy were somehow improperly influenced by him. Steps were also instituted to have Struelens removed from the country.

In the fall of 1961 Struelens was called into the U.S. Immigration office in New York City, where the official in charge wrote on his passport that his American visa, by order of the Secretary of State, had been invalidated. Certain members of Congress did not look favorably upon this action. Nor, to its credit, did the sometimes oblivious American Civil Liberties Union. At the request of Senator Thomas Dodd, the Internal Security subcommittee investigated the matter, and discovered that the effort to oust Struelens was, pure and simple, an attempt to silence opposition to official policies.

This conclusion was not nailed down, of course, without a great deal of backing and filling by the State Department,

which managed to think up a half-dozen reasons, other than the real one, for ousting Struelens. The committee's patient inquiry, however, established these contrived explanations to be without exception misleading. Some of the matters on which, the subcommittee concluded, the Department had been lax with the truth:

1. When he was called before the Subcommittee, Struelens testified he had been on extremely cordial terms with the State Department up through August 1961, having as a matter of fact in that month gone on a secret mission to the Congo at State Department request. State Department officials flatly denied this, but under cross-examination backed down. The subcommittee found Struelens was telling the truth, and the State Department was not.

2. When Struelens was called to come down to the immigration office, he was not told his visa was to be cancelled. He was told, instead, that immigration officials wanted only to "look at" his passport.¹

3. The State Department said Struelens had exceeded the proper scope of his visa. The Subcommittee found the issuing officer had himself written on the visa the functions Struelens was to perform in America, and these were precisely the functions he did perform.

4. The State Department said Struelens' ejection from America was mandated by the U.N. action in the Congo. "The resolutions of the United Nations security council have called for the termination of his services."² The committee found this to be completely false.

5. The State Department retreated to another position: that it had itself made a technical error in issuing Struelens the wrong kind of visa, and for this reason had to withdraw it. Questioned by the committee, Under Secretary George McGhee acknowledged that even this was a subterfuge, enabling "us to protect ourselves against his efforts . . . to undermine our policies."³

6. Assistant Secretaries of State G. Mennen Williams and Carl T. Rowan delivered speeches on the same day—December 27, 1961—attacking what Williams called the “well-financed propaganda machine”⁴ of Katanga; Rowan said Struelens had been “spreading around at least \$140,000 over the last year.”⁵ *Newsweek*, obviously acting on “leaked” information, had earlier charged Struelens had spent \$140,000 in six months.⁶ Drew Pearson, with typical restraint, refined this to \$100,000 in one month.⁷

The truth: Struelens had spent \$40,000 in 1960, including the cost of setting up his office; and \$100,000 in 1961—not all of which had been expended when Rowan made his speech. These sums, the Subcommittee proceedings revealed, were considerably smaller than those most foreign information offices spend, and proportionately less than the amount spent by the public relations firm of the Central Congolese Government. Although this latter agency failed to register as a foreign agent until public protest was made, Rowan had nothing critical to say about it.

7. Assistant Secretary Williams caused the issuance of a statement accusing Struelens of involvement in an effort to “bribe” the Government of Costa Rica into recognizing Katanga. This charge was denied by Costa Rican officials, and no evidence was ever produced to support it.

8. The Subcommittee states: “The evidence in hand strongly indicates that sources in the Department of State at different times circulated the story that certain speeches delivered on the floors of Congress dealing with the Congo had been written in whole or in part by Mr. Struelens.”⁸ That charge was printed by Drew Pearson on the same day as the Rowan and Williams speeches, and two days later by a reporter for the *Washington Post*. The Subcommittee found it to be totally unsupported.

Of particular interest in this episode was the performance of Carl T. Rowan, presently head of USIA, then Deputy

Assistant Secretary of State. Since Rowan had functioned as the Administration's chief hatchetman against Struelens, the subcommittee found occasion to question him at length. Delivering his December 27 speech in Philadelphia, Rowan had declared that "there has been a clever big money campaign to convince Americans that they ought to support the Katanga secession." He went on to add:

Heading up this campaign is a former Belgian civil servant, Michel Struelens, who operates out of some rather plush quarters in New York.

By spreading around at least \$140,000 over the last year, Mr. Struelens has gotten some extremely vocal help in dispensing a string of myths and a stream of misinformation about Katanga and the Congo . . .

It is an extremely revealing thing to look at the sources of support for Tshombe and his policy of secession.

In the United States we have a conglomeration of arch-conservatives; People who oppose the income tax; avowed defenders of racial segregation; opponents of fluoridation of water; those who want to destroy the Supreme Court, largely because of its ruling on school segregation and so forth.⁹

This speech was coordinated with Williams' parallel address in Detroit, charging sympathy for Katanga had been "cultivated widely in Europe and even here in the United States by a well-financed propaganda machine speaking for Mr. Tshombe and against the U.N."¹⁰ Also on the same day, columnist Pearson unleashed a bitter attack against Sen. Thomas Dodd (D-Conn.), charging Dodd was in cahoots with the Katangese because he had dared to criticize the U.S.-financed aggression there. While all this was going on, the U.N. was driving in for the kill in Katanga, and the U.S. State Department was laying its plans to oust Struelens from the country.

Under questioning by Senator Dodd and committee coun-

sel Jay Sourwine, Rowan was unable to back up the sweeping generalizations contained in his speech.

SOURWINE. What information did you have about the amount of money spent by Mr. Struelens over the year preceding your speech?

ROWAN. I had information as to the figures that he had filed with the Justice Department . . .

SOURWINE. Is it not a fact that those figures showed that the total amount made available to him for a period of a year and 3 months was \$140,000; \$40,000 for the first quarter, including the expense of setting up the office, and \$100,000 for the year 1961; and that all of this money had not yet been expended at the time you made your speech?

ROWAN. I do not know specifically what those figures showed, but I had information that led me to believe that that was an accurate statement . . .

* * *

SENATOR DODD. Let us see if we cannot get at the heart of this. This man has made a report which he is required to file with the Department of Justice under law. You say you have no information that it is not accurate. Your speech cites a figure which, on the face of it, if the report filed by Struelens is accurate, is inaccurate . . . My question is: How do you reconcile these things? . . .

ROWAN. I am saying that the information provided to me as to what Mr. Struelens had spent indicated that over the last year he had spent \$140,000.

DODD. Was this information other than his official report to the Department of Justice?

ROWAN. I did not personally go to the Department of Justice to take the information out of the files.

DODD. I understand. You saw the report, though, you said?

ROWAN. Not the report specifically before that speech, no.

DODD. It would seem to me that this is a serious matter. You are a high official of this government. You charge a man with having spent more money than he reported and is required to report under the law. It seems to me that a high official who made a

misstatement of that kind ought to correct it, if it is not accurate.

ROWAN. If it is not accurate.

DODD. That is right. Do you have information that \$140,000 was spent that year?

ROWAN. If I find that the statement is not accurate, I will correct it to the point of accuracy.

DODD. I think you should give this committee right now any information that you have indicating that such a sum of money was spent by Struelens over that year, any information of any kind from any quarter.

ROWAN. I do not have the specific figures information, sir.¹¹

Rowan was further questioned about the assertion that the backers of Tshombe in America were political kooks and extremists:

SOURWINE. Did you mean in this speech to have reference to Senator Dodd, of Connecticut?

ROWAN. I was not referring to Senator Dodd, of Connecticut, specifically.

SOURWINE. Were you aware that Senator Dodd had made a number of speeches supporting Tshombe?

ROWAN. I was aware that Senator Dodd had made some speeches supporting Tshombe.

SOURWINE. Did you think that Senator Dodd would fit into any of your oratorical pigeonholes? . . . Do you consider Senator Dodd an arch conservative?

ROWAN. Let me say that, as I indicated, I was referring to the signers of the Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters ad, and there are signers of that ad who fall into that category.

DODD. Of course, you recognize, Mr. Secretary, that in the public mind it was not the ad in the *New York Times*. I am quite certain you would agree it was, I think, pretty largely the men who spoke in Congress who were in the public mind, the individuals who had been speaking up for, to put it that way, Tshombe in Katanga.

I do not know of anyone, though, who has advocated the aboli-

tion of the income tax. I am sure I have not. I am sure Senator Keating has not. I do not believe Senator Yarborough has. I do not believe Senator Russell has. I just do not believe that.

ROWAN. Let me reiterate that I was not referring to members of Congress.

SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, perhaps I can capsule this, and let me ask a question that may be a little long. I will ask permission to put in the record at this point various items, newspaper clippings and so on, which show that a number of individuals have in recent periods of time been on Tshombe's side. These include the editors of *Life*, the editors of the New York *Herald Tribune*, Richard Nixon, Senator Dodd, Senator Yarborough, Senator Lausche, Herbert Hoover, Arthur Krock, Billy Graham, William S. White, editors of the Los Angeles *Times*, Max Lerner, editors of the Scripps-Howard newspapers, Bishop N. S. Booth, Methodist Bishop of Katanga, Paul Henri Spaak, Madame Suzanne Labin, Maurice Schumann, and other members of the French Socialist Party who signed a telegram to protest to President Kennedy, Prime Minister Macmillan, President DeGaulle, Max Ascoli, and the *Reporter* magazine, and the editors of the Detroit *Free Press* . . . Do you consider any of these individuals as included in the categories, the items of the category that you listed here, as the sources of support for Tshombe and his policy of secession?

ROWAN. I do not recall all the names you read, but I think in fairness I ought to reiterate that I did make the distinction between those who were critical of our policies, those who even supported Tshombe to some extent, and those who were propagandizing in behalf of secession and spreading myths and misinformation.¹²

The subcommittee found Rowan had in fact made no such distinction:

Mr. Rowan's *ex post facto* explanation of the intent of his speech is difficult to reconcile with the actual text. Nowhere in his speech did he draw a distinction between those who were

critical of our policy, those who supported Tshombe to some extent, and those who, for different reasons, were propagandizing in behalf of secession and spreading myths and misinformation. On the contrary, the clear and only impression conveyed by Mr. Rowan's words was (1) that those supporting Tshombe were, *ipso facto*, supporters of secession, and (2) that overwhelmingly this support came from bigoted and extremist groups in the United States. While Mr. Rowan argued that he was referring primarily to the signers of the New York *Times* advertisement, nowhere in his speech did he mention the New York *Times* advertisement or place any such limit on the scope of his accusations.¹³

The Subcommittee came to the following conclusions concerning the Rowan charges:

Mr. Williams and Mr. Rowan told the committee they had not meant to imply that Mr. Struelens had spent the money of the Katanga Information Service in an improper way, or that Members of Congress and newspaper columnists who had expressed misgivings about the U.N. Congo operation were improperly influenced by Mr. Struelens.

Mr. Rowan offered no evidence to back his charge that support for President Tshombe came primarily from an amalgam of political extremists, including those who opposed the income tax and those who opposed the fluoridation of water. Mr. Rowan was not prepared to place any one in any of his several extremist pigeonholes.

Although spokesmen implied that the State Department was in possession of information indicating that Mr. Struelens had in some way been involved in an attempt to arrange recognition of Katanga by Costa Rica through the bribery of certain Costa Rican officials, the State Department failed to present any such evidence to the subcommittee, nor was any found elsewhere.¹⁴

Concerning the Rowan allegation that "by spreading around at least \$140,000 over the last year, Mr. Struelens has

gotten some extremely vocal help, etc.," the subcommittee found (1) that the allegation was factually incorrect, (2) that the spending by Struelens was modest compared with other government information agencies, (3) that the implication of suborned sympathy was false. Said the subcommittee report:

In his periodic statements to the Department of Justice as a registered foreign agent, Mr. Struelens reported expenditures of \$140,000 over a period of one year and three months. Of this amount, \$40,000 was for the first quarter, including the expense of setting up the office, and \$100,000 was expended over the course of 1961. No evidence was found to cast doubt on these figures. In comparison with the expenditures of other governments for information purposes in this country, the expenditures of the Katanga Information Service seem quite modest.¹⁵

The episode would seem to suggest that Liberal Carl Rowan, being singularly free with the use of blanket charges he cannot sustain, is hardly the man to head so pivotal an agency as the USIA. It also suggests another dimension of Establishment sincerity in its professed allegiance to dissent.

3. *Don B. Reynolds*

Among the various embarrassments which have troubled Lyndon Johnson during his tenure as Vice President and President, none has been more persistent than the Bobby Baker case. And in that case, no single individual has been more bothersome to Johnson and Baker alike than Don B. Reynolds, the Maryland insurance man who once performed as Baker's partner, gave an expensive stereo set to Johnson via Baker, and at last told all to Senator John Williams of Delaware and the Senate Rules Committee.

In early 1964, the Rules Committee, after a good deal of public pressure, prepared to release Reynolds' testimony con-

cerning the bizarre matter of the stereo set and asserted pressure placed on him, through Walter Jenkins, to buy advertising time on Johnson's TV station in Austin. Disclosure of such matters, as Johnson went about the business of consolidating himself in the esteem of the public, was not favored at the White House. Nor was Reynolds' testimony rendered more acceptable by the fact that he produced in evidence the cancelled checks with which he had paid for the stereo and the advertising, plus the shipment order from the Magnavox Company in Fort Wayne, Indiana.

As the *Washington Star* reported, "the Rules Committee juggled this hot potato for eight days, trying to decide whether to shelve the testimony, release it, or call Mr. Reynolds to testify at a public hearing."¹ When the painful decision was at last made to release it, steps were taken at the White House to smear and discredit Reynolds with various members of the press. This sample of police state tactics shocked many of the journalists involved, including, to their credit, a number of Liberals.

The most complete story of what took place was told by reporter Cabell Phillips of *The New York Times*, whose account is worth quoting at length.

Persons within and close to the Johnson administration, [Phillips wrote] have attempted to use secret government documents to impugn the testimony of a witness in the Robert G. Baker case . . .

Some reporters and editors concerned with the Baker investigation have been advised by persons in the White House that Mr. Reynolds is an unreliable witness.

In several instances, individual newsmen and news executives have been read excerpts from what purported to be reports by either Air Force intelligence or the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These reports purportedly contained derogatory information on Mr. Reynolds' background and his reputation for veracity . . .

The *Times* has established that direct approaches were made

by persons in the White House to at least two publications in an effort to have them alter or suppress articles based on the Reynolds testimony. In the case of a third publication, a White House aide volunteered that Reynolds was not to be believed . . .²

When the Reynolds testimony was about to break, Phillips continued, two reporters took their articles on the subject to the assistant White House press secretary, Andrew Hatcher. In at least one instance, Hatcher disappeared with the reporter's copy for about 20 minutes, returning with the message that there would be no comment:

Later that afternoon, however, the reporter's editor received a telephone call from a well-known aide to President Johnson.

The aide told the editor that the story was inaccurate in certain details concerning Mr. Johnson's understanding about the source of the gift. He suggested, according to the editor, that the paper might want to kill the article outright, or at least postpone publication until the next week, when the facts could be checked against the official transcript.³

The editor in question did make a few changes in the article, but printed it the next day. A check of the transcript, he said, showed that his reporter's copy had been accurate.

In another instance, according to Phillips, a reporter called a friend at the White House for comment on Reynolds' testimony. He was assertedly told: "You ought to see this fellow's record. You can't believe a word he says."⁴

Phillips reported still another episode:

In a third instance . . . the publisher of a national news magazine was called by long-distance telephone by someone described to the Times as "an important White House personage, but not the President." There was more than one telephone call in this instance, in which the caller "warned" the publisher that any article based on Reynolds' testimony would probably be inaccu-

rate. Excerpts allegedly from the FBI file were read to the publisher to substantiate the "warning."

The fact that the White House was in possession of FBI or other intelligence reports on Mr. Reynolds was known to a number of reporters.⁵

One newsman who employed the data on Reynolds according to White House desires was Drew Pearson, who wrote two articles, purportedly based on FBI information, concerning Reynolds' service in the Air Force. They characterized Reynolds as a man "who has brought reckless charges in the past against people who have crossed him," and accused the witness of having engaged in black market and other improper activities.⁶ The FBI denied having made such information available to Pearson, as did the White House. Pearson himself said "the White House seemed flabbergasted when I told them about Reynolds' amazing record."⁷ Reporter Phillips of *The Times* noted, however, that Pearson's charges "paralleled in many details information made available to other reporters and editors."⁸

Reaction to this move by the Johnson administration was heated. Republican Senator Hugh Scott addressed a letter to FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover and to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, urging an inquiry into the whys and wherefores of the "leak." Scott pointed out that the material referred to had not been made available to the Rules Committee—a point on which he was supported by committee counsel Lennox P. McLendon. McLendon, who had asked the FBI and the Pentagon for background documents on Reynolds, related: "I was informed that the reason they were not available was that they were 'classified.'"⁹ Others criticizing the procedure were Rep. H. R. Gross of Iowa and Rep. Katherine St. George of New York.

Nor was the critical commentary limited to Republicans. While there was no massive outcry from the Liberal guard-

ians of our freedoms, certain members of the press spoke strong words of dispraise. Arthur Krock of *The New York Times* commented:

The Democratic committeemen have said nothing on these matters in public. But if they are not troubled by the anonymous release for publication of personal dossiers, gathered by powerful executive agencies from informants whose identity and assertions are concealed from the subject, and consigned to government archives under a seal of secrecy, they should be.

And they should also be troubled by the criterion implied in this instance for the choice of the secret documents to be released to the press—the discrediting of persons who have acquired a public audience for statements impairing the confidence of the people in the ethical standards of their government . . .

When the method employed [to discredit a witness] is the anonymous handout of this nature to the press, the constitutional rights of persons are violated . . . These include perhaps millions of citizens who should be concerned about this particular example, because the government has on file allegations about them of which they are as ignorant as of their sources.¹⁰

Andrew Tully fired off a similar criticism in a column appearing in the *Chicago American*:

As a free American citizen, I am scared by the Johnson administration's attempt to smear a witness in the Bobby Baker case thru the apparent use of material in confidential FBI and military files. . . .

To the citizens this situation should be far more frightening than any nightmare featuring Nikita Khrushchev fondling a nuclear bomb.

It says, in simple and ugly language, that no one is safe from the machinations of his own government. It says that secret police dossiers on Americans may be used against any man or woman who dares to stir up trouble for the political party in power.

... the shameful aspect of this tawdry mess is the effect it may have on other witnesses to be called before the committee. Few human beings lack a skeleton in the closets of their past, and a witness would not be inclined to testify freely and honestly if he knew that some public official was lurking in the wings ready to use the government's "secret" file against him.

A file on a citizen's past is a security necessity when a citizen is, or has been, employed by the government, as Reynolds was in the air force and diplomatic service. But much of the material in such files is raw, unverified stuff, made up of gossip, rumors and the like.

This muck leaked to the press about Reynolds may or may not be true. That, however, is irrelevant. The point is that the law says it may not be used in this shabby fashion. And that is what is so frightening.¹¹

Questioned about the matter by CBS newsman Roger Mudd, Reynolds himself offered some interesting commentary:

MUDD: Mr. Reynolds, is there any doubt in your mind that the "leak" to Drew Pearson about your character file was made with White House help?

REYNOLDS: I am sure it was coordinated through White House efforts and was made available either directly through the White House or through subterfuge of White House efforts. There is no one else that it could hurt.

MUDD: Who would Drew Pearson be trying to protect?

REYNOLDS: I would assume in the natural order of things, number one, that Bobby Baker has already had his problem. So he is not trying to protect Bobby. I would assume he is trying to protect Mr. Jenkins, the President of the United States, and many, or at least several, other people who are intimately associated with this particular group.¹²

In the Reynolds case, then, we see the coercive effects of big government at work in ever-widening circles. First power

and money are consolidated by the welfare state in Washington; then a "wheeler dealer" moves in to make his fortune from the resulting entanglement of influence, pressure, contracts, etc.; then, when these improprieties are threatened with exposure, intimidation and abuse of confidential information are called into play to silence those who would protest or inform the public. What starts out as an allegedly innocuous invasion of "property rights" winds its way, with little difficulty, to abuse of personal rights as well.

4. Mary K. Jones

Demotion and harassment of a loyal government employee, furbelowed with wiretapping and an exercise in perjury; a government effort to smear and discredit a legally-accredited spokesman for another country who disagrees with official policy; and an effort to silence an unfriendly witness by the abuse of confidential information. Now we come to an even more complex and frightening case, in which hostility to dissent has by degrees brought certain Establishment members to outright denial of due process, including the right of *habeas corpus*.

As the Bobby Baker case produced its attack on the right of dissent, so did the Billie Sol Estes scandal. One of the great mysteries of the Estes case involved an Agriculture Department employee named Henry Marshall, the cotton expert who was found shot to death in East Texas in June, 1961. Marshall had assertedly opposed the Estes arrangement to buy up cotton allotments, claiming it was illegal. In the midst of the Estes controversy, however, this important witness was found dead. From that mysterious death flowed a whole series of other enigmas, concluding with an outright attack on the most elementary "civil liberties" of a little-known file clerk in the Agriculture Department office in Washington.

Marshall was important to the Estes case because he had allegedly rendered an opinion against Estes' Rube Goldberg plan for gaining cotton allotments and told Estes as much, which would mean Estes and the Agriculture Department knew more than a year before action was taken that the scheme was illegal. With Marshall dead, however, nothing could be proved. As Secretary of Agriculture Freeman put it, nobody knew what had happened "because the key figure in this was the man who unfortunately is not alive."¹

Freeman's reference to Marshall and his key role in the Estes case caused a number of people, including a grand jury in Robertson County, Texas, and the Texas Rangers to take renewed interest in the case. In May, 1962, Marshall's body was exhumed and a belated autopsy performed by a group of examiners headed by Houston pathologist Joseph A. Jachimczyk. "For reasons that no one seemed to be able to explain adequately," writes Julius Duscha, "there had been no autopsy at the time of Marshall's death eleven months earlier . . . The pathologist concluded that the cause of Marshall's death could have been suicide but more likely was homicide."² The grand jury could come to no conclusion. The Texas Rangers, however, decided Marshall's death was murder. The Rangers' report said carbon monoxide was found in Marshall's lungs, that his hands were bruised, that he had received "a serious brain injury and cut over his left eye,"³ that there was blood on the sides and rear of his pickup truck, and that a dent in the right side of the truck "was caused by some type of instrument other than a human hand or head," indicating the possibility of a struggle.

Most conclusive of all was the fact that Marshall was shot five times through the stomach with a bolt-action rifle. To shoot oneself in the stomach even once with a rifle, holding it away from the body and pushing the trigger outward, would be difficult. But to shoot oneself five times in this manner, repeatedly lowering the rifle to pump the bolt, is impossible.

Moreover, the Rangers found three of the bullet wounds were such as to render Marshall incapable of further action, and that he had died quickly of internal hemorrhaging. The Rangers could find no motive for suicide, and determined that Marshall's behavior immediately before his death was not suicidal.

"This investigation has resulted," said the Rangers, "in our conclusion that Mr. Marshall's death could not have been the result of suicide; therefore, this Department's continuing investigation will be based on the theory that he was murdered."⁴ That conclusion drew the assent of Senator John McClellan of Arkansas, as it will of anyone who considers the wild improbability of a suicide being committed in such a manner. It would appear, then, that the one man who could throw light on Estes' cotton allotment deal was murdered—the man whose death, according to Secretary Freeman, meant "nobody knows" the full story on Estes.

But one of Freeman's subordinates, a man named Battle Hales, thought the problem could be unravelled. Hales claimed to have in his files material establishing that another man, Taylor Allen, had been present at the meeting between Marshall and Estes' attorney, knew Marshall had said the allotment transfers were illegal, and could therefore dissolve the cloud of uncertainty to which Freeman alluded. As Senator John Williams put it:

[Hales] said that with his files he could prove that Mr. Marshall, deceased, had rendered an opinion that their plan to transfer cotton acreage in West Texas was illegal. Mr. Hales had also claimed that the manner in which the Department was letting Mr. Estes handle acreage allotments was wrong. He said there were also reports in the file concerning this recommendation of another important witness, Mr. Taylor Allen, which would support his charges.⁵

It would appear from this that the distraught Secretary Freeman had deliverance close at hand. With such a fund of information in his files, Battle Hales should have been the Agriculture Department's man of the hour. For some reason, however, the Department did not see it that way. Its officials did not seem to care for his criticisms of the way the Estes case was handled; nor were they much impressed by his offer of data establishing that what Estes had been doing, with Department permission, had long been certified as illegal. Hales succeeded, in fact, in drawing official displeasure, not toward Estes, but toward himself. Senator Williams said:

Suggestions had been made that there were circumstances in the Estes case which warranted its referral to the Department of Justice. Instead, Mr. Hales, on April 19, [1962] was intensively questioned by the FBI.

The following day, April 20, when Mr. Hales returned to his office he found a guard at the door, and he was barred from entering. He was told that he had been relieved of his previous duties and transferred to another job involving the Department's food stockpiling activities in connection with the civil defense programs. He was allowed to take his personal effects from his office but was told that his files must remain. Allegedly the combinations on his files were all changed to make sure that he did not have access to any of the information which had been compiled during his examination of the Estes case.

After Mr. Hales had been removed from his office and sidetracked to an insignificant position his secretary was placed under suspicion, and the harassment began.⁶

The treatment accorded Hales was in some ways similar to that accorded Otepka. Much worse things were to follow, however, for Hales' secretary, Mary Kimbrough Jones. Senator Williams continued:

Apparently she remained too loyal to her former boss and tried to protect his files from being pigeonholed or destroyed, with the

result that she became very unpopular with other Department officials.

Allegedly, she was ordered from the office and when she objected she was bodily removed and detained in an adjoining office.

Dr. Lee K. Buchanan, the Chief of the Health Division of the Agriculture Personnel Office, was called in, and without any effort to consult Miss Jones' personal physician concerning commitment to a mental institution he arbitrarily ordered this lady carried to a mental institution.⁷

This was April 25, 1962. Miss Jones was taken to District General Hospital, where she was kept under mental observation for 12 days. On May 7, pursuant to a court order for an examination to determine whether she was sane, Miss Jones was released as being of sound mind. In the meantime, however, she had been held a virtual prisoner for almost two weeks, without protection from the safeguards of the law. "I was amazed to find," said Williams, "that if a man while on the streets of Washington, D.C., murders someone, the officer who arrests him takes him to the police station where he must first be officially booked; and he is given an opportunity to call his lawyer. But this girl who had committed no crime was given no such opportunity. The police officer, and I have here his statement, confirms that not only did they not call any of the family of this girl, but they made no effort to call any of them. They merely loaded her in the patrol wagon and sent her off."⁸

No doctor signed anything before Miss Jones was committed; and the police officer called in by the Agriculture Department had never before been in charge of a mental case. The officer testified that Miss Jones was not violent, but that she repeatedly walked over to a window—a possible indication she was getting ready to kill herself. It developed, however: (1) The room was on the first floor, (2) the win-

dow was closed: (3) Miss Jones made no effort to open it. Moreover, this occurred *after* she had been forcibly carried from an office, detained in another room, and told she was going to be submitted to psychiatric examination. The fact that she was sane was at last established by medical authority.

What was behind this strange assault on the rights of Miss Jones? Why was it important, first of all, that Battle Hales be separated from his files? Why important that Miss Jones be separated from them? And why, finally, important that Miss Jones be subjected to the discrediting experience of detention as a possible mental case for 12 days?

According to an interview with Jack Steele of the Scripps-Howard newspapers, Taylor Allen subsequently confirmed everything Hales had said about Estes, Marshall and the Agriculture Department. Allen disclosed "that the Department has known for more than a year that Billie Sol Estes was warned in advance that his plan to transfer cotton allotments to West Texas was illegal . . . Mr. Allen said the warning was given by the late Henry Marshall, the department's cotton expert in Texas, at a meeting in Mr. Marshall's office at College Station, Texas, on January 17, 1961.

"He said Mr. Marshall gave the warning to John Dennison, attorney for Mr. Estes, and W. F. (Bill) Mattox, vice chairman of the Reeves County (Pecos) Stabilization Committee, which later approved many of the allotment transfers for Mr. Estes.

"Mr. Allen recalled that Mr. Marshall had told Messrs. Dennison and Mattox emphatically that the proposal of Mr. Estes to transfer allotments was illegal."⁹

Allen added, according to Steele, that he had given this information to a Department investigator more than a year previously. Thus, on this testimony, it would appear Battle Hales' contention was right, Secretary Freeman's supposition wrong.

We now have this sequence of events: Estes' attorney and

Agriculture official Mattox—the latter appointed at Estes' behest and with the intercession of LBJ aide Clifton Carter—are told by Henry Marshall that the proposed allotment scheme is illegal. Estes goes ahead with it anyway, and Mattox gives his approval. When trouble begins to brew over the matter, Marshall is found dead, shot five times in the stomach with a bolt-action rifle. The Texas Rangers conclude that more likely than not he was murdered. Secretary of Agriculture Freeman, questioned about the allotments, says unfortunately "nobody knows" what went on down there in Texas because Marshall is no longer around to tell the story. Agriculture official Battle Hales, however, says somebody does know and he, Hales, has the proof in his files. Hales is subsequently questioned, finds a guard at the door to his office and is barred from entering, is transferred and told to leave his files behind. When, apparently, Hales' secretary, Mary K. Jones, tries to protect the files, she is bodily removed from the office and committed to a mental institution for 12 days without judicial process.

As Senator Williams concluded: "Should those files now fail to produce what Mr. Hales had alleged, who will ever know whether or not they have been stripped? Certainly these files were not confiscated for nothing. If Miss Jones is discredited as a witness, it could prove convenient to someone."¹⁰

By way of postscript, it should be noted that the Establishment did *not* rise up in outrage at the assault committed on the civil liberties of either Mr. Hales or Miss Jones. Or, for that matter, on the civil liberties of Mr. Marshall.

In sum, the cycle of the Baker-Reynolds case is repeated: From welfare state bonanza to swindle to crackdown on personal liberties. Only this time the assault on personal liberties was not merely an attempt to discredit—as distasteful as such an attempt can be—but actual incarceration, without due process, without *habeas corpus*, without counsel. In this case,

that is, we see the full mechanics of the police state exposed and functioning with totalitarian purpose.

Nor is the case of Miss Jones the only example of such a startling assault on legal safeguards. An equally flagrant example occurred in the case of former Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker, whose criticisms of administration policy in several fields and membership in the John Birch Society have made him a favored target for Establishment spokesmen. Walker appeared at the University of Mississippi in the fall of 1962, when Federal troops were effecting the enrollment of Negro student James Meredith. During a night of student demonstrations, bottle throwing, and use of tear gas bombs by the troops, Walker was on the scene. He was accused of inciting the students to riot, but was exonerated by a grand jury and won a sizable libel judgment against those who had so accused him. Before his case ever got to a court room, however, he was subjected to one of the most fantastic ordeals ever visited on an American citizen.

Without a semblance of due process, the Federal government arrested Walker and spirited him out of the state to a Federal prison for psychiatric prisoners in Springfield, Missouri. He was denied right to bail, having been shipped out of Mississippi before he was able to make bond. And he was subjected to a court order submitting him to psychiatric tests, in a proceeding where he was not represented by counsel. Walker's confinement and psychiatric examination were ordered on the basis of a memorandum by a government psychiatrist who had never seen Walker, who had not examined the details of the case, who was 1,000 miles away, and who based his opinion of Walker's mental balance on "news reports."¹¹

Walker was, in short, a political prisoner, subjected to treatment similar to that meted out in totalitarian countries. Here was a denial of "civil liberties" with a vengeance. Yet once more the Establishment, with the exception of the

American Civil Liberties Union—sensitive enough to the norms of freedom not to overlook so flagrant a dereliction—was mute; as indeed it had to be, since this trampling upon constitutional rights was being executed by the Establishment itself.

►► 6. *The Silencers*

IT MAY BE ARGUED that the cases discussed in the preceding chapter are not typical; that while Liberals are sometimes out of patience with dissent, they are after all human and therefore prone to make a mistake now and then. Perhaps we have focused on exceptional episodes, exaggerating the danger to "preferred rights" resulting from the Establishment quest for power.

Such speculation, even if true, would not answer the questions raised by the Liberal performance. That Establishmentarians are human beings and do make mistakes, or sometimes get carried away with their own sense of mission to the point of imposing it on others, is precisely the issue. All human beings, Liberal or conservative or in between, are susceptible to this particular failing. That is why no group of human beings should be given unchecked power over their fellows.

There is evidence, additionally, that Liberal hostility to dissent is not a sometime thing. Increasingly over the past few years the Establishment's urge to silence whole classes of people who disagree with Liberal policy has become painfully apparent. In this respect, too, the Establishment commits the very sins it is fond of imputing to conservatives.

It is sometimes charged against "right-wing extremists," for example, that they use bullying tactics to silence political opponents; "blacklisting" methods to put the Indian sign on people who disagree with them; the techniques of censorship and social pressure to silence opposition; "guilt by association" to smear people who won't accept their views on political questions; etc. In point of fact, all these methods and others have been employed by various prominent Liberals, including some high in the councils of our government.

This chapter discusses some of these matters. Its purpose is not to suggest that *all* Liberals use all the methods described herein, or that all conservatives are blameless with respect to all of them. Political malfeasance is seldom limited to a single side of any dispute. Our purpose is to bring to the surface an aspect of the record seldom mentioned in the Liberal media—the fact that a systematic and coordinated effort has been launched by a number of Liberals to silence conservatives, employing both public and private means of coercion.

One of the most startling episodes in this category occurred in the fall of 1962, in this writer's home city of Indianapolis, Indiana. As the congressional elections of that year approached, the New Frontier found itself in political difficulty. A great hue and cry had gone up around the nation concerning the intrusion of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Throughout August, September, and October, the Kennedy regime had stoutly denied that any such thing was taking place. But the unrest was growing rapidly, and President Kennedy launched into the campaign to shore up Democratic chances and to take a few soundings. The soundings had not been good. In

Cincinnati, Kennedy had been greeted by conservative dissidents demanding action in Cuba. The resulting newspaper photographs, showing pickets holding signs which bore the legend "Less Profile, More Courage," and other like sentiments, had not been beneficial to the New Frontier image. And, as Kennedy prepared to move on to Indianapolis, it was learned that members of the conservative youth group, Young Americans for Freedom, planned a similar demonstration there. Steps were taken to prevent such an unfortunate occurrence.

Kennedy arrived at Indianapolis Municipal Airport October 13, and delivered a speech lambasting Republicans as warmongers and praising Democrats as the embodiment of virtue. The high ethical tone of the meeting, however, may have been lost on the YAF members in the audience, fully absorbed as they were in the business of being beaten up. Their planned demonstration, as things turned out, never did get off the ground. The students relate that as soon as they hoisted their signs, they were set upon by a squadron of braves who ripped the placards from their hands and tore them to pieces. The goons also gave a number of the students a thorough working-over.

One picketer was knocked down, kicked in the head and pummeled in the kidneys. Another, beaten around the head, had his teeth knocked loose and his mouth split open. A 22-year-old girl was set upon by three men who wrenched the poster from her hand and injured her arm.

The YAF members say they identified their assailants by two common features 1) they were wearing straw hats advertising the candidacy of Indiana Democrat Birch Bayh for the Senate; 2) many of them wore AFL-CIO or other union pins.

The students also charge that state and city police officers, both under Democratic jurisdiction, saw several of the beatings and took little or no action. They say they called on

police to arrest their attackers, or at least to take their names, but to no avail. Police did intervene to break up some of the scuffles when called upon, but made no arrests. Officers interviewed afterward said they could not tell who had started the violence.

Eric Johnson, a student of Purdue University extension in Indianapolis, said: "I was standing there holding a sign. I felt someone grab my arm and pull it down. I turned around and was hit in the jaw. I caught a rain of punches in the throat and face. About six to eight men were really letting me have it. They were all big, and were all wearing those Birch Bayh hats.

"They knocked my teeth loose and split open my chin. I was bleeding from the mouth pretty freely and spitting blood. I got loose and went over to an officer standing nearby. 'You saw what happened,' I said. 'What are you going to do about it?' He just ignored me."¹

Doug Whitehead, a student at the medical center, gave this statement: "I was the first to put a sign up. Six guys came up and surrounded me. One of them said, 'Put the sign down.' When I refused, they started shoving. I still held on to the sign. My glasses fell, and when I bent over to get them they hit me and knocked me down. They pummeled me when I was on the ground. They ripped my sweater up the back and broke my watch."

A young man named Ken Jester said he received a wicked clout in the jaw. A medical student, Peter Horn, witnessed this attack and tried to step between Jester and his assailants. Horn told the story as follows: "The same group of men who had attacked Doug Whitehead moved in on us again . . . one of them grabbed Jester around the neck while another hit him in the face. I told them to let the kid go. They were killing him. They threw him aside and turned to me.

"I ducked and they knocked me to the ground. One of them kicked me in the head. One of them went to work on my back just over the kidneys."

The goons apparently drew no lines as to what was permissible and what was not. When it came to silencing conservative opposition to the President, anything went—including the roughing up of women. Miss Linda Liddy, a volunteer secretary for Indiana Young Americans for Freedom, said she was holding a sign when “three big men, all wearing Birch Bayh hats” came up to her. “One grabbed my arm. The other two tore the paper off the sign. When it was all over, I noticed that my arm was scratched and bruised.”

Rudy Kachmann, a graduate of the I.U. medical school, asked a policeman to arrest the men attacking Whitehead. “The officer told me to keep quiet,” Kachmann says. “He said I was making too much noise.” Kachmann also witnessed the attack on Horn. “Two civil defense policemen were standing there,” he says. “I asked them to help and they just backed off.”

Virtually identical testimony comes from Geoffrey Hammond, then a student at Butler University in Indianapolis, and Richard Allen, who attended Indiana University, Indianapolis Extension. Allen says that when three men tore a sign away from a young girl of about 18, he tried to stop them and reported the episode to a civil defense policeman “who was standing about 10 or 15 feet away watching the whole thing. I wanted to be on record as having turned this information in. He turned and walked away.”

There is more to this story, but the preceding conveys the general idea. Needless to say, by the time President Kennedy got into his speech, opposition signs demanding action against Castro had disappeared from the crowd as if by magic. The President was free to hold forth on the virtues of his party without annoyance. Nine days later, Kennedy appeared on a national TV hookup to announce that he had ordered a blockade of Cuba.

It is not to be inferred from the foregoing that the Establishment routinely resorts to violence to silence its opposition. There is no proof that the national labor-Democratic

axis knew of what its local cohorts were doing, and good reason to suspect that if it had known it might have disapproved. Such methods, after all, tend to be counterproductive—as suggested by the fact that the roughing-up of the YAF demonstrators attracted even more unfavorable publicity than would have a few photographs of anti-Kennedy pickets. There are better ways of squelching dissent, and the Establishment knows what they are.

In the opening section of this volume, we referred to a document called “the Reuther Memorandum.” The Reuther brothers, as noted, were highly concerned about what they called “the radical right,” and wanted some measures taken to silence it. Asked to specify ways and means, they submitted the memorandum, spelling out their views at length in a fairly complete blueprint for throttling conservative and anti-Communist sentiment of every description. In some respects the Reuther memo resembled that other famous document of 1961, the Fulbright Memorandum. Much of it is devoted to the “danger” of anti-Communist military men, the inadvisability of military sponsorship of anti-Communist speakers, a suggestion for a full-scale purge of the military by Secretary of Defense McNamara, a hint that a military coup might be in the offing, etc. Also, the Reuther memo contains the interesting thesis that anti-Communists are “unappeasable” but that Communists are not; that domestic anti-Communists are more dangerous than domestic Communists; and that the “radical right” *“must never be permitted to become so strong”*² as to endanger Liberal programs. (Italics added.)

The Reuther Memorandum makes quite clear that it wants the “radical right” silenced by coercive governmental action. Among its suggestions:

1. Hearings to determine whether “radical right” organizations should be put on the Attorney General’s list of subversive groups. (The memo makes clear it thinks they should be.)

2. A broad hint that if the FBI "has not yet infiltrated" these organizations, it should.

3. Harassment of these organizations by looking into their tax status, and ditto for companies which sustain with advertising such things as telecasts of Fred Schwarz anti-Communist meetings.

4. Use of the FCC to neutralize conservative and anti-Communist programs on radio and TV. In particular, the FCC "might consider examining the extent of the practice of giving free time to the radical right and could take measures to encourage stations to assign comparable time for an opposing point of view on a free basis."³

5. A sustained effort to make officials who "exaggerate the domestic Communist menace" "fall into line"⁴ with the Reuther view that there is no such menace. J. Edgar Hoover is singled out as one of those who, not to put too fine a point on it, is to be silenced.

6. A parallel effort by "private agencies" to "expose the radical right."⁵

This "hard line" against conservatives and anti-Communists was subsequently adopted by the administration. To date, there have been no public efforts to put "radical right" groups on the Attorney General's list, and it is not known whether the FBI has been ordered to infiltrate such organizations. But the rest of the program is in full swing. The muzzling of the military is standard operating procedure; official insistence that the danger is not Communism but anti-Communism is by now routine; the Federal Communications Commission is hard at work to choke off conservative spokesmen; tax-exemptions are being looked into; and "private agencies" have moved into action to help in the "exposure." The last point is one of particular interest, involving as it does a further elaboration of the Reuther conception of silencing those who disagree with Reuther.

Shortly after the Reuther Memorandum was submitted, the Establishment came up with a rather complete agenda for

muzzling conservatives by exposing them as minions of "hate." Wherever conservative spokesmen might pop up, whatever their standing or their scholarship, they were to be described as the familiars of anti-Semites, blackhearted tormentors of school teachers, and devotees of the anonymous phone call.

Supplying ammunition for the "exposure" was an organization called "Group Research, Inc.," headquartered in Washington. GRI had assembled a magpie-like collection of data about "right wingers," a category which it conceived as including everything from the anti-Semitic absurdities of *Common Sense* to the lofty cerebrations of Ludwig Von Mises. GRI's function was to send out fact sheets on these "right wing" individuals and organizations, to be filed and kept in instant readiness against outcroppings of conservatism. The contents traced obscure and frequently remote connections among the various right-wingers, linking the individual concerned by a chain of associations to the most disreputable "extremists" available.

GRI makes every effort to be factual, and seldom includes its own evaluations in its reports. The general bias is mainly evident in the over-all scheme, in the occasional use of inflammatory language ("reactionary," "extremist," etc.) and the inclusion of such things as a statement by a group of ministers flaying Dr. Fred Schwarz and excoriating such dangerous characters as former Representative Walter Judd (R-Minn.) and Senator Thomas Dodd.

Principal consumers of GRI's output are the publications of the labor unions. The AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education seems to be particularly fond of them. In March 1963, COPE sent out a memorandum to union leaders around the country, urging the use of GRI materials. The real object of the "right-wing," COPE said, is "determined anti-labor activity and an all-out drive against social welfare legislation."⁶ Combating this menace in cooperation with

other Liberal groups, "unions can find a common ground which will help counteract right-wing activities and build support on labor questions."⁷ GRI materials, COPE believes, provide a means of doing this.

"When you hear that a right-wing speaker is coming to town," says the memo, "check him out immediately in the GRI Directory and alert friendly groups . . . Armed with the facts about extremist groups, labor union members can take some leadership in combatting them, *either by heading them off before they really get started or by limiting the damage they do and helping to dry them up.*"⁸ (Italics added.)

Following this noble statement, COPE offered a passage eloquent with "democratic" tolerance:

"Preventive action is best, of course, but it is not easy. The idea is to alert democratic groups to the possibility of trouble and meet with their representatives.

"Ordinarily it is best not to pass resolutions or take a vote. But there is sometimes an advantage in arranging a meeting at which community leaders actually sign a warning statement, for release to the press, in advance of a right-wing meeting, exposing its nature and intent."⁹

What, we may well wonder, has happened to "freedom of expression"? How does Liberal concern for the "free market place of ideas" jibe with "heading off" and "drying up" conservative speakers before they get a chance to say their piece? Equally intriguing is the warning against passing resolutions and taking a vote. Why do these stalwarts of democracy object to the democratic procedure of voting? Could it be they fear the spirit of dissent in their own ranks?

GRI's material was also made use of by the more explicitly political branch of the Establishment. In short order, its researches began popping up in speeches by New Frontiersmen on Capitol Hill—a fact which jibes strangely with the stated purposes of the organization. GRI is incorporated as a non-profit, educational organization. Its statement of purpose says

"the objects of the corporation are exclusively educational and no other." Yet the record shows GRI immediately became involved in a political campaign of guilt-by-association, far less "educational" than many of the conservative programs it tars with the brush of "extremism."

For example, the first verifiable airing of GRI's researches was a speech delivered October, 1962, by Liberal Senator Gale McGee (D-Wyo.), in criticism of the Washington newsletter *Human Events* and the conservative Americans for Constitutional Action. McGee's dissertation followed, point by point, the "research" previously turned out by GRI. In some places, the wording was virtually identical.

In July 1962, GRI produced a "special report" on Americans for Constitutional Action. The report says: "ACA's first organizer appears to have been John Underhill of Washington, D. C. Soon after the opening of the Washington Office, Kenneth Ingwalson, who had been on the staff of the American Farm Bureau Federation, became Executive Director of ACA. He served until early 1961 and then became assistant publisher of *Human Events*, which collaborates with ACA. He was replaced as executive director of ACA by Charles A. McManus, who had been with the ACA staff since 1959."¹⁰

McGee's version was almost a carbon copy, as follows: "The first paid organizer appears to have been a John Underhill of Washington, D. C. However, soon after the opening of the office here, Kenneth W. Ingwalson took over as executive director. Mr. Ingwalson, as has been noted earlier, had been on the staff of the American Farm Bureau Federation, where he was director of their special education program. He served with ACA until last year, and as I have mentioned, is now at *Human Events*. Mr. Ingwalson has been replaced as ACA's executive director by Charles A. McManus, Jr., who has been with the organization since 1959."¹¹

McGee's fidelity to the GRI material produced one error

which gave the game away even more obviously. GRI listed, as a contributor to ACA, one "Harold Rousburg," of Indianapolis, Indiana. McGee also listed, as a contributor to ACA, one "Harold Rousburg," of Indianapolis, Indiana. In point of fact, the gentleman's name is *Ransburg*. He is a prominent businessman in Indianapolis, and a quite open and active leader of conservative causes there.

Another exponent of GRI material was Congressman Ronald Brooks Cameron (D-Calif.), who took to the floor of the House in May 1963 to renew the attack on ACA. Cameron described ACA as a "political leech" which was "doing the devil's work in American politics."¹² Having thus established his own moderation, Cameron proceeded to parrot the GRI material for the benefit of his House colleagues. Like McGee, he lapsed into the phraseology of GRI, on occasion neglecting to put the matter in his own words.

Following Cameron, New Frontiersman John Brademas of Indiana joined the attack, reading into the record material on ACA finances which bore an amazing resemblance to the findings of GRI. In none of these instances, going back to Senator McGee, was credit given to the "exclusively educational" services of Group Research, Inc.

During the 1964 presidential campaign, GRI itself found time in its educational program to publish a 31-page dossier on the background of people supporting Barry Goldwater for President, making sure to include everyone who could be remotely connected with the John Birch Society and dragging into the discussion such people as Minuteman Robert DePugh, anti-Semite Gerald L.K. Smith, and the head of the Ku Klux Klan. Exactly what "educational" purpose this served was not made clear. Its political purpose, however, was obvious, particularly since it was brought out at the height of the presidential campaign (October 12, 1964).

In September, 1964, two other onslaughts were launched against conservatives, also under allegedly nonpolitical aus-

pices. The first of these was the "National Council for Civic Responsibility," headed by former Eisenhower official and premier "modern" Republican Arthur Larson. The group exhibited a high degree of interlock with GRI, setting about to establish the same kind of "web of subversion" on the part of conservatives, leading back eventually to the John Birch Society, that is a favorite of Group Research. GRI itself acknowledged as much in its report for September 30, 1964, giving Larson's organization a handsome send-off and not failing to note, along the way, that Larson had "announced he would vote this year for Lyndon Johnson."¹³ (Ah, education.) GRI also revealed that "Larson said his organization will use the factual material prepared regularly by Group Research, Inc."¹⁴

The second enterprise was a book called *Danger on The Right*, by Arnold Forster and Benjamin Epstein, which follows the same pattern employed by GRI and set forward by Larson as the operating plan for his group: Establish the John Birch Society as the supreme menace in American life, then tie every conservative in sight to Birchism. Group Research also hailed the appearance of this volume, describing it as "a documented but hard-hitting description of who's who and what's what in the real right wing, including its financing."¹⁵ The book was sponsored, interestingly enough, by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, which is usually associated in the public mind with the job of combatting anti-Semitism. The two authors are officials of this organization. Since there isn't much organized anti-Semitism in the United States, however, the authors say they decided to attack the non-anti-Semitic right wing instead.

Because ADL is a "nonpolitical" organization, question arose as to the propriety of rushing into print a book of such marked political implications barely a month before election day. ADL chairman Dore Schary blithely dismissed this question by saying: "The coincidence that the candidate nomi-

nated [by the Republicans] has the unpleasant support of the radical right is a problem for the GOP, not us.”¹⁶ Schary added that “withholding publication” might have given the impression that ADL was supporting Goldwater, and “rather than let this happen, we went ahead”¹⁷—a non sequitur matched only by ADL’s reasoning that since there was no anti-Semitism to combat, it would combat those who weren’t anti-Semitic.

The ADL book was published October 9. The Group Research rundown on Goldwater, published only three days later, contains quotes from the ADL book, woven into a text intended to be detrimental to Goldwater. Thus a study prepared by a tax-exempt organization (ADL) was used by an “educational” organization (GRI) for the express purpose of discrediting a presidential candidate in the very thick of an election campaign. And, as flagrant as was this mutilation of assertedly non-political privileges, the best—in the doings of the National Council for Civic Responsibility—was yet to come. While Liberals were piously denouncing “the right” for alleged political use of tax-exempt funds, the National Council for Civic Responsibility was employing some \$60,000 received from the Democratic National Committee, funneled to it through a tax-exempt organization called the Public Affairs Institute. Reporter Jack Anderson detailed this fantastic maneuver as follows: “The National Council for Civic Responsibility was formed on too short notice to obtain a tax exemption. So the Democrats quietly arranged with the Public Affairs Institute, a tax-exempt foundation, to take it over. This permitted the council to solicit tax-deductible contributions. The biggest donation, however, was a fat \$50,000 check from the Democratic National Committee’s ‘book fund.’ Later, the Democrats handed over another \$10,000 in cash.”¹⁸ And the burden of the ADL book is that right-wingers are illicitly using tax-exempt money for political purposes!

One of the chief side effects of using tax-exempt funds for the political purpose of attacking conservatives (for using tax-exempt funds for political purposes) is clearly to stop the flow of money to the right, as recommended in the Reuther memorandum. Columnist Ralph de Toledano observes: "The ADL book will be used by Liberal-left-labor groups to attack corporations and foundations which have, to a tiny extent, attempted to counterbalance the overwhelming Liberalism of America's tax-exempt spending. Except for the trickle of funds going to the handful of conservative foundations, a conservative scholar would find it impossible to find anyone to subsidize his research in the social, political, and economic sciences."¹⁹ That precisely this result has been achieved may be confirmed by talking to fund-raisers for almost any conservative group.

In addition, the Establishment has moved to take away tax-exemption from various conservative groups, another of the chief objectives spelled out in the Reuther memorandum. GRI and its political spokesmen in Congress have made much over the tax-exempt money which has found its way into conservative hands. The ADL book recites at length the names and financial dossiers of groups which have committed the offense of funneling money to conservatives who in one way or another resemble or "parallel" the John Birch Society. As noted, Rep. John Brademas (D-Ind.), in his House speech following Representative Cameron's recitation of GRI prose, focused at loving length on the finances of Americans for Constitutional Action. Six days later, Senator Maurine Neuberger (D-Ore.) delivered a speech driving the point home. Mrs. Neuberger listed the usual agenda of right-wing organizations, focusing on those which held tax-exempt status. "It is painfully clear," she said, "that the tax service has simply not done the job Congress gave it. To rout out the propagandists from the bona fide educators."²⁰

This campaign bore its first fruit in November, 1964, when

the Internal Revenue Service informed one of GRI's favorite subjects, Billy James Hargis, that his "Christian Crusade" organization was in danger of losing its tax-exemption. Much of what Hargis writes and says is clearly political in its overtones, but no more so than the work of the Liberal groups we have been discussing. How is it that Hargis is to have his tax-exempt status revoked but these groups are not? The powers of the Internal Revenue Service, obviously, are to be used for political objectives, to cut down conservative dissent and allow full rein to the Liberal orthodoxy, whose tax-exempt political spokesmen are "bona fide educators."

The Establishment next took on H. L. Hunt's radio program, "Life Lines," one of the pet targets of GRI and COPE. The Internal Revenue Service decreed the program was not educational and, therefore, not entitled to a tax-exemption. Also attacked were Circuit Riders, Inc., and the American Enterprise Institute, a highly esteemed research organization in Washington, some of whose officials had taken leave of absence to work in the 1964 campaign for Senator Goldwater. Meanwhile, nothing at all was being done about the activities of Public Affairs Institute, replete with \$60,000 on an illegal maneuver direct from Lyndon Johnson's own Democratic National Committee. No action by Hunt or AEI or anyone else on the conservative side remotely approached the action of the Public Affairs-NCCR group; yet official crackdown was launched against the conservatives, not the Liberals.

The official alibi for this bold assault on conservative dissent is an IRS statement that "We've done a good job of weeding out the left-wing organizations, now we're going to clean up on the right-wing organizations."²¹ The NCCR example suggests the "good job" of cleaning up is "good" for the left exclusively. Nor is this episode the only one that comes to mind. As William F. Buckley Jr. notes, "the American Committee for the United Nations . . . pleads for the

admission of Red China on tax-exempt dough, even while the Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Red China is denied tax-deductibility."²²

Yet another aspect of the Reuther program which has received full backing from the Liberal administration is the throttling of conservatives on radio and television. For the past two years, GRI's chief customer, the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education, has been flailing away at this subject, demanding that something be done about such right-wing figures on the airways as Dan Smoot, Dean Clarence Manion, and Hargis. Obedient to Reuther's wishes, the Federal Communications has set about, in the guise of "fairness," to make things uncomfortable for these people and for stations using their broadcasts. These same "fairness" strictures, however, do *not* apply to, *exempli gratia*, the AFL-CIO's own paid broadcaster, Edward P. Morgan, who also appears on national television as a network commentator.

Also faithfully executed were Reuther's demands that anti-Communist spokesmen in the military be silenced. In this category, the Kennedy administration embarked on one of the most extensive programs of outright censorship in the annals of American government. Both the FCC crackdown and the muzzling of the military deserve fuller development on their own merits, and will be examined further.

Add to this calculated program of extinguishing conservative voices the immense potencies of the Liberal media—the books, the newspapers, the magazine articles, the TV shows, discussed previously—and it becomes apparent the Establishment campaign to silence its opposition is formidable indeed.

►► 7. *Censorship and Muzzling*

IF there is any absolute in the moral universe of the Establishment, it surely must be the axiom that "censorship" is evil. Contemporary Liberalism abounds with First Amendmentarians who have with Jefferson sworn on the altar of God eternal hostility to the slightest incursion on free expression. This enthusiasm extends even unto the Communist Party. Everybody should have a right to his opinion and the unhindered statement thereof, say the civil liberties advocates, no matter how heretical or revolutionary.

Liberal doctrine on this score does not hold true, however, for dissenters on the right. To censor Communist propaganda or salacious literature is verboten. But to censor the *anti*-Communist remarks of American military men, that is an entirely different matter.

That Liberals do like censorship when they are wielding the blue pencils first came to light in the summer of 1961,

when Senator Strom Thurmond (D-S.C.) discovered State Department functionaries were systematically crossing out anti-Communist remarks from the speeches of military officers, including some of the most respected members of the armed services. Among the phrases State and Defense Department censors blue-pencilled from speeches by such high-ranking officers as Lt. Gen. Arthur Trudeau, Adm. Arleigh Burke, and Gen. Curtis LeMay were the following:

"The Communist strategy is one of subversion and armed revolution supported from outside the target nation."

"If the Communists attack." (Changed to: "If an attack on our country or its allies occurs.")

"He (Khrushchev) has been known to take off a shoe and bang that on the table."

"I for one do not believe that the Soviets have relented in the slightest in their determination to dominate the world and to destroy our way of life."

"As we engage the Communists." (Changed to "As we strive for real peace.")

" . . . to meet the critical challenges of Communism." (Changed to "the critical challenges of the day.")

" . . . the poisonous fumes of world Communism."

" . . . Communists." (Changed to "Sino-Soviet bloc," several times.)

"The Communist challenge." (Changed to "the challenge.")¹

And so forth. Senator Thurmond placed 170 different examples of this kind of censorship in the Congressional Record, reflecting the Establishment's unwillingness to have the simplest facts about Communism recited by official sources. Gen. Trudeau, for example, had proposed to say that either we can face up to the cold war and "remain the champion," or else go down in "ignominious defeat." The State Department censor challenged this, commenting: "This

section might well be tempered since it largely rules out any chance of an evolution of the Soviet system.”²

The pattern of deletions was consistent. The censors’ efforts were aimed at:

(1) Preventing identification of the Communists by name, if at all possible; references to the “Sino-Soviet bloc” were preferred; or, better still, indefinite mention of “other powers”; or “an adversary”; or, best of all, avoidance of hostile thoughts altogether.

(2) Toning down references to “conflict” or “cold war” or “warfare.”

(3) Eliminating references to Khrushchev personally and, in at least one instance, to Castro.

(4) Silencing suggestions that the Communists do not operate in good faith.

(5) Avoiding references to the ability of the United States to strike the Soviet Union militarily.

(6) Most characteristically, eliminating references to the idea of “victory” over Communism or the Soviet Union.

In this last category, Brig. Gen. John W. White proposed to say, in a speech in Columbus, Ohio: “Victory on each of the battlefields of the world is essential to the survival of freedom.” The State Department inverted this to read “defeat of Communist aggression,” commenting: “The word victory has a militaristic and aggressive ring less suited than the substituted phrase for describing our national objectives. It also implies an ‘all-or-nothing’ approach leaving no room for accommodation.”³

The events leading to these disclosures began in the spring of 1961, when Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker was cashiered from his command of the Army’s 24th Division in Germany for alleged involvement in “politics.” It soon became clear that the attack on Walker was simply a pretext for a much larger crackdown. Reporter Cabell Phillips of *The New York Times* disclosed that “high officials at the Pentagon have said

that they hope this example will have a restraining effect on other military men . . . ”^{4*}

In the midst of the Walker controversy, Senator Thurmond unearthed a veritable manifesto of appeasement which had been put out under the signature of Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), which seemed to be controlling in the administration's attitude toward anti-Communist pronouncements by the military. (*“Shortly after the receipt of the Fulbright Memorandum,” Phillips said, “and a subsequent conference between the Senator and Defense Secretary McNamara, a directive was issued reinforcing the authority of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs to provide ‘policy guidance [for] . . . the conduct of any information programs directed in whole or in part to the general public.’ ”*⁵) The Memorandum lashed out at military participation in anti-Communist seminars, and attempted to prove that the nation was somehow in danger of a military take-over.

This note, curiously enough, had been sounded July 16, by Gus Hall, General Secretary of the American Communist Party, in an article urging all-out war on “the radical right.” Hall particularly berated the military for staging and participating in anti-Red seminars, saying such enterprises “cannot

* On the merits of the case against Walker based on allegations by a sensationalist tabloid called *Overseas Weekly*, Maj. Gen. Thomas A. Lane (ret.) makes this comment: “On complaint of persons deserving no credence whatsoever (General Walker later received a judgment against the publishers of *Overseas Weekly* in a German court for defamation), an officer of thirty years of distinguished service who had received the continuing approbation of his military supervisors in this period, was removed from command before the charges had even been investigated . . . The action was apparently motivated only by political considerations. The object was to make an example of a trenchant anti-Communist whom the presidential advisors considered ‘extremist.’ They disregarded the fact that General Walker was carrying out the order of his superiors and acting pursuant to National Security Council directives which had never been rescinded.”

With respect to Walker's so-called “Pro-Blue” program for his troops in Germany, allegedly “political” in nature, Senator John Tower (R-Tex.) placed in the Congressional Record for August 30, 1961, the text of this program. It is an effort to instill moral and patriotic values, and to teach some of the basic facts about Communism.

help but create our own 'French Generals,' who feel at home in fascist circles, and are ready to lend themselves to their objectives."⁶

The Fulbright statement, leaked to Phillips July 20, made the identical point: "Perhaps it is far-fetched to call forth the revolt of the French generals as an example of the ultimate danger; nevertheless, military officers, French or American, have some common characteristics arising from their profession and there are numerous military 'fingers on the trigger' throughout the world."⁷

On August 2, Senator Thurmond succeeded in getting a copy of the Memorandum, and inserted it in the *Congressional Record*, forcing Fulbright himself to follow suit. The Establishment, which had hitherto behaved as if the issue did not exist, suddenly unleashed its counter-arguments. The Memorandum, it was asserted, was simply intended to keep the military "out of politics" and to crack down on "extremists" appearing at the seminars. As Senator Karl Mundt observed, however, Fulbright had had no objection when the military sought to enter "politics" by another door—when, e.g., Lt. Gen. James Gavin and others indicted the performance of the Eisenhower Administration. At that time, Fulbright commented: "Their Commander-in-Chief complains that 'too many generals have all sorts of ideas.' Yet mankind moves on ideas. Men with ideas are the makers and shakers of the world. The larger their number serving the country, the more fruitful and vigorous the country."⁸ And Fulbright added: "I have read many of the statements made by some of our great generals . . . and they have persuaded me that they are correct."⁹ In short, it was all right for generals to speak out on issues so long as what they said agreed with the views of J. W. Fulbright.*

* In the 1963 debate over the nuclear test ban treaty, Fulbright reversed his field yet once more. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had said the treaty had "military disadvantages," but "political advantages." Their views on the

Further, the argument that the dispute had nothing to do with Communism *per se*, but only with keeping the military "out of politics," was thoroughly refuted by the systematic censorship of *anti-Communist* phrases. It is obviously not a matter of politics for a military man to say Communists are Communists. Yet, under State Department blue pencils, these were the phrases removed from speeches. What does the phrase, "Communist conspiracy directed toward absolute domination of the world,"¹⁰ have to do with politics? Or "the Communist challenge"? or "the critical challenges of Communism"?

The muzzling effort, clearly, was directed at removing material offensive to the Communists in Moscow, but hardly offensive to any American, whatever his politics. Accordingly, the Kennedy officials fell back to a second line of defense. The phrases had been deleted, said Under Secretary of State George Ball, during periods of international stress, when "relations between the United States and the Communist bloc were in a particularly sensitive and critical state."¹¹ The idea was that the Kennedy regime did not want military men saying things which would, in these delicate intervals, offend the Communists. This alibi was also exploded by Thurmond. The Senator's insertions in the *Congressional Record* showed censorship of material unfriendly to the Communists took place continuously—not during isolated episodes.

Thurmond said:

The censored actions which are now in the record demonstrate clearly that the 'sensitive negotiations' reason will not suffice to justify the deletions. Two specific examples have been given as instances of sensitive negotiations. The first concerned the release of the RB-47 Fliers. Those fliers were released on January 25, 1961, and indeed, were back in Washington on January 27, 1961.

political gain from the treaty, Fulbright said, should be convincing to any senator. Senator Thurmond was not long in recalling Fulbright's 1961 aversion to military ventures in "political" questions.

The other sensitive negotiation which has been cited was the Vienna conference between the President and Khrushchev which commenced on June 4, 1961.¹²

Yet numerous deletions were made from speeches *after* the release of the fliers, and well before Kennedy departed for Vienna. Hostile references to Khrushchev were crossed out of military remarks on February 14, March 18, April 12, April 20, April 21, and May 11. Moreover, similar deletions were made after Kennedy returned from Vienna, in July and August of 1961. Thurmond commented: "... it is apparent that the censors used the sensitive negotiations when possible to explain the deletion or change of statements on the subject of Communism and the cold war. They deleted the same type of materials, however, with a high degree of consistency when they had no pretense of the existence of any sensitive negotiations."¹³

That the censorship was aimed, not at protecting "sensitive negotiations," but simply at a general policy of conciliating the Communists—and cracking down on our own military men to do it—was made clear by the various comments of the State Department, as relayed to the Senate by Under Secretary Ball. For example, in deleting a reference to Khrushchev's shoe-pounding at the U.N., the Department commented: "*It was the policy of the United States not to conduct personel attacks against high-ranking foreign officials.*"¹⁴ Reference to Khrushchev's "we will bury you" statement was removed from one speech on this pretext: "The State Department reviewer suggested omitting this quotation since Khrushchev had explained that if he made this remark, what it referred to was the inevitability of the triumph of Communism, not the military destruction of the United States."¹⁵ Thus, on the strength of Khrushchev's "explanation", which explains nothing, a United States military officer was muzzled.

Other comments: "References to a policy of liberation of

the satellite nations of Eastern Europe were considered inadvisable.”¹⁶ And: “Statements by a military officer could have been used to cast doubt on the sincerity and good faith of the President’s expressed desire to try to seek an accommodation with the Soviet Union.”¹⁷

The Fulbright Memorandum had played variations on the same theme, saying: “In the long run, it is quite possible that the principal problem of leadership will be, if it is not already, to restrain the desire of the people to hit the Communists with everything we’ve got, particularly if there are more Cubas and Laos (*sic*).”¹⁸ And: “Fundamentally, it is believed that the American people have little, if any, need to be alerted to the menace of the cold war.”¹⁹ Rather, it says, the people must be educated to the “true nature” of the cold war—an education, presumably, aimed at keeping them from wanting to “hit the Communists with everything we’ve got.” Military leaders, of course, cannot understand this kind of thing, and for that reason have to be silenced. As Fulbright’s Memo put it: “There is little in the education, training or experience of most military officers to equip them with the balance of judgment necessary to put their own ultimate solutions into proper perspective in the President’s total strategy for the nuclear age.”²⁰ In other words, men trained to believe in victory are not “equipped” to understand appeasement.

As Thurmond pressed on, the Establishment came up with yet another version of what it was doing. By keeping the military “out of politics,” the argument ran, the New Frontier was simply abiding by the precepts of the American Constitution, which vests control over military affairs in the hands of civilian officials. The real issue, the Establishment decided, was “civilian control” and whether we were, by gadfry, going to have constitutional government in this country, or military usurpation—like in France!

All very well. Let us always be careful, in dealing with the

military as with other matters, to abide by the letter and spirit of the Constitution. But what in fact does the Constitution say on this subject? It indeed specifies that control over the military shall be vested in civilians—and it even designates the civilians who are to be in charge, namely, those who sit in the United States Congress. The Congress is entrusted with various responsibilities concerning the military, including the responsibility “to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces,” and “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.”²¹

Yet when these civilians thus entrusted with the superintendence of the military attempted to look into the matter of censorship and muzzling, the advocates of constitutional civilian control would have none of it. Called before the Senate Armed Services Committee and asked to reveal who had been erasing anti-Communism from the rhetoric of America's military leaders, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara refused, claiming “executive privilege.” He and President Kennedy had determined that the body of civilians who have constitutional mandate in these matters should be denied such information.

All of which served effectively to underline the hypocrisy of the “civilian control” argument. The censorship had nothing to do with civil vs. military prerogatives: It had everything to do with hard vs. soft policies on the issue of Communism, and the desire of the Establishment to silence those who disagreed with its own particular views. Thus two acts of suppression were committed: Officers were muzzled, and information was denied to Congress concerning responsibility for the muzzling. And, needless to add, Establishment civil libertarians uttered no audible word of protest.

►► 8. *Managing the News*

WHEN THE GOVERNMENT of a once-free society begins to take on authoritarian airs, there is no better corrective than the truth. If the voters are fully and regularly informed of what is going on, they can take steps to put things right at the next election. For those who would consolidate total power, therefore, it is essential to control the circuits of information. This brings us to that final stronghold of "civil liberties," freedom of the press.

The independent press is a boon of liberty which, the Establishment says, should be inviolate. Yet the imperatives of the Liberal program, leading to the several malfeasances we have examined, draw Liberalism inexorably toward control of the press as well. Unfriendly articles in the newspapers, *exposés* on television, radio facilities available to the opposition—all these could stir up resentment, and trouble. They therefore must be brought under Establishment jurisdiction.

In some part, this problem is taken care of by the fact that many segments of the media are already suffused with Liberalism, so that only perfunctory attention is paid to Liberal misdoings in government and a great deal of attention is paid to conservative misdoings outside of government. As in the case of the Kennedy assassination and the 1964 presidential campaign, the predispositions of the media tend to help the governmental Establishment along. The effort of Johnson aides Clifford and Fortas to kill the Jenkins story is indicative of Establishment temper in such matters; and the apparent willingness of certain editors to go along with the suppression is indicative of how successful the Establishment can sometimes be. Would the same editors attempt to suppress a story of such magnitude if it concerned Goldwater rather than Johnson?

A similar willingness to suppress one side of the record was evident in the "equal time" controversy during the campaign, when Johnson appeared on television to "explain" leadership changes in the Soviet Union and the detonation of an atomic device inside Red China. When Goldwater applied for equal time, the Federal Communications Commission turned him down. The three television networks also declined Goldwater's request, although they had made time available to Adlai Stevenson, who had also been turned down by the FCC in a parallel situation in 1956. Again, the desire of the Establishment to cut off opposition views was apparent, as was the willingness of some of the media, in this case all three national TV networks, to go along with that design.

There are nevertheless many newsmen and electronic journalists more interested in reporting the facts than in ideological apple-polishing. When a big story comes along, such newsmen, whatever their politics, are eager to convey it to the public. The governmental Establishment, not content with the more than even break it consistently gets from the

media, finds this unacceptable. It therefore sets about to suppress stories, disguise facts, and browbeat unfriendly newsmen.

During the 1960 campaign, John Kennedy declaimed: "... I want to be a President who has the confidence of the people and who takes the people into his confidence; who lets them know what he is doing and where we are going, who is for his program and who is against."¹ That statement suggested that the new President, when he took office, would follow an open-handed policy toward the reporters who supply the people with their information.

It soon became apparent, however, that "freedom of information" in the Kennedy conception was subject to variable meanings. As beneficiary of an excellent press, the New Frontier glowed its approval; but let an unfriendly article appear and reporters were given a dressing-down comparable to that accorded Roger Blough. The new Liberal regime, it developed, was not much interested in supplying information to the press impartially; it saw the press instead as an instrument with which to shape its "image," ventilate its opinions, and advance its programs.

To this end, the administration deployed the tandem incentives of carrot-and-stick. Reporters considered "friendly" were petted and supplied with propitious "leaks." Unfriendly or merely indifferent reporters were denied information and bawled out for their indiscretions. Additionally, the Kennedy regime concealed information from the press generally, and sought to shape stories—particularly those in specialized publications dealing with the armed services—to fit its policies.

In 1963, the Freedom of Information Committee of the American Society of newspaper editors severely criticized the New Frontier's news policy. Among the items singled out were "information from official sources that distorted the true picture of the Cuban crisis," and "a clamp-down in the

Pentagon and the State Department on access to news sources.”² The committee also took note of a dispute “as to whether a government press spokesman has an inherent right to deceive the people if he feels that it would be in the interest of national security”; and scored “‘executive privilege’ as exercised by the Kennedy administration to withhold information from Congress and the people.”³

The report added that “administration press spokesmen have been forceful in their denials that the public has been denied legitimate information because of ‘news management.’ They have been less successful in refuting hard evidence that some of their information was purposely distorted for purposes of propaganda deception.”⁴ And: “The Kennedy administration, as with past administrations, continued to exercise a policy of executive privilege to suppress information.”⁵ Examples cited in this connection were the hearings on military muzzling, and the appearance of State Department Policy Planning chief W. W. Rostow in connection with his thesis that Moscow is “mellowing.”

ASNE official Lee Hills of the Knight newspapers and Freedom of Information chairman John Colburn submitted this statement to the Government Information Subcommittee of the House of Representatives: “Today the press and the people throughout the country are most concerned by the statements of the Defense Department spokesman that in times of crisis . . . news will be used as a weapon of propaganda warfare; that it’s also an inherent right of the government to lie if necessary under threat of nuclear attack. This is a philosophy of totalitarianism, utterly foreign to our American precepts. Congress, through this committee, must determine whether this is to be a continuing policy.”⁶

The “utterly foreign” philosophy referred to had been formulated by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Arthur Sylvester. *The New York Times*, under the headline “U.S. Aide Defends Lying to Nation,” reported

Sylvester had told the New York Chapter of Sigma Delta Chi, in the *Times*' paraphrase, that "when a nation's security is threatened, as that of the United States was during the recent Cuban crisis, that nation's leaders are justified in telling lies to its people."⁷ The direct Sylvester quote, as recorded by the Associated Press, was: "It is basic throughout history, that it is the government's right, and therefore the people's right, inherent if necessary, to lie to save itself. This seems to me basic."⁸

As the ASNE commentary suggests, criticism of Kennedy news policies was widely expressed in journalistic circles. In a poll of Washington correspondents conducted by *Newsweek* magazine, 29 respondents said the New Frontier "worked harder" at news management than did the Eisenhower regime, compared to 3 who held the reverse opinion. And on the basis of "fairness and competence," 28 respondents said Ike's press chief James Hagerty rated over Pierre Salinger, compared to 7 who thought Salinger the better of the two.⁹ Two *New York Times* correspondents were particularly critical of the Kennedy press technique. Arthur Krock of that newspaper wrote:

"1. A news management policy not only exists, but, in the form of direct and deliberate action, has been enforced more cynically and boldly than by any previous administration in a period when the United States was not in a war or without visible means of regression from the verge of war.

"2. In the form of indirect but equally deliberate action, the policy has been much more effective than direct action in coloring the several facets of public information, because it has been employed with subtlety and imagination for which there is no historic parallel known to me."¹⁰

The *Times*' military analyst, Hanson Baldwin, issued a similar complaint, charging "FBI agents have been employed in at least half a dozen separate instances in the past two years in investigations of the sources of news stories."¹¹

The magazine *Aviation Week* commented, concerning news in its own particular field: "Review of information for security has become almost a one-man affair in the Pentagon. Even relatively minor questions must now go to the office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public affairs Arthur Sylvester for a ruling. Speeches are confined largely to non-controversial material, with little or no reference to the Communist threat permitted."¹²

Reporter Fletcher Knebel, writing in *Look* magazine, said "the Washington press corps has taken almost as many lumps in 19 months of Kennedy rule as during the three previous administrations put together."¹³ The three previous administrations—Eisenhower, Truman, and Roosevelt—dated back 30 years, to 1933. Knebel supported his assertion with the following examples:

Kennedy personally has called down at least six Washington correspondents either for their writings or for their publications.

Three Kennedy Administration officials have threatened to sue newspapers.

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy has reproved at least four newspapermen for stories he disliked.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation questioned six newspapermen in connection with stories concerning policies of the Kennedy administration.

Pentagon security officials quizzed three correspondents.

The White House cancelled 22 subscriptions to the *New York Herald Tribune*.

White House Special Counsel Theodore C. Sorenson has reprimanded some newspapermen.

Administration officials, reporters charge, put 'the freeze' on some reporters who had offended them.

White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger has rebuked about a dozen reporters for their stories.

White House aide Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., a Pulitzer Prize historian, called one columnist 'an idiot.'

Even the Kennedy women have gotten into the act. Ethel Kennedy, wife of the Attorney General, and Mrs. Jean Smith, sister of the President, braced one correspondent for his story about dunkings in the Bob Kennedy pool.¹⁴

Robert Spivack, a Liberal writer for the New York *Herald Tribune*, commented on the celebrated move to cancel that newspaper, along with certain other aspects of Kennedy press treatment. "The summary firing of competent Jack Romagna as chief White House stenographer," Spivack said, "after 21 years of faithful service to Presidents Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower seemed a brutal action. [Romagna was fired after noting on a presidential statement that it had been dictated from the White House swimming pool.]

"The President's decision to cancel not only his own subscription to the New York *Herald Tribune*, but 21 other subscriptions, could only leave the impression that he is now deciding the reading habits of his associates.

"There is a joke making the rounds in Washington these days. 'President Kennedy,' it goes, 'firmly believes in the right to dissent. In fact, he will tell you what you can dissent about.' . . ." ¹⁵

Spivack also commented on the administration's techniques of persuasion: "Unfortunately, when a President honors some reporters with his presence, or with a story, they fall all over themselves. They even assume their assignment is henceforth to defend the man's every action and to protect him from hostile questions. This leads, as it has in the Kennedy administration, to an unhealthy relationship. Thus many newspapermen did not protest the midnight calls from G-men to reporters who were covering a phase of the big steel story. The President compounded that blunder by trying to laugh it off . . .

"Although there were heated discussions by newsmen in the outer hall [at Kennedy's latest news conference] about

the Romagna and *Herald Tribune* episodes, when they came into the conference auditorium not one of the regulars asked a question about either. Whether it was the presence of the cameras, or the experience of previous complaints from the White House, or the grim look on Mr. Kennedy's face, they blew the big stories."¹⁶

Thus "the stick"—intended to make Washington reporters think twice before writing dispatches which displeased the President or those around him.

There was also the carrot, which consisted, among other things, of endless wooing of the press, pats on the back for "objective" stories, exclusives to the favorites. These tactics were designed to get a congenial play for the stories the New Frontier wanted used. An example was the "briefing" held by Presidential aides Sorenson and Lawrence O'Brien in September, 1961. Unfavorable reporters were not invited, since the object was to float a background story telling how successful Kennedy had been in getting legislation through his first session of Congress. Sorenson and O'Brien produced a memorandum stating the President's achievements, which asserted that Kennedy had been three times as effective as had Roosevelt during his first 100 days—a result arrived at by hailing the passage of the most routine and unnoticed bills as "victories."

Similar tactics have been charged to President Johnson. Many newsmen complain that the Johnson technique of holding impromptu press conferences, or peripatetic ones on the White House lawn, severely limits access to the news. This procedure, they say, enables Johnson to cut off questions he doesn't like, to deal only with those reporters he favors, and to shape press coverage along lines congenial to his wishes. *U.S. News* notes the charge that White House news tends "to be fed out to a few privileged individuals" and that "the President uses his influence to curtail the flow of news . . . except on terms set by the White House." One correspon-

dent is quoted as saying: "The censorship in Washington is serious. There is more under Johnson than under any other Democratic President to my knowledge. He has clamped down on everybody in government."¹⁷

Yet another aspect of the New Frontier press technique was revealed when certain memoranda passed around among the official family were made public. An assistant to Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, for example, issued a memo saying: "It was mandatory that the White House be given 48 hours notice before contracts were announced." Concerning one \$39 million project, for example, "considerable mileage could have been made by giving the White House a chance before the week-end of notifying interested members of Congress."¹⁸

Kennedy aide O'Brien voiced the same sentiment, coming at the matter from the other direction, in a "Memorandum to all Cabinet Officials and Agency Heads": "Despite frequent requests, the procedure for notifying members of Congress of projects and favorable action of the administration has not been functioning smoothly. It is not in the best interest of legislative harmony to have Republican Senators announce projects directly affecting districts with sitting Democratic Congressmen."¹⁹

The richest of all such ukases, however, was fired off by one Herbert W. Klotz, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce. Quoth Klotz:

"At a White House meeting of Cabinet assistants, we have been advised again that speeches of Cabinet and sub-cabinet officers do not contain sufficient reference to the President and his personal interest in, and compassion with, the problems which face the nation. Liberal quotations from his speeches, past or present, should be used . . . It is also to be kept in mind that, in making announcements of local projects, the President should be given credit line in the lead paragraph."²⁰

When confronted by the "news management" charge, the

Establishment responds that its actions were dictated by concern for the national security. Acts of censorship and of outright falsification occurred, however, in many areas having nothing to do with security matters. A few examples:

1. When a government investigator named Jerry Jackis was assigned to look into the administration of the foreign aid program in Cambodia, he came up with a highly unfavorable report. He subsequently was fired, and when he sought access to his own personnel records to prove he had been unfairly dismissed, that privilege was denied him.

2. Immediately prior to the 1962 elections, Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz announced that "over 4,500,000 more Americans have jobs than when this administration took office in January 1961"—a statement obviously beneficial to the New Frontier in the impending contest at the polls. After the election, however, it was revealed that Wirtz's assertion did not take into account the normal increase of jobs between January and October, thus exaggerating the number of "jobs created" by about three million.²¹

3. The Democratic administration has refused to disclose the details of what happened in the disastrous 1961 invasion at Cuba's Bay of Pigs. An official report on this subject has yet to be released. The truth about the death of American pilots involved in the action has come forth piecemeal, from sources other than the administration. The New Frontiersmen tried to gloss over the fact that air support was planned for the invasion and then pulled back by presidential order.

4. In the TFX controversy, as *U.S. News and World Report* put it, "favorable information was 'pushed,' unfavorable facts were hidden. At one point, some of the Pentagon's loftiest officials were asked to agree to take lie-detector tests to find out who had given a reporter a nonsecret document that officials wanted to suppress."²²

5. In the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, a whole series of actions were taken to misrepresent the situation to the American people. Chief among these was the repeated statement

that no missile build-up was taking place in Cuba, a line that continued even after the date when—by the New Frontier's own admission—there was a photographic proof of what was going on, not to mention the mountain of intelligence data that had been piled up in the preceding weeks and months. After the "crisis" was officially presumed over, the administration floated a story that it had not come up with its photographic information sooner because Hurricane Ella had prevented aerial surveillance of Cuba between October 3 and October 14. Yet in fact this particular storm did not assume hurricane proportions until October 15.*

The performance of the Kennedy administration in the realm of "news management," by common testimony, surpassed anything seen in Washington before. With the advent of President Johnson, however, it was apparent the new president would not lose the title by default. High-pressure efforts to control the shape of the news in all its aspects were still very much the order of the day. One of Johnson's first acts in office, for example, was to get under control the developing controversy about the Kennedy assassination. When it became apparent the evidence implicated Lee Harvey Os-

* Writing in *The New York Herald Tribune*, David Wise summed up the administration's total effort at news management in the missile crisis:

1. Misinformation was deliberately given out by the White House and Pentagon during the week of October 14 to protect the government's crisis planning. Instead, in many cases, information might simply have been withheld for a few days.

2. A broad, 12-point list of forbidden subjects was promulgated by the Pentagon to guide its officials, and the White House simultaneously asked publishers to exercise restraint along the same lines . . .

3. The Big Brother rule (a requirement that no official could give an interview unless a third person were present) was imposed at the Pentagon, and a modified Big Brother rule was issued at the State Department. Although differing in detail, they were designed to reveal reporters' news sources. The fear among the press corps is that this will inhibit officials from talking to them.

4. Petty curbs were instituted by Presidential press secretary Pierre Salinger, restricting photographers and newsmen from waiting at the west entrance to the White House and to photograph and interview officials as they enter and leave the nation's important public building.

5. The Pentagon's press chief expounded the theory that news stemming from government actions was part of the 'weaponry' of the cold war.

wald, and that Oswald was associated with the far-left Fair Play for Cuba Committee, the Senate Internal Security subcommittee evinced some interest in the matter. This committee, as we have noted, has conducted extensive hearings on the Fair Play group, uncovering the fact that Fair Play had been financed by the Castro government. It is, moreover, staffed by some of the most knowledgeable anti-Communists in the nation.

Johnson moved quickly to avert such an investigation by setting up a special commission under Chief Justice Earl Warren, himself an ultra-Liberal who had been in the front rank of those attempting to pin the Kennedy murder on "hate" groups, by which he meant conservatives. It was openly acknowledged that among the main purposes of establishing the Warren inquiry was to pre-empt the Internal Security subcommittee. The *New York Times* reported that "one purpose of the presidential inquiry is to head off competing investigations by House and Senate Committees and give the public a single report that would command the nation's full confidence."²³ (Italics added.)

Two other examples manifested themselves in the early weeks of 1964—both freighted with political dynamite. One concerned the Bobby Baker case, discussed in the preceding section; the other concerned Senator Barry Goldwater's charge that America's ICBMs were not sufficiently dependable for the nation to stake its survival on them alone.

In the first case, reporter Jay G. Hayden of the North American Newspaper Alliance wrote: "New allegations derogatory to Baker have been cropping up ever since October, 1963, but delayed release until last week of the official transcript of testimony by Don B. Reynolds, a Washington insurance broker. All Senate proceedings in the matter have been kept strictly out of sight. Three Republicans on the Senate Committee on Rules, Carl Curtis of Nebraska, John Cooper of Kentucky and Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, again and again have moved for normal official publicity, but six

Democrats just as adamantly said 'no.' . . . After portions of the Reynolds testimony had leaked out, however, the Democratic wall of secrecy cracked. The full Reynolds transcript was released and it was announced that the committee would now reveal in open session all that it has been able to uncover concerning Baker's operations."²⁴ Subsequent to this, as we have seen, strenuous efforts were made to discredit Reynolds.

In the second case, columnists Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott reported Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was holding the lid on evidence that would vindicate Senator Goldwater's stand. Testimony by Gens. Curtis LeMay and Thomas Power backed up Goldwater's criticism. But, said the reporters: "While testifying several months ago, their comments are still under lock and key. Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.) chairman of the Preparedness subcommittee, has several times sought Pentagon approval to publish Power's testimony. Defense Secretary McNamara has refused."²⁵

One other aspect of news management persisting from the New Frontier to the Johnson administration is that allocated to the Federal Communications Commission. In July of 1963, the FCC issued an order instructing radio and TV broadcasters that, in effect, conservative presentations were not to be allowed on the airways without rebuttals being solicited in advance from Liberals. No similar provisions were suggested for rebuttals to the Liberalism that is standard fare on the national networks. The net effect of this order has been to harass the few conservative commentators who have access to microphone or camera.

The FCC informed its licensees that "when a controversial program involves a personal attack upon an individual or organization, the licensee must transmit the text of the broadcast to the person or group attacked, wherever located, either prior to or at the time of the broadcast, with a specific offer of his station's facilities for an adequate response."²⁶

The FCC evinced a rather specialized view as to what was

“controversial” and what was not. In deciding whether material was “fair,” the commission said, it would examine substance rather than “label or form”: “It is immaterial whether a particular program or viewpoint is presented under the label of ‘Americanism,’ ‘anti-Communism,’ or ‘states rights,’ or whether it is a paid announcement, official speech, editorial or religious broadcast.”²⁷ This pronouncement just happened to coincide with organized labor’s drive to muffle conservative voices on the airways. As the Reuther memorandum had put it, the FCC could, and did, “take measures to encourage stations to assign comparable time for an opposing point of view on a free basis.”²⁸

Results were not long in coming. Dean Clarence Manion, whose program of interviews and commentary appears on some 300 stations, discloses that numerous license-holders have felt it necessary to cancel his show because of the FCC order. “One such station,” Manion said, “declined to air our October 27 broadcast, but felt perfectly safe in substituting a recording by Dr. Walt W. Rostow, the chief planning officer of the American State Department,”²⁹ author of the notion that we can get along with the Communists because they are mellowing.

When Manion aired a criticism of the 1963 nuclear-test ban treaty, advocates of the agreement demanded free time for rebuttal on all stations carrying his show. Given the fact that the same Liberal politicians responsible for pushing the treaty were also responsible for the issuance of broadcast licenses, a number of stations understandably complied with this expensive request. The obvious alternative to such harassment is to drop the Manion program altogether.

Washington correspondent Ralph de Toledano reports other instances of the doctrine being employed to silence conservatives. “In one of Ohio’s small towns,” he notes, “an independent station dropped one of its commentators because, it was alleged, the FCC did not approve of his Ameri-

canism message. The station also told him that according to FCC regulations, every time he made any statement which might antagonize an individual or a group, copies of it had to be sent to all concerned and free time granted to them for rebuttal. In Kentucky, the GOP candidate lost by 13,150 votes in the 1963 gubernatorial election. The influential trade publication, *Broadcasting*, noted how the FCC directly affected the outcome of that contest and loaded it in favor of the Democratic hopeful. The FCC, in the guise of 'fairness,' ordered that every radio station had to notify the Democrats if it ran a paid political announcement. The Democrats were then empowered to demand and get equal time free. The result: Radio stations refused to accept GOP spot announcements on the ground that it was giving away two spots for one."³⁰

Broadcasting magazine asked of this episode: "If the GOP had achieved planned radio exposure, could it have overcome the 13,000 vote advantage of Democrat Breathitt?"³¹ There is no way of knowing that, of course, but it is obvious enough that in so exceedingly close an election, failure to achieve such necessary exposure as this could all too easily be the margin of difference. *Broadcasting* concluded: "The FCC, under its present leadership, is acting more like an arm of the . . . administration than like the arm of Congress that it and other independent agencies were originally created to be."^{32*}

This program was of course initiated under the Kennedy administration; but the FCC under Johnson continues to

* The readiness of many Liberals to employ the FCC's potencies to their own advantage was further illustrated early in 1965, when Rev. Carl McIntire, a favorite target of the COPE-GRI axis, moved to buy a small-town radio station in Pennsylvania. Organized Liberalism was up in arms. *Time* reported (February 12, 1965): "More than 40 organizations—including the Greater Philadelphia Council of Churches, the NAACP, the Philadelphia chapter of the Jewish Anti-Defamation League, and the Roman Catholic weekly *Commonweal*—asked the FCC to ban the sale . . ." Among dissenting voices were *Time* itself, which described the Liberals' protest as "a classic failure to be tolerant toward people or ideas they oppose," the *Minneapolis Star*, and *Christian Century*. All honor to these.

elaborate upon and defend it. A letter signed by Ben F. Waple, Secretary of the FCC, offers this defense of the "fairness" policy: "From time to time, licensees of the Commission and others have urged, in effect, that programs treating with 'anti-Communism,' 'pro-Americanism' or religion should not be governed by any obligation of fairness since the opponents of the views expressed on such programs must by definition be 'pro-Communist,' 'anti-American' or atheistic. We know of no significant controversy in this country concerning the merits of the Communist form of government, the American form of government, or religion. However, the programs in question often do express vigorous viewpoints on the United Nations Organization, the wisdom of foreign aid, how best to combat Communism and a host of other genuinely controversial issues."³³

All very well—but this explanation does not tell us why "states' rights" was so helpfully included in the original directive instructing licensees to look beyond label and form. Has anyone been contending that "states' rights" is not a controversial subject, exempt from the "fairness" doctrine? It seems doubtful. Which means the FCC's inclusion of this example in its original order was *not* an effort to set people straight who thought their views were non-controversial, but an effort instead to pinpoint for broadcasters the *kind of* controversial things, namely conservative things, which should be pounced upon and subjected to harassment.

The bias of the FCC position becomes apparent when we note that it faults "anti-Communist" and "Americanism" programs for attacking the United Nations and foreign aid—"genuinely controversial issues." But why not select for equal disapprobation those programs which take the Liberal position on such issues? Are these subject to free rebuttal also? He who thinks the answer is yes has not fathomed the nature of the Liberal Establishment.

►► *Conclusion*

OUR MAJOR THEME has been the decline of freedom. We have attempted to set forward, as briefly as possible, the preconditions of liberty and the proper functions of government in seeking to preserve it. And we have noticed, in a journalistic way, the odd contortions by which Liberalism has managed to get its order of priorities in this respect reversed.

The first and obvious function of government, in its domestic aspect, is to suppress acts of crime and violence, to insure that its citizens are able to go about their daily affairs without being knocked in the head or traduced to foreign enemies. Under the Liberal stewardship, this function of government has been increasingly defaulted. As suggested in chapters 2 and 3, Part II, the Establishment is either unable or unwilling to address itself resolutely to the problems of crime and internal security, preferring to consign such matters to the category of "civil liberties"—meaning these are

areas in which the ordinary citizen is no longer entitled to the protective services of government.

In other categories which are not part of the chief and most elementary functions of government, or else doubtfully included in that rank, Liberalism is eager to accumulate power and to extend its sway, without limitation or constitutional restraint. It will not suppress a Lee Harvey Oswald or an Andrew Mallory, but will enthusiastically control American farmers and businessmen, lock up a Mary K. Jones or persecute an Otto Otepka. In areas where the exercise of power is needful to the existence of society, the Liberal blushes and rejects the crown; but in areas where power is illicit or of doubtful paternity, he seeks it out and wields it with zest. He would have government do almost nothing it is supposed to do, and everything it is not.

Nor is the paradox alleviated by quibbles about "preferred rights," the special sanctity of the First Amendment, or the negligible importance of property. For we have seen that Liberalism manages to violate, not only the long-received standards of liberty familiar to the West, but its own specially-contrived standards as well. Whether freedom means unfettered use of all faculties and energies, or merely of particular faculties designated by the left, modern Liberalism in its pursuit of power has managed to violate it. Property rights, free speech, due process, rights of conscience, the free press—all have fallen impartially before the advance of Liberal power. There is no conjugation of liberty—always excepting the liberty of criminals to roam the streets and of security risks to consume the taxpayer's substance—which has not suffered.

The reasons for these strange contradictions cannot be canvassed in a book like this one, which seeks to set down an unexamined side of the record rather than to speculate upon the motives behind it; indeed, the contrast between the two sides of the Liberal performance, and the contradictions

within the major subdivisions of it, are more suited to psychological analysis than to political speculation. *Why Liberals* behave as they do is the topic for another and larger volume; our object has been merely to establish that, contrary to their own verbal testament, Liberals do behave in a fashion detrimental to liberty.

While the twistings and turnings of Liberalism in its Procrustean bed of "civil liberties" are cause for puzzlement, its ultimate hostility to freedom is not. Given the basic commitment to power, it is not only possible but necessary that Liberalism, after all is said and done, should be harmful to liberty. If men have learned anything over two millennia of political enterprise, it is that freedom depends upon effective restraints on the exercise of power. The chief business of America's founders was to build such restraints into our constitutional system; the chief business of Liberalism has been to remove them. The Founders believed government was the servant of the people, and to that end created a system in which power, through various stratagems, was *limited*. Liberalism means to give us, and in large part has already done so, a system in which government is not servant but master, and power is in effect *unlimited*. As we have noticed in the "pragmatic" performance of the Kennedy-Johnson politicians, and the "planned economy" notions of the ADA, Professor Schlesinger, *et al.*, Liberalism seeks to transport us to a realm where government has unhindered power to direct every aspect of our lives; these gentlemen want to create an American brand of collectivism in which power, far from being diffused and restrained, is compact and convenient for their own political uses.

That objective is incompatible with freedom. If government in fact should possess such power, then liberty of any sort can survive only at the sufferance and pleasure of the authorities. To avert that plain conclusion, to obscure its relevance, Liberalism has devised all the various exceptions

and special definitions about higher and lower liberties and the rest of it that we have had occasion to notice. But even the special freedoms admired of Liberalism must eventually fall victim to its potencies. If consolidated power is released from the check of alternative centers of decision, there is no logical reason that free speech should be more exempt from its decrees than the right to dispose of one's property. And so, in fact, it has turned out.

Nor should it be supposed that the inversion of our constitutional system has been accidental. The unhappy truth of the matter is that, even as the Founders wanted limited government to preserve freedom, so Liberals want unlimited government to destroy freedom. Not, of course, with malicious intent; but because freedom, which implies diversity and the play of individual judgment, is hostile to the uniformities desired of pragmatists and planners. President Kennedy believed he had worked out a satisfactory arrangement concerning steel prices and wages in 1962, and was infuriated when the steel industry, in that election year, failed to agree. Suddenly, the massive potencies of the Federal establishment, unhindered by constitutional restraint, were thrown into the balance, and along with the resulting incursion on the rights of stockholders and management to run a private business FBI agents were found routing newspapermen out of bed at 3 A.M. to demand what they knew of the matter. The farm program begins with controls imposed on farmers concerning the use of their land, proceeds through the various declensions of power to the creation of a Billie Sol Estes to the outright denial of due process to a Mary K. Jones. Where property rights have fallen, the demise of other rights has not been far behind.

Liberals, quite naturally, will deny any necessary relation between these various acts; will argue that Liberalism's fundamental commitments, contrary to our assertion, are to freedom; and that the matters we have cited are mere aber-

rations—exceptions to Liberalism's great rule of libertarian fervor. And, to support their argument, will note the labors of individuals and organizations—not merely in behalf of criminals and security risks—but in behalf of minority groups, as in the "civil rights" struggle, and even, in certain isolated instances, in behalf of some right-wing as well as left-wing dissenters. In several of its particulars, the rebuttal is true enough; but in its interpretation of them we think it is possible to show the Liberal view mistaken.

It is apparent, first of all, that the intervention of certain Liberals, notably the American Civil Liberties Union, in behalf of right-wing dissenters substantiates the case we have been making about the present tendencies of the Establishment. If Liberalism at large were not persecuting these dissenters, there would be no call for the ACLU to look into the matter. For its honesty in believing free speech should be extended to conservatives as well as Liberals, the ACLU deserves a good deal of credit. But for making such intervention necessary, and for making it vivid by contrast to the general drift of Establishment performance, Liberalism in general deserves no credit at all.

While the ACLU position in the *Struelens*, *Walker*, *FTC* and other cases does honor to that organization's sentiments, moreover, it is less consistent with the logic of power than the more authoritarian performance of its Liberal colleagues. For while the ousting of a *Struelens* or jailing of a *Walker* violates Liberalism's stated views on free speech, these actions are all too consistent with Liberalism's basic premises about government. Such things are not a perversion of Liberal philosophy but necessary and natural products of it. Liberalism becomes increasingly hostile to freedom in all categories—including the particular categories favored by the ACLU—because the Liberal system, as such, is hostile to freedom.

So long as Liberalism continues to aggregate power in the interest of a "planned society," and continues to erode the

institutional barriers against the abuse of power, the logic of authoritarianism will continue to do its work. Intractable individuals will forever not be knowing what is really good for them—as the ADA or Prof. Schlesinger or Prof. Galbraith, by their own testimony, *do* know—and will forever be going off on inconvenient tangents. Their freedom will therefore have to be diminished. In the first instance, this will involve the power to dispose of energies and resources—that is, the much-despised property rights. Since such matters as printed or spoken dissent, political opposition, and even religious sentiment can, however, also be troublesome, balking the plan or stirring resistance to it, these freedoms will draw the hostile notice of the authorities soon enough in their turn.

Thus it is not really astonishing that, under the Liberal stewardship, we should observe such things as managed news, harassment of dissenters, wiretapping, censorship, and denial of due process—in short, the whole apparatus of control applied to freedom of speech and conscience. The Liberal view of government, in its master plan, has created a sufficient motive for such things; in its consolidation of power, has supplied a convenient instrument; and in its destruction of constitutional restraints, has removed the impediment to doing them. Nothing remains to prevent the deed but the Liberal conscience itself, and this, as the ACLU's protests make clear, is becoming increasingly negligent of its own distinctions.

Clearly, the elevation of certain well-regarded liberties from the general decline of all liberties is not the rule, but the exception. The institutions favored by Liberalism are uniformly aimed toward despotism. They amount to unlimited, centralized power, preferably concentrated in the executive, to be used without let or hindrance wherever the wielders of it find such action to their taste. The ease with which such power can fulfil the ends of despotism is apparent; let the users merely *decide* to be despotic, and there is no re-

straint, no constitutional barrier, no alternative center of power, which can be interposed against them.

Consider Liberalism's previously-noted enthusiasm for "civil rights." Even if we discount the obvious inconsistencies of the Liberal view and the political motives behind it, the central fallacy remains. The expanded freedoms Liberalism would confer on Negro citizens—like those they would extend to various left-wing dissidents—cannot be logically derived from the Liberal ethos of "planning," majoritarianism, and disdain for the Constitution. They are the effulgence, not of institutional settlement, but of personal caprice. Because Liberals, for various reasons, *happen to want* more freedom for B'hais or Vegetarians or Negroes in the South, they graciously confer such freedom, even as they are contracting other freedoms elsewhere (and even as, in the matter of "civil rights," they are dismantling the general design of free institutions). The liberty in question is not what the Constitution makes necessary, but what the all-powerful government condescends to grant. In previous cases, we have been told liberties affirmed by the Constitution must be ignored; in this one we are told a liberty affirmed by the Constitution must at all cost be vindicated. Obviously, it is Liberal discretion, not constitutional text, which rules. The people at large, and even the beneficiaries of Liberal discretion, receive their portion of regimentation or liberty, not by right, but at the pleasure of government, exactly as do the neglected subjects and petted favorites of an absolute monarch.

Like those court favorites, the chosen few of the present hour may think the arrangement a good one, until such time as the whim of the rulers changes, or the rulers themselves are changed. At that moment, there will be nothing to prevent all the powers assertedly gathered in behalf of these groups from being turned against them. Their supposedly augmented freedom will then join that of the nation at large in a common ruin.

The evanescence of liberty in collectivist systems is a common feature of modern history. Hardly an "ism" has made its mark in the 20th century without promising someone greater "freedom"—always, of course, at the expense of someone else's freedom and the general system. Invariably, too, the particular freedom to be exalted above the rest has been destroyed with the freedoms it was supposed to replace. That is the inevitable result of power released from the bondage of constitutional or customary restraint; coercive arrangements made for one occasion, like those "temporary" government buildings which were so long a staple of the Washington landscape, often outlive that occasion to be used for other purposes. Power loosed from constitutional limits to serve some particular group may end up disserving that group because in the last analysis it disserves everyone who would be free.

In an earlier chapter, we asserted that the regimentation desired by Liberalism bears a strong resemblance to Socialism. So much is attested not only by some of the Establishment's more unguarded spokesmen, and by the obvious similarity of objective and technique, but by the Socialists themselves. In certain essential respects, however, the comparison breaks down. In its deeper implications, in the randomness of its "pragmatism," its yen for *ad hoc* power, and its exaltation of a single ruler as the embodiment of the nation, Liberalism differs from socialism. Social democracy in Britain and on the Continent is more consistent, more structured, and more rational than Liberalism in America. It does not tend toward paeans in behalf of power or the species of Bonapartism that has attached itself to the American presidency.

In this respect, Liberalism does not resemble socialism so much as it does that "revolution without a doctrine," Nazism, and its Mediterranean in-law obsessed with the majesty of power for power's sake. Indeed, despite the obvious influ-

ence of the Fabians, the borrowings from European Socialism and Marxism, and the acclaim of Norman Thomas, an excellent case can be made for the position that Liberalism is a genteel American version, not of Socialism, but of fascism. That, too, however, is the topic for yet another book. Enough has been said in this one, we think, to suggest that, whatever collectivist "ism" is most closely aligned with it, Liberalism is a creed profoundly hostile to American freedom.

Notes

PART I

Chapter 2: Moment of Truth

1. "The Radical Right In America Today," identified as "the Reuther Memorandum" by Andrew F. Oehlmann, executive assistant to the Attorney General, in letter to John Wesley Rhoads of Philadelphia, July 11, 1963.
2. "The Fulbright Memorandum," placed in the *Congressional Record* for August 2, 1961, by Senator J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., and Senator J. Strom Thurmond, D-S. C.
3. "Report of the Warren Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy," New York Times edition, McGraw-Hill, 1964, p. 49.
4. Interview with UPI reporter Aline Mosby, quoted in *The New York Times*, November 25, 1963. Oswald's statement: "People hate because they're told to hate, like school kids. It's the fashion to hate people in the United States." Those words might have been taken from any number of Liberal commentaries attempting to pin responsibility for non-hater Oswald's actions on American conservatism.
5. Warren Report, *op. cit.*, p. 391
6. *Ibid.*, p. 43

Chapter 3: Operation Goldwater

1. *The New York Times*, September 9, 1963.
2. For a fuller discussion of this dispute, see my article, "Goldwater, Rockefeller, and the Young Republicans," *National Review*,

August 13, 1963.

3. *Chicago Daily News*, April 15, 1964
4. *Time*, June 12, 1964, p. 34
5. These figures are from *U.S. News and World Report*, June 15, 1964, p. 36
6. Concord, N.H. *Monitor*, January 7, 1964
7. *Newsweek*, January 20, 1964, p. 21
8. San Francisco *Examiner*, May 25, 1964
9. *Indianapolis Times*, June 1, 1964
10. These headlines are photographically reproduced in a brochure entitled, "On The Nation's Front Pages," published by The New York Times News Service.
11. *Chicago Daily News*, August 13, 1964
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Indianapolis Times*, September 16, 1964

PART II

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2. Joseph Alsop, *Reader's Digest*, February, 1964, p. 60
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8. *Congressional Record*, February 6, 1964
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10. *New York Herald-Tribune*, December 1, 1963
11. *Let Us Begin*, Simon & Schuster, 1961, pp. 9, 15
12. *Baltimore Sun*, March 2, 1961
13. *Op. cit.*, p. 16
14. *Reader's Digest*, February, 1964, p. 60
15. Introduction to *A Time For Action*, Pocket Books, Inc., 1964, p. 12
16. *Life*, August 14, 1964, p. 26
17. *The Lyndon Johnson Story*, Avon Books, 1964, p. 117
18. *A Time For Action*, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16
19. Victory Lasky, *JFK: The Man and The Myth*, Macmillan, 1963, p. 436
20. See Fulton Lewis Jr. column, King Features, July 1, 1964

Chapter 2: Americans For Democratic Action

1. James McGregor Burns, *John Kennedy: A Political Profile*, Avon Books, 1961, p. 135
2. Clifton Brock, *Americans For Democratic Action*, Public Affairs Press, 1962, pp. 185-86
3. *Ibid.*, p. 187
4. *Ibid.*, p. 179
5. Lasky, *op. cit.*, p. 408
6. Lyle Wilson, UPI dispatch, *Indianapolis News*, November 30, 1963
7. Brock, *op. cit.*, p. 178
8. *Ibid.*, p. 148
9. Quoted in "Americans For Democratic Action," Study by the Staff of the Senate Republican Policy Committee, April, 1958; p. 88
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11. *Ibid.*
12. Quoted by James Burnham in *National Review*, May 7, 1963
13. Brock, *op. cit.*, p. 83
14. *Ibid.*, p. 144; Hartmann, *op. cit.*
15. Burnham, *op. cit.*
16. "The Future of Socialism: The Perspective Now," *Partisan Review*, May-June, 1947, p. 231
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*
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21. *Ibid.*
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34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*

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11. Speech by Admiral Moreell, July 13, 1962
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Chapter 7: Inflation, Social Security, And Medicare

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